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Abstract
This Ph.D. thesis explores the complex interplay between finance and tech-
nological change. The duality between finance and technological change has
long been recognized as a main driving force behind capitalist dynamics and
economic progress. The search for new technologies is a risky and uncertain
endeavor, especially for the ones leaving established technological trajectories
and engaging in more radical forms of innovation. This search is dependent
on a variety of resources, such as knowledge, infrastructure, equipment, and
capital – which seldom can all be provided by any single entity. Conse-
quently, it is well understood that innovation – a main driving force of tech-
nological change – is above all a social process, not happening in isolation but
as the outcome of the interplay between multiple actors. In modern capitalis-
tic economies, not only researchers, inventors, entrepreneurs and managers,
but also their providers of capital are crucial participants in this process. In
this thesis, I investigate how interaction and cooperation pattern among and
between investors and innovators influence the rate and direction of techno-
logical change with respect to the characteristics of the technological system
in which this change happens.
As a guiding case to answer this question, I mainly focus on investments
in the renewable energy area, and the resulting transition of the energy sys-
tem. Indeed, the interdisciplinarity of knowledge and resulting actor hetero-
geneity, the system character and complexity, and the high capital intensity of
the energy area makes it an an interesting case to illustrate the complexity of
financing technological change. However, even though the conditions appear
to be unique in their combination, they stem from more generic problems,
which can be observed in several other sectors. Consequently, the implica-
tions of this Ph.D. thesis, and the methods developed to derive them, are,
mutatis mutandis, applicable in a variety of other technological systems.
In detail, I develop a guiding framework, where technological change
can be explained as the outcome of interactions within and between (i.) the
v
Abstract
research space where technology is developed by research agents, (ii.) the
intermediate technology space where a technological system evolves through
the recombination and -configuration of its elements, and (iii.) the financial
space where financial agents search for possible investment opportunities in
technology space. The six core chapters represent research papers written
with a variety of co-authors during my Ph.D. fellowship. The first two lay
groundwork by discussing generic issues of research on the finance of innova-
tion and technological change. All following four papers analyze separately
a specific and important aspects of network or actor dynamics within or be-
tween the proposed three dimensions of technological change, and in combi-
nation attempt to enhance our understanding how technology evolves as the
macro-outcome of micro-interactions of actors and entities within and along
these dimensions. Where needed, chapters aim to establish an empirical or
theoretical foundation for further analysis, or focus on analyzing the effects
of different variables, illustrating or develop methods to do so. The empirical
context of this work varies broadly, ranging from the cross-industry, equity
investment, the smart-grid industry to the singularity movement. Some of
the attempted contributions are empirical, some theoretical, and some are in
method development. Yet, what all of them have in common is that they draw
from system and complexity theory, envisioning technological change as the
interplay between different subsystems, which are in turn populated by in-
teracting agents or elements. Here, network theory and analysis provides the
“glue” connecting these dimensions.
I provide evidence how network structures among investors – and with
innovators – greatly influence the rate and direction of technological change,
and how this influence varies with respect to different characteristics of tech-
nological systems. I thereby identify how investors via interaction and coop-
eration alleviate barriers associated with investments in innovation in com-
plex technological systems – such as uncertainty, asymmetric and imperfect
information, and bounded rationality. Further, I also demonstrate how tar-
geted investments in technological change are able to influence the network
structure among firms and researchers active in the innovation process. I
thereby provide direct policy implications on how to facilitate the emergence
of network structures among innovators and investors which are conducive
for a certain desired rate and direction of technological change. Further,
this thesis aims for an academic contribution by conceptualizing technolog-
ical change in a Schumpeterian duality of micro-level interaction between
investors and innovators, and demonstrating methods to conduct research
on this interaction.
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Preface
“We have not succeeded in answering all our problems – indeed we
sometimes feel we have not completely answered any of them. The an-
swers we have found have only served to raise a whole set of new ques-
tions. In some ways we feel that we are as confused as ever, but we think
we are confused on a higher level and about more important things.”
– Earl C. Kelley
So, the dices are rolled. After three years, this Ph.D. project, my largest
research endeavor so far, is coming to an end. What a journey. The extract of
combined knowledge gathered during this journey is what you – dear reader
– now hold in your hand. A little book of three-hundred -and-some pages.
Was it worth it? Well, that is up to you now to decide. Yet, as evolutionary
economists we like to not only judge things according to their outcome but
rather the process that lead to them. And indeed, I can tell you this was
a process of struggles and doubts, but also personal growth, insights and
pleasure. Glad to have chosen this profession, I now realize how fulfilling it
can be to dedicate all your effort to the enhancement of knowledge. On an
individual level, i find this endeavor to have been highly successful, since my
knowledge has indeed greatly expanded. On a higher level, I can just hope
this thesis provides you some new insights helping you to make sense of our
enormously complex social and economic system.
I am well aware that I offer little answers to all the questions I raise,
yet hope the thoughts reflected in this thesis shed new light on what moves
technologies, societies, and economies. If nothing else, it might – in line with
one of my very favorite quotes to be found above – elevates our constant
confusion as social scientists to some higher level.
I hope you enjoy reading this peace of work, which is very dear to me.
Daniel S. Hain
Aalborg University, August 13, 2015
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Part I
Introduction
1

Introduction
1 Objective and Motivation
Understanding the pattern of technological change is a crucial precondition
to formulate meaningful long-term research and industry policy, and to se-
cure sustainable long-term economic and social progress. This Ph.D. thesis
attempts to enhance our understanding of a particular facet of this progress
in capitalistic economies – the complex interplay between finance and techno-
logical change. Indeed, the duality between finance and technological change
has long been recognized as a main driving force behind capitalist dynamics
and economic progress (Schumpeter, 1934, 1942).
Yet, the search for new technologies is a risky and uncertain endeavor,
especially for the ones leaving established technological trajectories and en-
gaging in more radical forms of innovation. This search is dependent on a
variety of resources, such as knowledge, infrastructure, equipment, and cap-
ital – which seldom can all be provided by any single entity. Consequently,
it is well understood that innovation – a main driving force of technologi-
cal change – is above all a social process, not happening in isolation but as
the outcome of the interplay between multiple actors. In modern capitalistic
economies, not only researchers, inventors, entrepreneurs and managers, but
also their providers of capital are crucial participants in this process.
While we can draw from a large body of literature on how interaction
between firms and other agents carrying out research influences the rate and
direction of technological change, and how in return the characteristics of
technologies feed back in the way how cooperation is organized, the same
holds not true for the interaction between and among investors and innova-
tors.
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In this thesis, I investigate exactly this interplay according to the guiding
research question:
How does interaction and cooperation pattern among and between
investors and innovators influence the rate and direction of technological
change with respect to the characteristics of the technological system in
which this change happens?
2 Backgound – The Case of Renewable Energy
As a guiding case to answer this question, I mainly focus on investments in
the renewable energy area, and the resulting transition of the energy system.
Indeed, the interdisciplinarity of knowledge and resulting actor heterogene-
ity, the system character and complexity, and the high capital intensity of the
energy area makes it an an interesting case to illustrate the complexity of
financing technological change.
To create a truly sustainable energy systems, the challenges are indeed
manifold. Progress is needed in a broad range of technologies to improve the
way and increase the set of options as to how we produce, distribute, store,
and use energy. This is the sphere of natural science, including engineers,
computer science, and physics. Environmental consequences of our current
energy system such as the massive emission of carbon-dioxide have to be
analyzed and evaluated. This is the sphere of biologists and environmental
scientists. Finally, these insights have to be transferred to action by specify-
ing research agendas, allocating public R&D funding and promoting private
investments in the development and deployment of key-technologies, estab-
lishing favorable interaction structures among the energy system’s actors,
and creating supportive institutions. This is the sphere of social scientists,
one might argue particularly of us innovation researchers. To create mean-
ingful advice in this process we face our own challenges, which are empirical
as well as conceptual.
2.1 Relevance and Case-Motivation
Our new generation undeniably lives in a world where economic growth and
the associated use of resources will reach hard physical constraints. Against
the background of an increasing scarcity of fossil energy sources and accu-
mulating negative environmental effects of CO2 and other emissions, the de-
velopment towards a sustainable, and environmental friendly economy has
4
2. Backgound – The Case of Renewable Energy
become the major challenge our modern society has to face. Its severity re-
veals that incremental, as well as isolated solutions, will not be sufficient;
the world is in need of substantial changes, involving all parts of contem-
porary economy and society. Accounting for more than 80 percent of global
CO2 emissions and confronted with peaking oil and coal (IPCC, 2007), the
fundamental transformation of the energy sector is of particular importance.
However, the development of the green economy also offers potentials for
national growth and propensity (Jaeger et al., 2011).
2.2 The system character of the energy sector, and its actor
heterogeneity
Yet, financial markets are far from maturity regarding the financing of inno-
vation in renewable energy and indicate structural problems, as well as the
lack of a proper institutional setup, which hampers the ability to properly
respond to some critical characteristics of the sector – namely high technol-
ogy as well as policy risks (Astolfi et al., 2008), the immense capital intensity
(Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009), and long term perspective of investments
(Kenney, 2011). Up to now, there is surprisingly little known about the com-
plex systematic nature of renewable energies – especially when it comes to
the finance of innovation. Even though there exists a large body of literature
from the strand of environmental economics discussing the static efficiency
of different financial measures and incentives,1 literature falls surprisingly
silent when it is about dynamic efficiency and future oriented investments in
innovative activity. Owing respect to the pivotal importance of finance to a
smooth functioning of modern economies (Rajan and Zingales, 1996), there
exists a strong immediate need to address this gap.
However, understanding investments in the energy sector requires un-
derstanding its distinct characteristics (Grubb, 2004). The first such feature
is that there is a high degree of system and infrastructure character. The
production, innovations, and technologies in the sector are often connected
to and dependent on other, complementary elements and technologies in the
energy sector. Consequently, changes in one part of the sector are often linked
to changes in other parts of the sector. In many respects it is possible to talk
about “energy systems” rather than just “sectors”.
1Consider Popp et al. (2009) for a exhaustive summary of more traditional economic ap-
proaches which, to be fair, at least partially take exogenous technological change into consider-
ation.
5
This energy system, cutting through many different industries, shows a
huge variety of involved actors with idiosyncratic rationales. First, the com-
panies within the sector and the way innovation is exercised are quite hetero-
geneous. While some industries such as windmill production have already
reached a high degree of maturity and are dominated by multinational en-
terprises (MNE)2 and innovation manifests in a more incremental way, other
industries and technologies such as hydrogen, full cells, smart grid and en-
ergy storage solutions are still in experimental phases, dominated by en-
trepreneurial activity and offering potential for the futures disruptive inno-
vation. Where in some cases both types of innovation dynamics, namely the
Schumpeterian mark I (Schumpeter, 1934) and mark II (Schumpeter, 1942),
peacefully coexist(as described by Winter, 1984) in other cases inertia and tra-
ditionalism of incumbent firms and regulatory bodies3 and normative stick-
iness lead to serious barriers for technological regime shifts (Tsoutsos and
Stamboulis, 2005). Also the RE investors’ landscape is much broader that
in most other sectors. Besides traditional R&D funding and financial inter-
mediaries such as venture capital, non-profit organizations, large institutional
investors, private and public project developers, et cetera, are heavily involved
in determining the amplitude and trajectory of futures research and innova-
tion.
Energy innovations are often interwoven with other parts of the system, in
the sense that, for being successfully taken to market, solutions in renewable
energy require integration with other elements in the energy system. They
are also said to involve more complex knowledge bases compared to most
other innovations, indicating a broad need for cooperation and interaction
among a broad set of actors active in the system. Indeed, in another research
project (cf. Antunes Nogueira et al., 2015) we find firms in the danish re-
newable energy sector to show a roughly double cooperation intensity and
diversity with external partners than their counterparts in other industries.
In conclusion, the world of renewable energy is vast and diverse, stretch-
ing over huge institutional, social, organizational and cognitive distance be-
tween the involved actors. Social, economic, and environmental pressure
calls for fundamental changes in pace and direction of the sector’s devel-
opment, where traditional economics is very limited in providing guidance.
2For instance. the two biggest Danish windmill producers, Vestas and Bonus/Siemens, ac-
counted for around 99 percent of installed capacity in 2004 (Lewis and Wiser, 2007).
3To give an example, utilities can be seen as one of the most traditional firms on markets in
general, what often leads to a general adverseness against change in general, may it be organi-
zational, technological or whatever. They are also often willing to exercise their influence on the
market and regulatory bodies to prevent these kind of changes.
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The heterogeneity and complexity of the energy system result in intense and
broad and intense cooperation and interaction pattern among these hetero-
geneous actors.
2.3 The danish case
Even though there exists a general awareness of these facts, national gov-
ernments around the world show varying ambitions and efforts towards the
creation of sustainable energy systems. With the highest worldwide share of
renewable energy in domestic generation, a strong national knowledge base,
and ambitious targets for the future, Denmark can be seen as one of the pi-
oneering countries in this field. In his opening speech to the parliament in
October 2006, the Danish Prime Minister announced the long-term target of
total independence of fossil fuels and nuclear energy by 2050. A large re-
search project conducted by the Danish Association of Engineers (IDA) con-
firmed the physical and technical long-term feasibility of an energy system
completely based on renewable resources (Lund and Mathiesen, 2009). Yet,
tremendous and comprehensive changes throughout the whole economic and
social system and its institutions, as well as the supporting infrastructure, will
be necessary. Among others, a steady and high rate of technological progress
in a variety of established and emerging technologies represents a necessary
condition for feasibility.
In the latest 2014 danish community innovation survey (CIS), 12% of firms
that planned to be active in energy innovation projects reported that they en-
countered financial barriers to do so. About 70% said this barriers where too
severe to overcome, even in a country with a generally high acceptance of
renewable energy (RE) technologies and board investment and financial sup-
port schemes by the state. This measure can even be seen as a conservative
estimate, since it does not include firms discouraged to aim for innovation ac-
tivities entirely, in anticipation of financial barriers. It also does not consider
firms and other actors in the energy system with the potential to contribute
to technological change towards a sustainable energy sector, but no incentive
to do so. In short, there is ample demand to identify mechanisms conductive
for the development of renewable energy technologies. Public and private
finance is a likely candidate to be one of the driving forces of a sustainable
transition, if understood well.
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Theoretical Building Blocks:
Complexity, Networks and
Technological Change
This Ph.D. thesis is inspired by multiple streams of literature, namely clas-
sical finance theory, industrial dynamics, innovation systems, evolutionary
economics, the sociology of science, network and complexity theory. While
specific literature reviews on the topic under research are provided in the
corresponding papers, I will still use this chapter to introduce these core con-
cepts, which are cross-cutting through the whole thesis.
Finance, Investors, and Technological Change
The finance of innovation, and the behavior of different types of investors,
such as banks, venture capitalists, or government authorities allocating pub-
lic funding, lies at the very core of this thesis. In the following, I will briefly
summarize some key insights from a long tradition of finance research from
various streams. Firstly, I elaborate on a very central theme in finance liter-
ature – and also this thesis – which is said to be responsible for the major
frictions on capital markets – asymmetric information. I proceed with elab-
orating on the interplay between finance and technical change on a macro-
level, and arrive at the more micro-level issues of financing innovation – the
driving force of technological change. In the following, I firstly discuss the
role of the state in financing technological change, and close with expanding
on the decision making process of – mostly private sector – investors.
9
Finance basics - Financial constraints and asymmetric infor-
mation
Traditionally, financial constraints are said to stem from asymmetric and im-
perfect information. This leads to a highly perceived uncertainty and the
need for banks and other financiers to gather firm specific soft and private
information for a proper assessment of creditworthiness. Because of this,
financiers employ different strategies in their screening procedures to deal
with this problem. These strategies include repeated contracts and relation-
ship banking, specialization, monitoring, independent auditing and screen-
ing, milestone financing, and collateral. However, not only are these mea-
sures costly to the financier, they are also insufficient to reveal all relevant
information or compensate for the remaining information. Financiers are
therefore particularly skeptical at the outset when assessing proposals from
firms that either have characteristics that amplify the lack of or asymmetries
of information and/or in the past have been shown to make up a dispropor-
tionate share of defaults. As a result, some firms with certain sets of char-
acteristics appear to be consistently penalized by capital markets; namely
those who are young, small, innovative, and mainly based on intangible as-
sets (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Carreira
and Silva, 2010, e.g.). At the same time, exactly these firms are repeatedly
mentioned as those who are meant to carry much of the future growth of the
economy, both in terms of employment growth (Acs et al., 2004) and static
and dynamic efficiency of the economic system (Audretsch, 1995, 2006).
Finance and technological change
The pivotal role of finance in facilitating innovation and propelling techno-
logical change is already emphasized in the work of Schumpeter (1942), who
claims innovations based on credit creation as the force behind capitalist dy-
namics. However, it has also been recognized that investments in innovation
appear to be substantially different from other forms of investments (Hall,
2010; Hall and Lerner, 2009). Early work (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959) com-
monly associates innovation and technological progress with investments in
R&D and also argue that knowledge spillovers lead to incomplete appropri-
ation of their results. This decreases firm/investors incentives to carry out
such investments. Subsequent research during the last decades has provided
manifold examples of how the design of financial systems (Dosi, 1990), the
behavior of investors on financial markets (Perez, 2002, 2004, 2010), public
funding (Mazzucato, 2011), and firm level resource allocation (Tylecote, 2007)
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massively impact the rate and direction of technological change. Yet the vast
majority of research on technological change focuses on the behavior of re-
searchers/inventors and innovators/entrepreneurs while neglecting financial
agents.
The finance of innovation
Investments in innovation projects appear to be substantially different from
other forms of investments. Early work (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959) com-
monly associates innovation with investments in R&D and argue that knowl-
edge spillovers lead to incomplete appropriation of their results, thus de-
creasing decrease firm incentives to carry out such investments.
A second major argument rests on the lack of and unequal distribution
of information. The innovation process is inherently characterized by uncer-
tainty (Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988) but even on a more general level, the financ-
ing process has been dealt with as one of asymmetric information, leading to
credit rationing. The separation of ownership and management has added to
this in the form of principal-agent problems (Brealey et al., 1977; Myers and
Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
When R&D projects are involved the asymmetries in information may
cause the markets to malfunction and impose a premium on external finance
thus rendering retained earnings relatively more important for financing of
innovation projects. Ways of mitigating these problems include repeated in-
teractions and reputation Hall (2010).
Innovation processes are reliant upon and embedded in human capital,
which is often volatile and not easily maintained in the firm. The intangible
nature of many innovation processes, and the fact that they have long time
lags from initiation to returns, means that financiers are faced with projects
where they have poor possibilities to estimate the returns, and poor options
to cover the risk by way of collateral. It is likely that these problems are
amplified in the case of young, small firms based primarily on knowledge.
The role of the state and public funding of research and de-
velopment
The direct funding of R&D in selected technologies of interest represents an
integral component of modern innovation policy. Given the proper institu-
tional setup it offers a powerful tool to directly steer rate and direction of
research activities (Pavitt, 1998). Indeed, throughout history most techno-
logical revolutions which fundamentally changed our society, such as rail
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roads, modern ITC and biotechnology initially where triggered by massive
government funded research programs before spilling into the private sector
(Mazzucato, 2011; Perez, 2011). However, in general, our understanding of
how governments interact with the system they try to affect is limited (Jaffe,
2008), and in particular, the efficiency of public R&D funding is still under
heavy discussion.4
Economic theory suggests the direct funding of R&D by the state as a
mean to: (i.) Prevent market failure associated with the characteristics of
knowledge production (Arrow, 1962) and uncertainty of innovation (Knight,
1921), which otherwise would lead to an underinvestment in innovative ac-
tivities on a general level.(ii.) Promote a development in direction of tech-
nologies with large expected social returns but at the current state lacking
economic returns (Klette et al., 2000). (iii.) Securing the presence of a broad
and diverse set of technological opportunities (Freeman, 1974). (iv.) Correct-
ing system failure by generating networks among firms, societal organiza-
tions, and knowledge institutions (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991).
Investment decision making, incomplete information and un-
certainty
While in standard finance theory investors primarily aim to optimize their
risk-adjusted returns and do not care about much else, reality has proven
a convenient assumption for economic modeling as oversimplistic in a cou-
ple of ways. First, not only the average, but also the variance of returns
matter. Assuming investors per se to be risk averse, given the same risk ad-
justed returns they will tend to choose the investment with less variance.
Second, different investors will have different risk preferences and special-
ize on certain risk-return-variance levels. While institutional investors such
as pension funds usually show a very low risk tolerance and require only
modest returns, venture capitalists invest in highly risky targets but there-
fore demand extraordinary returns.5 Third, a long tradition of research on
behavioral finance tells us that this risk/return assessment is less of an objec-
tive optimization process by fully rational agents, but rather a heuristic one
by agents acting under “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1955). Since the set of
information needed to fully assess an investment’s risk adjusted returns in
most cases is incomplete and the agents processing power is limited, their
4For an overview of the academic discourse regarding the impact of public R&D funding
consider David et al. (2000); Klette et al. (2000)
5In later chapters, I will also challenge this assumption, at least on theoretical ground.
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judgment will often be based on simple heuristics, rules-of-thumb, and intu-
ition (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Further, this judgment is also subject
to a set of cognitive biases (McFadden, 2001) caused by the agents beliefs,
historical experiences, and social influences. Thus, investment decisions are
made based on “perceived risk”, which will differ between agents accord-
ing to their existing knowledge, available information, and cognitive biases.
Besides optimizing perceived risk-adjusted returns of their portfolio, some
investors in RE also integrate social, environmental, and ethical considera-
tions into their decision making (Renneboog et al., 2008). Moreover, financial
constraints are in the financial literature said to stem from problems derived
from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (Akerlof, 1970;
Myers and Majluf, 1984). Because energy systems are highly integrated and
interdependent, these problems are likely to be multiplied.
Even though this assessment is still subject to imperfect information and
cognitive biases, it will become more precise when investors undertake the
effort of gathering a more complete set of information on investment and
context, and when applied heuristics improve with increasing investment ex-
perience and knowledge relevant for the particular investment. Therefore,
capital markets are characterized by a division of labor and specialization
which is expedient when investors need to cope with complex and asym-
metric information in the market. Investors might specialize on investments
in firms of certain characteristics (start-ups, mature firms), deployed tech-
nologies (ICT, biotech, RE), asset classes (VC, PE, loans, project finance), risk
profiles (low, high), et cetera. Specializing on one or more of these investment
characteristics results in a particular set of relevant investment targets and
information needed for the assessment.
Scientific and Technological Paradigms in Social Sci-
ence
In neoclassical economic theory, technological change is commonly envi-
sioned as an equilibrium shifting exogenous shock or as something subject
to a production function with a determined relationship between inputs such
as R&D spending, and outputs such as patents or sales with new products.
A more modern understanding depicts innovation inherently as happening
endogenously to the system it is embedded in. The system’s components are
understood as interdependent among each others as well as with elements
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outside the system’s boundaries (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Freeman,
1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) or other.
In the long tradition of research in social science since (Kuhn, 1962), tech-
nology primarily exists to fulfill or support some societal functions through
direct application or indirectly through derived products. It is thus always
embedded in and framed by a societal, political, and organizational context,
which co-evolves with it (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Work by sociologists
within the Science, Technology and Society (STS) tradition has produced
many concepts and valuable insights into processes of systemic technolog-
ical change Bijker et al. (1987); Hughes (1987). The seminal work of Kuhn
(1962) illustrates how science develops in a path dependent manner within
a scientific paradigm – which can be understood as framework of accepted
concepts, results, and procedures within which subsequent scientific work is
structured. The progress of normal science is usually bond by the structure
of problem-solving processes within such paradigms, hence, usually focuses
on incremental extensions of relationships, the refinement of agreed ones,
and the increase of measurement precision.6 However, discoveries funda-
mentally contradictory to what is universally accepted can sometimes lead
to epistemological paradigm shifts which Kuhn (1962) labels as “scientific
revolution”.7
Since scientific and technological development have always been closely
linked, we similarly understand a technological paradigm as “a set of pro-
cedures, a definition of the relevant problems and of the specific knowledge related
to their solution” (Dosi, 1982). Technological trajectories here represent path-
ways spanning across the technological space delimited by the paradigm Dosi
(1982), focusing the problem solving process over time around one possible
configuration of technologies as illustrated in figure 1.
While such relevant problems are formulated in a societal discourse, the
selection of procedures to address them are determined by technological and
economic trade-offs. The problem solving process towards more advanced
solutions usually unfolds gradually; yet sometimes significant technological
discontinuities punctuate a trajectory, leading to a technological revolution
(Perez, 2010) that alters a paradigm’s internal logic and replaces existing tra-
jectories in an act of Schumpeterian creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942).
The result of such a development – a technological system – can also be un-
6As at its time famously claimed by Lord Kelvin: “There is nothing new to be discovered in
physics now. All that remains is more and more precise measurement.”
7Traditional examples are the shift from the Maxwellian electromagnetic worldview to the
Einsteinian Relativism in natural science, or in social science the Keynesian Revolution over
orthodox neoclassical economics
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Fig. 1: Technological paradigms and trajectories
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derstood as a complex system with a number of elements that collectively
fulfill one or several goals (Simon, 1969).
Existing empirical work to map and analyze technological chance can be
broadly divided in three strands. Research in STS tradition often relies on
case studies, including detailed description of the complex multidimensional
setup around the studied technology, and sheds light on the variety of fac-
tors that can influence and shape its development (eg. Bijker et al., 1987).
A stream of more positivist research in the fields of industrial economics
and sciencometrics is primarily based on patent and scientific publication
data as an approximation for technological development. Research so far
mostly incorporates patent data as aggregated numbers to explain differ-
ences in scale Pavitt (1982), or in a network representation to explain struc-
tural differences (Fontana et al., 2009; Verspagen, 2007) in the development of
technologies across countries and industries. Patent data has also been used
to study invention as a recombination process (eg. Fleming and Sorenson,
2001). Most recently, social scientists have also started to deploy methods
from the fields of computational linguistic and NLP to advance empirical re-
search on the development of science and technology (DiMaggio et al., 2013;
McFarland et al., 2013; Mohr and Bogdanov, 2013; Ramage et al., 2009). In
their essence, such linguistically informed methods are capable of identifying
patterns of language usage in large bodies of text and communication. They
range from simple measures of word co-occurrence across documents, cor-
pora, and over time Chen et al. (2012a,b), to complex linguistically informed
probability model (Hall et al., 2008; Nallapati et al., 2011; Ramage et al., 2010)
and dynamic technology networks (Jurowetzki and Hain, 2014).
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Complexity and Technological Change
Framing technological change as happening within a complex technological
system also calls for a discussion on the research on complexity in general,
and in particular economic complexity. After doing so, I will expand fur-
ther on a analytic tool as well as theoretical concept in complexity research
which has proven to provide powerful implications for technological change
– namely the NK model and associated fitness-landscapes.
Economic complexity
Social, technological, biological, and information systems all share, if any-
thing, the characteristic of inherent complexity (Simon, 1991). The energy
system, crosscutting social, technological and economic space, is no excep-
tion. As the “language of complexity”, such systems are often described
as networks that have a topology of interconnected elements combining or-
ganization and randomness (Boccaletti et al., 2006; Newman et al., 2006).
Complex network analysis aims to understand how large networks of inter-
acting dynamic systems behave collectively given their individual dynamics
and coupling architecture (Strogatz, 2001). Framing relations and interactions
as complex networks has also brought a fresh perspective to most branches
of social science, including economics. Nowadays there are plenty of ex-
amples of how the logic and methodological toolbox of complex systems
and network analysis can be deployed to understand economic development
(Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann,
2009), international trade pattern (Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2005; Serrano
and Boguñá, 2003), instability and systemic risk on derivative (Battiston et al.,
2013; Roukny et al., 2013) and interbank loan (Markose, 2013) markets, banks
credit (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002) and venture capitalists invest-
ment (Bygrave, 1987; Hochberg et al., 2007) allocation, firms’ access to exter-
nal finance (Manolova et al., 2013), et cetera.
Fitness Landscapes and the NK-Model
To map and analyze selection processes as stochastic combinatory optimiza-
tion in complex systems, in this case, how technological change by the way
technologies within a larger technological systems are related to each others,
the concept of “fitness landscapes” has proven useful. In its core, such a land-
scape represents a multidimensional mapping of components with attributed
states of solution parameters to some measure of performance representing
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an elements fitness (Kauffman, 1993). In this fitness dimension, the land-
scape shows high performance “peaks” as well as low performance “valleys”,
where the peaks can be understood as the “evolutionary frontier” – the high-
est reachable level of a certain evolutionary path with respect to relevant en-
vironmental conditions. In the classical model proposed by Kauffman (1993),
biological evolution of complex organisms, in which the functioning of genes
is interdependent, has been analyzed as “hill-climbing” activity on NK fitness
landscapes through random mutation and natural selection. Since the com-
ponents are epistatically related, their fitness depends not only on their own
states but also the “interaction” with their neighbors. The systems complexity
is determined by the number of its components and their degree of epistasis,
and manifests in the “ruggedness” of the landscape (Levinthal, 1997). Simple
systems with a small set of components and/or low epistatic relations among
them correspond to smooth landscapes with a few evenly distributed peaks,
whereas complex ones correspond to a landscape with many unevenly dis-
tributed peaks of varying height. A main insight derived from such models
is the efficiency of different evolutionary processes. With increasing complex-
ity and associated ruggedness of the landscape, it becomes more and more
unlikely that pure local selection will lead to globally optimal outcomes but
rather to a lock-in into locally optimal evolutionary pockets.
This evolutionary metaphor has also been adopted to mimic research
strategies of firms, concluding that with increasing complexity of the tech-
nological/scientific paradigm one is operating in, the more important explo-
ration oriented research strategies become in contrast to local incremental
exploitation of already existing solutions (March, 1991). It is further high-
lighted that increasing interdependence between technologies makes it very
hard to integrate them in existing systems (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). In-
deed, modern technological systems appear to develop towards increasing
epistasis, making outcomes of recombinatory processes such as R&D activ-
ities harder to predict. In order to understand innovation activity in many
technological fields, it thus becomes important to understand the dynam-
ics of these recombination which happen on large scale and with increasing
pace. In the current energy system, for instance, the successful development
of potential new energy sources is highly dependent on how their charac-
teristics, such as their load fluctuation profiles, interact with existing energy
production, transmission, and storage infrastructure. Consequently, the ex-
ante prediction of research outcome in this area appears to be impossible
without immense technological knowledge, a fact that daunts many financial
agents to invest in emerging renewable energy technologies (Kenney, 2011).
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While the chapter C is inspired by this concept, it becomes an integral
part of chapter E and F. In chapter E I take up the task to map recombinatory
processes in technological systems in a network representation, where we fo-
cus on the role of what we call “interface technologies” acting as coupling
devices between formerly unconnected technological fields. An equivalent
in the energy sector would be smart-grid technologies and the underlying
ICT infrastructure, which ease the communication between energy produc-
tion, storage and consumption, thereby offering a variety of technological
possibilities. In chapter F I explicitly model the “search for investments” by
financial agents inspired by selection processes on fitness landscapes. Since
the energy system is known to be highly complex, diverse and interdepen-
dent, the corresponding technology landscape can be assumed to be equally
“rough”. Therefore, we explore how differences in investor population and
their information sharing infrastructure - their network - impacts investments
in technological change on flat versus rugged landscapes.
Research Networks and Technological Change
Previously I illustrated how complexity theory, in particular the concept of
“fitness landscapes”, can be leveraged to map and analyze technological
change. I discuss how one can envision and analyze technological change
as happening in a self-organizing system in technology space, orthogonal
to other dimensions. I furthermore provided some examples as to how the
research space and its population interacts with technology space by search-
ing for performance improvement on a given landscape. Here, I will briefly
review the rich body of literature on research and innovation networks, deal-
ing mainly with the question of how particular cooperation pattern between
firms or individuals emerge and how their structure affects innovation activ-
ities.
Research on cooperation of individuals and groups and their effect on
their activity has a long tradition in social science. Ranging from seminal
work by Simmel (1955) to Merton (1957), Granovetter (1973), Burt (1992) to
recent work, it is well understood that the behavior of individuals and orga-
nizations is strongly affected by the way how they relate to and interact with
larger collectives.
Nowadays it is well perceived that invention and innovation - the essence
of technological change - is above all a social process not happening in iso-
lation (Powell et al., 1996). A large body of literature from all strands of
social science - economics, organizational and management studies, sociol-
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ogy, psychology, economics et cetera - offers various and nuanced insights on
why and how firms and individuals draw a fair share of their input for the
development of novelties from their network.
During the early 1990s, scholars in management and organizational sci-
ence started to focus on the importance of internal (knowledge-based view: eg.
(Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Spender and Grant, 1996)) and external
(network-based view: eg. (Lavie, 2006)) knowledge stocks accessed via alliances
(Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004) to develop dynamic capabilities (Teece et al.,
1997) and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage (Dierickx and Cool,
1989). Around the same time, economists started to embrace systemic ap-
proaches to the economy in general, and technological change in particular
(Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). Here, economic development
is envisioned as the outcome of the interaction between various subsystems
and embedded heterogeneous economic agents (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007;
Pyka, 2002). Naturally, such a line of thought provides a fertile ground for
network theory and analysis.
Since then, cascading research has created awareness as to how a firm’s
strategic positioning in interorganizational networks affects its innovative
performance (e.g. Baum et al., 2000; Fleming et al., 2007b; Powell et al., 1996;
Stuart, 2000). Not only the firm-centered ego-network positions but also the
overall typologies of large-scale innovation networks have been shown to af-
fect the innovative performance of firms (Schilling and Phelps, 2007) as well
as entire networks (Fleming et al., 2007a) and regions (Fleming and Frenken,
2007; Saxenian, 2001).
Research also shows that networks of innovators are, like most other so-
cial networks, by no means static constructs in time and space, but rather
constantly rearranging (Doreian and Stokman, 2005; Glückler, 2007; Powell
et al., 2005), hence call for more dynamic and evolutionary approaches in
empirical innovation network research (e.g. Ahuja et al., 2007; Cantner and
Graf, 2011). Recent studies provide sound reasoning and empirical evidence
as to how cumulative and path dependent forces strongly influence the ac-
tor composition, structure, and outcome of networks. If the current network
structure impacts its possible future development, the network evolution be-
comes a path dependent and endogenous process (Glückler, 2007; Kilduff,
2003). Existing ties often tend to become more persistent over time (Burt,
2000), and preferential attachment makes the likelihood of creating new ties
influenced by the actors stock (Barabâsi et al., 2002), leading to a process of
structural reinforcement (Gulati, 1999). These findings also suggest that - as
in every complex system - the development of such research networks is very
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sensitive to internal and external initial conditions such as heterogeneity of
the industry structure or actor strategies. On these topics I will elaborate
more in chapter C and chapter F.
Sociological, bibliometric, and scientometric research has produced a vast
bulk of literature analyzing knowledge exchange among researchers, both
within and across individual companies and academic research groups (e.g.
Zucker et al., 1995), and investigating social networks of academic scientists
(e.g. Melin and Persson, 1996; Newman, 2004). Recent research in this field
is especially interested in the emergence of small world structures among
academic cooperation (e.g. Wagner and Leydesdorff, 2005). These studies
usually exploit information on co-authorship of scientific papers.
Scholars focused on cooperation among firms mainly come from the strand
of strategic management. They analyze research and product development
alliances with particular interest in their general rationales, their social (Gu-
lati, 1995) and governance structure (Rowley et al., 2000), resulting knowl-
edge flow and technology transfer among participants (Giuliani, 2007; Powell
et al., 1996). Data hereto is mainly derived from large scale surveys among
firms in a specific sector, or literature-based datasets.8
Another stream of scientific cooperation in industry an academia focuses
on co-inventions by utilizing information contained in patent data. Singh
(2005) reports especially social proximity as an important driver of patent-
cooperation networks, and resulting knowledge flows. Fleming and Frenken
(2007) and Fleming et al. (2007a) investigate the evolution of inventor net-
works in the Boston and Silicon Valley area, where they illustrate in both
cases the phase transformation of globally sparse structures with a high share
of isolated networks to one gigantic main component with small world prop-
erties, where some key actors bridge formerly unconnected clusters. They
also provide anecdotal evidence, as to how path-dependencies brought these
actors in their key positions.
Studies of network patterns based on the joint cooperation in public funded
research projects are rather scarce. Very early, Sharp (1991) and Mytelka and
Delapierre (1987) demonstrate the important role of research funding in es-
tablishing research alliances and networks in the European electric industries.
Van Rijnsoever et al. (2012) investigate the network structure that emerged in
the recent Dutch electric vehicle subsidy program, raising the question of
how the actors’ network position influences their probability of a successful
grant application. To the best of my knowledge,Salerno et al. (2010) firstly
8Such as the MERIT CATI database on interorganizational strategic alliances (see Hagedoorn,
1990, and subsequent publications).
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suggests the analysis of public funded R&D networks as valuable method
for policy evaluation and technology forecast. Following this emerging idea,
Mogoutov et al. (2008) combines the analysis of patent, publication, and pub-
lic funded R&D projects, where they demonstrate the important role of the
latter in linking the former two.
However, it is also recognized that on it’s own, all of these data sources are
likely to underestimate knowledge transfer and research cooperation in re-
ality, which takes places in various formal as well as informal dimensions
(Fleming et al., 2007a; Murray, 2002). Furthermore, cooperation between
academia and industry appear to underlie a very distinct logic and incentive
structure, which cannot be fully captured with one indicator. Recently, with
combining co-authorship and co-invention data, scholars started to investi-
gate how the two realms of academic science and industrial research are con-
nected. Indeed, even though the social structure and incentives of academic
science and commercial technology appear as rather distinct, this stream re-
veals first evidence of co-evolutionary processes to be at work. Murray (2002)
opens this field with proposing a novel methodology to analyze these devel-
opments by using patent-publication pairs in the field of biomedicine. Even
though not able to establish a predictable relationship, she provides plenty
of anecdotal evidence regarding the importance of key-scientists to connect
both realms. Bonaccorsi and Thoma (2007) investigate the performance of
co-inventions explained by additional cooperation in scientific publication in
the emerging field of nanoscience and technology. They report that patents
filed by inventors which also co-author together tend to outperform others in
terms of patent quality. They attribute this act to human capital and institu-
tional complementaries at the intersection of science and business. Recently,
Breschi and Catalini (2010) conducted a large scale analysis of European and
U.S. American academia-corporate networks in three science intensive fields,
i.e. lasers, semiconductors, and biotechnology, to assess the extent of over-
lap between the two communities. Their findings are that, on the individual
researcher level, the connectedness among scientists and inventors is rather
large. This highlights, again, the importance of certain persons which are
prominent in both worlds and act as gatekeepers. They furthermore demon-
strate that the connectedness of both spheres may be highly underestimated
by only considering either co-author or co-patent networks.
Most work presented up to now is of a static nature and analyses so-
cial networks in research at a given point of time, while a few (e.g. Flem-
ing et al., 2007a) choose a longitudinal approach. However, there exists a
growing awareness of co-evolutionary mechanisms driving the development
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of multilevel networks such as research cooperation (e.g. Ahuja et al., 2007;
Breschi and Catalini, 2010; Murray, 2002). However, analyzing evolutionary
developments also call for new methods able to capture them. Just recently,
researchers responded to this challenge with applying more dynamic and
endogenously driven models to the context economic cooperation in general,
and research cooperation in particular. To the best of my knowledge, Van de
Bunt and Groenewegen (2007) firstly introduced dynamic actor-oriented to
analyze endogenous effects in cooperation pattern of the genomics indus-
try – where they report strong preference to form alliances with high-status
partners. At the context of the project-based film industry Ebbers and Wijn-
berg (2010) try to disentangle reputation and network position effects where
they report weak evidence that actors tend to team up with partners of equal
reputation. Recently, Fischer et al. (2012) provided the first evidence in the
Swiss telecommunication sector how regulatory changes – here the liberal-
ization of the sector – lead to a endogenous reconfiguration of cooperation
pattern. Finally, Kronegger et al. (2012) applies dynamic agent based mod-
els to scientific networks in the Slovenian research community. Combining
a graph-theoretical perspective with the sociological concept of accumulated
advantage, they attempt to explain which mechanisms drive the observed
emergence of small worlds, but are ultimately not able to provide an unam-
biguous answer.
To sum up, network theory and analysis has proven to be a powerful
approach to analyze and understand how the topology of research and in-
novation network influences research outcomes, and how and why they de-
velop over time. Innovation is foremost a social process, and the increasing
depth of knowledge in specialized disciplines makes cooperation and the as-
sociated flow of knowledge and ideas vital. With increasing complexity and
interdisciplinary of a technological system, there is also an increasing need to
cooperate and integrate inputs from distant knowledge bases, which appears
to be particularly true for the energy system. Indeed, in the latest Danish CIS,
firms engaged in innovation activities in the energy sector across the board
show almost double cooperation rates compared to other innovators.
Industry and technology cycles and the finance of
innovation
Without the commitment of financial resources, ideas remain ideas, inde-
pendent of their potential. Surely, depending on the capital intensity of the
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technology, one can develop ideas and invention so far with a minimum com-
mitment, as is the case with classical garage inventions. However, this can
only go so far, since a fair share of progress is usually achieved by the testing
of such inventions in real life situations where technological and economic
properties can be gradually improved. To gain legitimacy and ease the way
to commercialization, it often is necessary to demonstrate the feasibility and
functionality of the invention in a real-life setting of appropriate scale. Fi-
nally, to become an innovation, the invention has to be introduced to the
commercial market, with all the costs associated. During this process, capital
requirements increase and at one point sooner or later exceed the amount
that can be stemmed without an influx of external financial resources. Con-
sequently, understanding decisions of investors to allocate investments in
the exploration, development, demonstration and deployment of novel tech-
nologies becomes integral to understand and explain technological change.
Figure A.3 in chapter A depicts a stylized linear model of technology devel-
opment, including typical characteristics and involved research and financial
agents.
Applying such a life-cycle perspective on technology development includ-
ing different types of agents, investments and investors offers valuable in-
sights. First, mismatches between actor and technology characteristics with
investor capabilities and preferences can cause financial bottlenecks at any of
these stages and seriously jeopardize the further technology development. To
such bottlenecks is commonly referred to as “valleys of death” in which tech-
nologies “die” due to underinvestment. Such valleys of death are particularly
likely to occur in the post-lab but pre-market stages. Moving them from the
lab to a full scale demonstration project can get very capital intense technolo-
gies and public funding which often funds early research gets scarcer at this
stage. When this challenge is managed, scaling up for full commercialization
becomes the next hurdle – when capital requirements get too high for early
stage investors but the technology risk is still unacceptably high for most
institutional investors with suitable capacity.
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Structure,Content and
Contribution of the Thesis
During the course of this Ph.D. thesis, me together with several co-authors
conducted research on the interplay between finance and technological change.
I develop a guiding framework, where technological change can be explained
as the outcome of interactions within and between (i.) the research space
where technology is developed by research agents, (ii.) the intermediate tech-
nology space which takes the form of a fitness landscape representing poten-
tial performance of certain technology configurations, and (iii.) the financial
space where financial agents search for possible investment opportunities in
technology space.
The present PhD thesis consists of seven chapters. The first introductory
chapter elaborates on the theoretical and empirical context, and further sug-
gests a unifying conceptual framework on the network dynamics of research,
finance and technological change. I here attempt to explain technological
change as the outcome of interaction within and between three dimensions
of an higher-level complex system, namely: (i.) the research space where
technology is developed by research agents, (ii.) the intermediate technology
space which takes the form of a fitness landscape representing potential per-
formance of certain technology configurations, and (iii.) the financial space
where financial agents search for possible investment opportunities in tech-
nology space. Such conceptual frameworks are helpful in a way that they
offer us an intuition of the behavior of systems by reducing their underly-
ing complexity to a readily comprehensible set of elements, their relation,
some input and some output delivered as stylized facts. They further help us
placing focused empirical and theoretical findings in a broader context.
All of the work in this thesis can be connected to the internal dynamics
in one of these dimensions, or the interplay between two. Where needed,
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chapters aim to establish an empirical or theoretical foundation for further
analysis, or focus on analyzing the effects of different variables, illustrating
or develop methods to do so. Some of the attempted contributions are empir-
ical, some theoretical, and some are in method development. The empirical
context of this work varies broadly, ranging from the cross-industry, equity
investment, the smart-grid industry to the singularity movement. Yet, what
all of them have in common is that they draw from system and complexity
theory, envisioning technological change as the interplay between different
subsystems, which are in turn populated by interacting agents or elements.
Here, network theory and analysis provides the “glue” connecting these di-
mensions.
The following six chapters represent research papers written with a vari-
ety of co-authors during my PhD. fellowship. The first two lay groundwork
by discussing generic issues of research on the finance of innovation and
technological change. All following four papers analyze separately a specific
and important aspects of network or actor dynamics within or between the
proposed three dimensions of technological change, and in combination at-
tempt to enhance our understanding how technology evolves as the macro
outcome of micro interactions of actors and entities within and along these
dimensions.
In the following, I provide a brief summary of key topics emerged during
this Ph.D. projects, and how they are reflected in the work in this thesis.
Measurement of Technological Change
Embracing complexity theory and framing the the evolution of technology as
outcome of a complex system has a first direct implication. A characteristic
of nonlinear dynamic systems, is the high sensitivity to initial conditions,
where small differences can yield to widely diverging outcomes (Kellert,
1994), making even deterministic systems without random behavior hard
to predict with traditional methods. Consequently, we are using the right
measure, and are able to do so with high precision. Together with my co-
author Jesper Lindgaard Christensen, in chapter A I therefore take stock of
our existing knowledge foundation that forms the basis for research, decision
making and policies regarding investments technological change in the en-
ergy sector, which represents the guiding illustration case along this thesis.
Our aim is to map what we measure up to now, to which extend of preci-
sion we do that, and what we do not measure at all, but could and should.
We start with providing an overview of current producers of energy statistics
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and the data they provide., ranging from primary national data on energy
production, consumption and emissions to the state of the art concerning
indicators of energy innovation systems and their dynamics. Arguing that
investments represents a real-time economic response on changing policy,
regulatory frameworks and technological opportunities as well as forward
looking measure for future technological change and capacity deployment,
we illustrate the benefits gained by a more thorough inclusion of investment
data for decision making in industry and policy alike. We particularly em-
phasize the role of investors as a linkage between public policy and firm level
activity, discuss the kind of data needed to sufficiently characterize them and
fulfill their particular information need to invest in the renewable energy sec-
tor. While doing such a mapping, we further point to several types of flaws
and difficulties related to getting a statistical overview of investments in the
energy sector, and argue they are not just a matter of increasing the exist-
ing statistical efforts and precision but caused by more generic difficulties
of the energy sector. We identify four interdependent key challenges for the
meaningful utilization of data on investments in the energy system, namely
(i.) the delimitation of the sector, (ii.) the identification of firms and (iii.)
investors active in it, and (iv.) the measurement of industry dynamics and
technological change.
Financing of Innovation
Before exploring further the network dynamics of industrial change, in chap-
ter B my co-author Jesper Lindgaard Christensen and I do groundwork by
first investigating some more generic issues of financing the essence of tech-
nological change, innovation. In detail, at the Danish context we empirically
study what enables firms, one of the main carriers of innovation (Schumpeter,
1942), to access external finance, a critical factor in determining a firm’s abil-
ity to survive, grow, and engage in innovative activities (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). Investments in innovation per se appear to embody certain
characteristics making them substantially different from other investments.
From a financier perspective, investing in radically innovative firms vis-á-vis
their not or only moderately innovative counterparts, is foremost associated
higher information asymmetries between firm and finance, and related with
higher risk and uncertainty (Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988) of investment out-
comes. This tension is supposed to increase when innovation activities are
not based on incremental improvements of existing products, processes or
services, but happen in a more radical way, fundamentally diverging from
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current business-as-usual. In addition, some characteristics associated with
the futures innovative and entrepreneurial high growth ventures, such as be-
ing young, small are said to cause cause further information asymmetries be-
tween financiers and finance seekers, making them likely to experience finan-
cial constraints when seeking external capital to fund innovative endeavors
Revest et al. (2010). While I later discuss how networks among and between
firms and investors might mitigate imperfect and asymmetric information, I
here first in isolation analyze the interplay between external finance, firms’
quality and quantity of innovation activities, and its structural and outcome
characteristics, thereby proposing that not a single but rather certain com-
binations of characteristics and context makes firms more likely to not find
their financial needs met. We indeed find the intensity and type of innova-
tion to matter in a nuanced way. While incremental innovation activities have
little effect on the access to external finance, radical innovation activities tend
to be penalized by capital markets. This appears to be particularly true for
small innovators.
Research network dynamics
This thesis mostly focuses on the effect of networks within the finance sphere
or between finance and research/industry, threatening network pattern and
dynamics in the research sphere as exogenous. I argue that, for the sake of
simplicity, one can at least in the short run assume analytic orthogonality
between the dimensions of technological change. Yet, since ample empirical
evidence suggests that a firm’s strategic positioning in interorganizational
networks may affect its innovative performance (e.g. Baum et al., 2000; Pow-
ell et al., 1996), and the structure of the overall network affects the innova-
tion output on the aggregated (Fleming et al., 2007a) and firm level (Kudic,
2014; Schilling and Phelps, 2007) alike. Consequently, understanding net-
work dynamics in research helps us discussing the impact finance may play
in facilitating the formation of network structure.
In chapter C my co-author Roman Jurowetzki and I investigate the dy-
namics of heterogeneous firm strategies, resulting network pattern and the
rate and direction of technological change in public funded R&D projects in
danish smart-grid research. Since this networks are to a large extend con-
structed by policy and the resulting grant allocation pattern, it provides an
interesting setting to discuss how “policy-motivated investors” are able to
influence network dynamics in research. We here focus on a theoretical as
well as political tension, namely the role of large incumbent firms in such
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research projects and networks. In innovation system literature and many
policy initiatives, engagement of large incumbent actors in the development
of emerging technologies, and especially joint research projects together with
young SME’s, is generally positively perceived as they have the capabilities
to fulfill necessary systemic functions in a better way than new start-up firms
(Bergek et al., 2013; Bulathsinhala and Knudsen, 2013). Yet, literature on so-
cioeconomic transition and the multi-level perspective (Geels, 2002) provides
a more critical perspective, arguing the involvement of incumbents might
however alter niche dynamics, making technology outcomes more incremen-
tal and adapted to the current unsustainable socio-technical regime. This is
particularly evident if the emerging technology is a potential substitution to
the existing solutions (Bower and Christensen, 1995). The incumbents’ ability
to influence the trajectory of technological development can to a large extent
be explained by their position in the niche network of early stage research.
A stochastic actor based network analysis suitable to investigate the path
dependent evolution of actor driven networks reveals that, in fact, large in-
cumbent companies over time become increasingly dominant in the networks
of actors that develop the Danish smart grid. Main force behind this devel-
opment we find on the supply side of public grant allocation, for instance the
preferences of public authorities towards certain firms, technologies, project
types. In addition, we identify demand side effects related strategic motives
of incumbents to participate in technological niches.
By emphasizing governance and influence related aspects combined with
firm characteristics and strategies, we provide an alternative - and perhaps
more critical - perspective on research and innovation networks, and the role
of the state in their coordination. Methodologically, we demonstrate the rich-
ness of stochastic actor-oriented models to answer such questions by mod-
eling collaboration decisions on actor level, and relating them to macro out-
comes of structural network evolution.
Investor Networks
While undeniably important, public funding of research and innovation – on
which I focus in the beginning of this thesis– has its limits. One is scale,
since state budgets only allow to invest so much in any technology. Ow-
ing to the increased techno-economic opportunities within knowledge-based
economies (Foray and Lundvall, 1996) going hand in hand with the strongly
felt uncertainties of scientific and technological innovation (Dosi, 1982, 1988),
specialized financial intermediaries dealing with these challenges emerged
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during the last decades. Venture capitalists (VCs) are a classical - but not the
only - example of such intermediaries who combine their unique blend of
technological competence and financial skills to provide both financial and
managerial support for entrepreneurs in innovative ventures. It has been es-
tablished by extant research that such specialized “innovation investors” not
only promote innovative activities (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, 2000; Samila
and Sorenson, 2010, 2011), but they also provide additional value-added sup-
port to enable innovative products or services to be rapidly brought to market
(Black and Gilson, 1998; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992).
In a connected world where capital as well knowledge is dispersed around
the globe, such investments in innovative and entrepreneurial ventures in-
creasingly are made across borders and jurisdictions, in locations with cul-
tural norms, market dynamics and business practices quite distant from the
investors local markets. Not surprising, attracting such foreign investments
and thereby taping in global pools of capital and knowledge has become an
integral goal of recent innovation-related public policies in many developed
and emerging economies (Beck et al., 2008; Kortum and Lerner, 2000), yet
with widely varying outcomes (Cumming, 2010, 2011). Successful examples
who succeeded in the development of a vibrant venture capital industry from
scratch are often attributed to network-based strategies, encouraging coop-
eration between local and foreign investors (Avnimelech et al., 2006; Xiao,
2002).
In chapter D, my co-authors Sofia Johan and Daojuan Wang a way to miti-
gate information deficits associated with investments over long geographical,
institutional and cultural distance by mobilizing knowledge and capabilities
of partners within an investor’s network of informants (Casamatta and Har-
itchabalet, 2007; Fiet, 1995). While based on micro-level actions of investors,
we mostly focus on macro-level outcomes on country and country-dyad level,
in particular we aim to explain the amount of bilateral flows of equity (VC)
investments in innovative ventures. We further contrast cross-border ven-
ture capital investments in developed and emerging economies, as many
emerging economies have been actively supporting their own venture cap-
ital markets pursuant to the perceived success of VC contribution to innova-
tion in more developed jurisdictions (Bruton et al., 2004, 2005). These same
economies are seeking not only to attract foreign funds but more specifically
foreign expertise as it is thought that not only would local entrepreneurs ben-
efit from specialist VC skills, but also that local VCs would benefit from the
transfer of knowledge from the more sophisticated foreign VCs. However,
underdeveloped investor and property protection, high cultural distance, di-
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verging business ethics and practices, and the perception of corruption in
certain jurisdictions are obstacles to the development of these markets.
Incomplete and asymmetric information issues of innovation finance are
a – if not the – main guiding topic of my Ph.D. thesis. In this chapter I empir-
ically investigate how investors adjust their strategies to minimize asymme-
tries, and how these micro-choices manifest in macro-outcomes. Claiming ge-
ographical, institutional and cultural distance apparent in most cross-border
transactions to be a major obstacle for investments in innovation and techno-
logical change, we identify how they can be mitigated by the investors coop-
eration strategies, and how they differ given the institutional setup of host
and target country. We thereby also demonstrate the importance of explicitly
taking the institutional context of innovation investments into account, which
greatly impacts their quantity as well as quality.
Mapping technological change
Conceptual frameworks, as the one I sketch in this thesis, help us under-
standing complex systems by identifying overall commonalities, rules, and
relationships. However, to make them useful beyond scholarly discussions
and support evidence based decision making, such a framework’s determi-
nants (elements, relations, input and output) have to be quantifiable. While
earlier we provide ample own examples and discuss related work on how
to measure elements and their characteristics, their network and interaction
pattern within and between finance and research sphere, mapping and mea-
suring elements within the technology sphere represents a more challenging
task. In chapter A, we define a set of interrelated challenges for empirical
research in the energy sector representative for a large and complex techno-
logical system, where the delimitation of sectors and technologies represents
the first necessary condition for empirical work. Indeed, the energy area is
vast and diverse, including a multitude technologies from different techno-
logical fields and deployed in various industries. Many of those technolo-
gies can in a specific configuration be used for the production, distribution,
storage and efficient consumption of energy, but originate from and are still
deployed for the same or different tasks in other sectors. This prevalent
technological diversity represents a major challenge for a delimitation of the
energy sector and it’s subsystems. Yet, such a delineation of technological
systems, subsystems, their components and interactions is fundamental for
any descriptive or predictive analysis of technological change and its drivers,
including finance. This challenge, even though quite distinct, is not unique
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to the energy sector but nowadays can be found in many large technologi-
cal systems. Contemporary trends of modularisation and the emergence of
“interface technologies” ease the combination and re-combination of compo-
nents from different technological trajectories, sectors and paradigms, mak-
ing the line between different sectors increasingly blurry. Among others, the
rapid progress of ICT technology led to its penetration of virtually all ar-
eas of social and commercial activity, and the development of common data
transfer protocols and interfaces is said to make technologies from different
trajectory more compatible with each other.
Obviously, static classifications such as industry IPC codes or patent classes
are of very limited use to delimit and map such interconnected and rapidly
evolving technological systems. Common approaches to do so are mostly
limited to qualitative in-depth case studies (Davies, 1996), quantitative meth-
ods based on patents (Verspagen, 2007) or scientific publication (Wagner and
Leydesdorff, 2005) data, and more generic simulation models (Dawid, 2006;
Lopolito et al., 2013). While undeniably useful, they either require massive
effort to qualitatively analyze complex interaction patterns in technological
space, or rely on quantitative data only available with non-negligible time de-
lay, and only relevant for certain technology domains, often underestimating
the context in which technology is used.
During the last decade we have witnessed tremendous growth of freely
available digital information, often in the form of unstructured text data from
sources such as web-sites and blogs, written communication of communities
in forums or via e-mail, and knowledge repositories (e.g. SSRN, Research-
gate). The topicality and sheer amount of such data bear great opportunities
for social science research in general, and particularly to timely analyze com-
plex technological change. Most recently, social scientists have also started to
deploy methods from the fields of computational linguistic and natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) to advance empirical research on the development of
science and technology (DiMaggio et al., 2013; McFarland et al., 2013; Mohr
and Bogdanov, 2013; Ramage et al., 2009). In their essence, such linguisti-
cally informed methods are capable of identifying patterns of language us-
age in large bodies of text and communication. Taping in this new source
and utilizing newest advances in NLP and network analysis, my co-author
Roman Jurowetzki and I in chapter E develop a framework and suggest a
set of methods geared towards mapping technological change in complex
interdependent systems by using large amounts of unstructured text data
from various on- and offline sources. Such an approach integrates the broad
multidimensional perspective of qualitative researchers with quantitative ob-
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jectivity given by the machine learning based methodology. As empirical
example we use the broad area of Technological Singularity, a umbrella term
for different technologies ranging from neuroscience to machine learning and
bioengineering which are seen as main contributors to the development of ar-
tificial intelligence and human enhancement technologies. We extract a large
number of text documents all over the internet, using a social search routine
that we built around the followship structure within the microblogging ser-
vice twitter. Using entity recognition tools from the semantic web area, we
reduce documents to technology-term representations and finally generate a
semantic timestep network of technology fragments. We then use community
detection techniques to identify fields of densely related technologies. By do-
ing so, we are able to observe the evolution of such fields over time, and iden-
tify the technological trajectories they follow. We believe this to be a crucial
step towards a dynamic and adaptable real-time mapping of technological
evolution. We further suggest feasible methods such as entity identification
techniques to link these technologies again to actors in the research and fi-
nance sphere. Having such tools at hand, in further steps a more nuanced
discourse on the interplay of finance and technology beyond the aggrega-
tion of investments fitting in certain static classifications is possible. Instead,
a dynamic mapping of technological change as the reconfiguration of rela-
tionships of technologies enables us to analyze the impact of investments in
terms of its contribution to the technological system’s evolution in a certain
direction.
Simulation
After the theoretical as well as empirical groundwork, in chapter F my co-
author Elena Mas Tur and I make a first attempt towards more predictive
models by developing a mathematical formalization of the interaction be-
tween finance, research and technological change. While we exhaustively
discuss possibilities to model interactions within and between all three con-
sidered dimensions (research, technology and investment space), or main
focus lies on the effect of finance on technological change - the guiding topic
of this PhD thesis. We carefully elaborate on the endogeneity between char-
acteristics of all three dimensions, yet demonstrate that - for the sake of an-
alytic orthogonality - they can be studied in isolation, at least in the short
run. In detail, we develop a model of investment by heterogeneous and
interacting financial agents in research projects on a given landscape of tech-
nological opportunities. Investment decisions are explained by the topology
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of the technology landscape, the agents’ capability to receive and interpret
incomplete landscape information, and their investment capacity. We are
particularly interested in the effects of different information-sharing an co-
investment network structures among financial agents on the rate and direc-
tion of technological change. We model financial agents to observe emerging
technologies on a technology “fitness landscape”, and select potential invest-
ment targets according to their perceived risk-adjusted returns, where risks
are a function of the technology’s maturity and the returns of the achieved
technological fitness. Subject to imperfect information and bounded ratio-
nality, financial agents are heterogeneous in their view of the landscape de-
termining the potential investment targets they are able to spot as well as
in their forecasting ability determining the accuracy of their prediction of
achievable technological fitness. Assuming a trade-off between search radius
and forecasting ability, the population of financial agents will consist of more
specialized investors with a narrow view on the landscape but high forecast-
ing ability within this area, and more generalized ones who can search a large
area but have a low forecasting ability. We observe which configuration of
financial agents lead to high rates of technological change and diversity, and
in which technologies get stuck in the “valley of death”. In a next step, we
introduce investor networks and allow financial agents to co-invest together
with their connected peers in order to pool financial resources and get ac-
cess to their forecasting capability in a specific technological domain. While
we expect such networks per se to be conductive, we are interested which
network structures and compositions lead to the high rates of technological
change and diversity.
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Combined Contribution - A
Framework of Finance and
Technological Change
After surveying relevant literature and concepts and elaborating on them in
separation, this chapter aims to integrate the insights gained in a “guiding”
conceptual framework for the research to come. Such conceptual frameworks
are helpful in a way that they offer us an intuition of the behavior of systems
by reducing their underlying complexity to a readily comprehensible set of
elements, their relation, some input and some output delivered as stylized
facts. They further help us to place focused empirical and theoretical findings
in a broader context.
In a nutshell, this thesis attempts to enhance our understanding of the role
of finance in facilitating technological change and socioeconomic transitions.
Invention and innovation – which are the creation and commercialization of
novel products, services, processes, and business models – lay at the very
core of such transitions. In a neo-schumpeterian tradition, I emphasize the
duality of invention and finance as driving forces of technological change in
modern capitalistic economies. A well-established key insight from a long
tradition of innovation studies is that it is not happening in isolation but
rather as a result of a collaborate effort between heterogeneous actors. Main
arguments put forward in this thesis is that this claim can also be expanded
to the financing thereof. Indeed, literature is full of hints as to how relation-
ships between firms and investors influence their access to external finance,
and how relationships among investors enable them to carry out investments
they would not be able to undergo on their own. Arguably, the impact of
such relationships can be expected to matter even more for investments in
innovation and technological change, where trust and knowledge transfer
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as an outcome potentially mitigate uncertainty and incomplete information
issues associated with such investments.9
Literature on innovation systems demonstrates that for reasons of clarity
and comprehensibility it can be helpful to depict the interaction of complex
socio-techno-economic systems as the interaction between subsystems on dif-
ferent levels of aggregation, with innovation and technological change as an
outcome. Following this stream of thought, I attempt to explain technological
change as the outcome of interaction within and between three dimensions
of an higher-level complex system, namely: (i.) the research space where
technology is developed by research agents, (ii.) the intermediate technol-
ogy space which takes the form of a fitness landscape representing poten-
tial performance of certain technology configurations, and (iii.) the financial
space where financial agents search for possible investment opportunities in
technology space. Figure F.1 provides an illustration thereof, and chapter F
provides a more exhaustive discussion regarding the dimensions and their
interplay.
This comes close to common conceptualization within the literature on na-
tional innovation systems, where the innovation capability of a nation state
is explained as the pattern, degree and quality of interaction between na-
tional subsystems such as the financial or educational one and the institu-
tional framework. Yet, I make two crucial distinctions. First, the dimensions
of the guiding framework in this thesis are delineated by the agents popu-
lating them and their behavior, which gears it towards micro-level analyses
of interaction between heterogeneous agents. Second, I explicitly avoid a
delineation by regional or national boarders. While I agree that many im-
portant decisions influencing long-run technological change – such as legal
frameworks and education policies – are made on a national level, financial
institutions, investors, and investment patterns have become increasingly de-
tached from the nation state and become globally oriented during the last
decades.10
Yet, for the resulting framework to be of use for statistical analysis and
mathematical modeling – as I do during the course of this thesis – one has to
find a balance between how much of reality it captures and how understand-
able the mechanisms are to derive useful implications. In this framework, I
9Yet, even though in this thesis I emphasize the enabling role of relationships and networks
in the innovation process, I also highlight in later chapters lock-ins and other “status quo”
maintaining forces less conductive for innovation and technological change.
10Nevertheless, even though not used for delineation purposes, the role of space and geog-
raphy can still to be found in this framework, mainly as characteristics of links between the
actors.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the theoretical framework
Investor Space
Technology Space
Research Space
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explicitly take co-evolutionary forces and the resulting endogeneity caused
by multiple feedback loops between the three dimensions into account. Yet,
I also argue during the course of this thesis that for short- and medium-run
analysis, it is possible to study dynamics within these dimensions indepen-
dently – taking inputs from other dimensions as given. Furthermore, for the
sake of clarity, I focus on the interaction of the elements within and between
research, technology, and financial space, thereby taking the institutional con-
text as given. This is surely a crude simplification of technological change
which always happens in a social, cultural and institutional context (Bijker,
1997; Bijker et al., 1987; Hughes, 1987). Indeed, all the really complicated
things, such as the collective formation of value and meaning, cultural norms,
attitudes, policy, regulation and so forth, I collect under the umbrella term
“institutions” and assume them to be exogenous. They represent a main part
of the systems initial conditions as well as its mechanisms. They determine
the selection criteria and thereby population dynamics of the system’s enti-
ties as well as the criteria how this entities create links, and how these links
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influence them. In reality culture, society, and institutions are also shaped
by technology, research, and finance. Still, integrating such a multiplicity of
additional mechanisms in a comprehensive yet understandable framework
appears to be too much of a challenge. In favor of this choice speaks that
most of the things we economists like to label institutions can be assumed to
be somewhat stable over time and only change slowly and gradually.
The overall implication and insights to be gained from this thesis and
its provided framework are geared towards facilitating the development of
a sustainable energy system. Indeed, the interdisciplinarity of knowledge
needed and resulting actor heterogeneity, the system character and complex-
ity, and high capital intensity of the energy sector call for new theoretical and
analytical approaches. However, even though the conditions appear to be
unique in their combination, they stem from more generic problems, which
can be observed in several other sectors. Examples are the enormous capital
intensity of the R&D process and the long amortization time in pharmaceuti-
cals, the reliance on infrastructure and state regulation in telecommunication,
and the technical complexity of aerospace. Consequently I believe, the result-
ing framework of this PhD thesis has, mutatis mutandis, the potential to be
deployed in a variety of other technological systems.
I provide evidence how network structures among investors – and with
innovators – greatly influence the rate and direction of technological change,
and how this influence varies with respect to different characteristics of tech-
nological systems. I thereby identify how investors via interaction and coop-
eration alleviate barriers associated with investments in innovation in com-
plex technological systems – such as uncertainty, asymmetric and imperfect
information, and bounded rationality. Further, I also demonstrate how tar-
geted investments in technological change are able to influence the network
structure among firms and researchers active in the innovation process. I
thereby provide direct policy implications on how to facilitate the emergence
of network structures among innovators and investors which are conducive
for a certain desired rate and direction of technological change. Further,
this thesis aims for an academic contribution by conceptualizing technolog-
ical change in a Schumpeterian duality of micro-level interaction between
investors and innovators, and demonstrating methods to conduct research
on this interaction.
I hope the findings of this thesis stimulate further research, and the devel-
oped framework provides useful guidance to do so. Indeed, much is still o
be done. Methodologically, for instance, to further advance the explanatory
power of a framework consisting of multiple dimensions of interconnected
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and interacting networks, the implementation modern advances in the anal-
ysis of multilayer networks11 appear s to be a particularly fruitful avenue of
research. Such multilayer network analysis aims to understand how different
types of nodes in different dimensions, and connected by different types of
edges interact with – and relate to – each other. Indeed, networks within and
between investors and innovators appear to co-evolve with the technologi-
cal system they are embedded in. To conclude, much is still to be done to
understand this co-evolution, calling for new sources of data, new methods,
and new theory alike. I hope this thesis provides a fruitful first attempt to-
wards a more eclectic understanding of technological change as the outcome
of micro-level interaction between investors, innovators, and technology.
11For an extraordinary exhaustive review consider Kivelä et al. (2013).
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Abstract
Possibilities for reducing carbon-dioxin emissions rest to a large extent on new so-
lutions and consumption, which in turn requires innovation. We take stock of our
existing knowledge foundation that forms the basis for decision making and policies
regarding further investments in renewable energy innovations. We point to that
there are a number of challenges related to a true identification of the sector and
to stimulating the industrial dynamics of the sector. Measurement techniques and
data form some of the knowledge foundation we have, but we call for improvements.
In particular, activities and barriers regarding investments and investors should be
thought into the knowledge foundation we need for wise decision making and poli-
cies towards a sustainable transition of the energy system. Current investments are
important links to future development of the industry, which makes information on
energy investments crucial in the assessment of future potential transition problems
and potentials.
JEL codes: Q42, O33, E01, O16, C82
Keywords: Energy statistics, investments, investors
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Preface
Embracing complexity theory and envisioning the the evolution of technol-
ogy as outcome of a complex system has a first direct implication. A charac-
teristic of nonlinear dynamic systems, is the high sensitivity to initial con-
ditions, where small differences can yield to widely diverging outcomes
(Kellert, 1994), making even deterministic systems without random behav-
ior hard to predict with traditional methods. Consequently, to provide and
meaningful results and implications during our research endeavors, we have
to ensure that we are using the right measure, and are able to do so with
high precision. Together with my co-author Jesper Lindgaard Christensen, in
this chapter I therefore take stock of our existing knowledge foundation that
forms the basis for research, decision making and policies regarding invest-
ments technological change in the energy sector, the guiding illustration case
along this thesis.
Our aim is to map what we measure up to now, to which extend of pre-
cision we do that, and what we do not measure at all, but could and should.
We start with providing an overview of current producers of energy statistics
and the data they provide, ranging from primary national data on energy
production, consumption and emissions to the state of the art concerning
indicators of energy innovation systems and their dynamics. Arguing that
investments represents a real-time economic response on changing policy,
regulatory frameworks and technological opportunities as well as forward
looking measure for future technological change and capacity deployment,
I illustrate the benefits gained by a more thorough inclusion of investment
data for decision making in industry and policy alike. I particularly empha-
size the role of investors as a linkage between public policy and firm level
activity, discuss the kind of data needed to sufficiently characterize them and
fulfill their particular information need to invest in the renewable energy sec-
tor. While doing such a mapping, I further point to several types of flaws
and difficulties related to getting a statistical overview of investments in the
energy sector, and argue they are not just a matter of increasing the exist-
ing statistical efforts and precision but caused by more generic difficulties
of the energy sector. We identify four interdependent key challenges for the
meaningful utilization of data on investments in the energy system, namely
(i.) the delimitation of the sector, (ii.) the identification of firms and (iii.)
investors active in it, and (iv.) the measurement of industry dynamics and
technological change.
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Discussing the potential insights for research, policy and industry gained
from this data, I advocate for a more thorough inclusion of investment data
on different levels, and point to sources and methods to do so. Thereby I
do conceptual and descriptive groundwork, broadly facilitating research on
different dimensions of technological change to come in later parts of the
thesis.
This paper was developed throughout my Ph.D. fellowship. It has been
presented in several internal research seminars, and has recently been sub-
mitted to the “Journal of Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions”,
where it is currently under review.
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1. Introduction
1 Introduction
Current policy discussions on binding targets for carbon-dioxin emissions
are based on two types of knowledge: knowledge on the state of affairs and
development in pollution and emissions. This is a sphere for biologists. A
second type of knowledge is knowledge on where we are, in which direction
we are heading, and in which pace. This is a sphere of statisticians and inno-
vation researchers. It is vital for pursuing evidence based policies in the field
that an adequate knowledge foundation for policy discussions is in place.
Hence, there is debate around if e.g. energy 2020 targets in the EU can be
reached if current investment levels continue as this will produce a funding
gap (Forum, 2013; Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2012). Likewise, for private in-
vestors to devote attention and resources to energy in-vestments information
on potential investment opportunities is crucial. We therefore discuss the fol-
lowing research question: what is the status of existing statistics and other
data available to facilitate policy makers, investors and firms in their decision
if and how to invest in the renewable energy sector, and what is needed for
these types of decision makers to take well-informed decisions?
The transition from our current, primarily fossil fuel dependent, energy
system towards a sustainable one based primarily on renewable resources
has high priority on the agenda of most high-income developed countries
and many developing countries as well. To facilitate evidence-based decision-
making to-wards this transition, there is a need for a solid knowledge foun-
dation at various levels of aggregation. It can be questioned if there is an
adequate amount of information available for investors or policy makers,
and it is claimed that what is available is often difficult to interpret and com-
pare. This has implications for allocation of capital to RE investments (Inderst
et al., 2012). We focus on investments in renewable energy (RE) technologies,
including the production, distribution and storage of electricity from renew-
able and sustainable resources. Our focus area represents only one segment
of the broader field of social responsible investments and impact investments,
but we believe the case of RE investments is illustrative for problem areas we
address and has wider applications.
In major social, technological and economic transitions, finance is an im-
portant driving force (Perez, 2010, 2013). Financial markets and their ac-
tors, such as institutional investors, banks and venture capital firms, repre-
sent the main intermediate link between savings and investments and are
pivotal to the smooth functioning of capitalistic economies, propelling eco-
nomic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1996), facilitate transition (Bolton and
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Foxon, 2015; Geels, 2013; Giddens, 2009) and defining technological trajecto-
ries (Dosi, 1990). Consequently, an investor perspective should be an inte-
gral component of any strategy towards a sustainable future (Dinica, 2006),
and understanding the composition, rationales and information needs of in-
vestors is crucial to formulating meaningful RE policies (Hargadon and Ken-
ney, 2011).
In order to identify global trends, formulate policy and assess their impact
across countries, comprehensive and comparable statistics on aggregated in-
vestments, deployed capacity, energy trade, innovation and other factors are
necessary. At a micro level, there is a need to understand which firms de-
velop and deploy RE technologies and which investors provide the necessary
capital and why they do so.
We find that one reason for these possible shortcomings is that both the
sub-industries and technologies deployed in RE are very heterogeneous. For
example, this is true of software based smart-grid solutions, measurement
and management of electricity demand, new battery solutions for energy
storage and large scale windmill production. Since it is already challeng-
ing to identify which firms are part of the RE sector (Shapira et al., 2014),
and to what extend they are active in “green” activities, adequately map-
ping the very heterogeneous group of investors including public agencies,
venture capitalists, banks, project financiers and large institutional investors
adds to the challenges we face in providing solid statistical evidence use-
ful in decision making processes. Moreover, the knowledge foundation for
policies should be based on good indicators and data (Garnåsjordet et al.,
2012; Stiglitz et al., 2010), but the statistical system we have faces a number
of challenges when moving from accounting past consumption and installed
capacity to investments into the innovation and transition of the system.
We further point towards several types of flaws and challenges related to
getting a statistical overview of investments in the energy sector, and argue
they are not just a matter of intensifying existing statistical efforts and im-
proving precision, but are caused by more fundamental difficulties. We par-
ticularly emphasize the role of investors as a linkage between public policy
and firm level activity, and we discuss the kind of data needed to sufficiently
characterize them and fulfill their particular information needs to invest in
the RE sector. This information is important not only in a research context
(Grupp, 1998), but also for political and practical reasons. Potentially, the
quality and amount of statistics may create virtuous or viscous cycles of in-
vestment behavior because investment areas only covered by weak statistical
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evidence may receive limited attention from investors, which may in turn
render fewer incentives for producing better statistics, and vice versa.
We proceed as follows. In the next section 2 we provide an overview
of the current primary producers of statistics on energy and the available
statistics. We include a short discussion on indicators based upon several re-
cent research projects (Borup et al., 2013; Gallagher et al., 2011; Inderst et al.,
2012) on this as well as efforts to produce statistics and indicators by OECD
(2011a). In section 3 we discuss how investments in energy are different from
other investments, and why consequently, particular information on RE is of
higher importance or scarcity than in other industries. section 4 focuses on
the challenges in measuring energy activities. In sub-chapters we discuss the
problems of identifying and delimiting firms, industry dynamics, and tech-
nological change. In section 5 we zoom in on the investor landscape of RE.
Finally, we summaries the deficiencies we pointed to during the discussion
on measurement challenges in RE and discuss how to address these chal-
lenges and whether producing comprehensive and adequate RE statistics is
realistic. Moreover, we discuss the possible implications of a lack of adequate
statistics.
2 Our knowledge foundation of today: existing
energy statistics
After a period of declining quality and coverage in energy statistics resulting
from the liberalization of energy markets, budget cuts, and lack of exper-
tise (EUROSTAT, 2005), a recent increased interest in energy has led to a
rapid improvement of the empirical evidence on energy investments. Energy
statistics now cover a wide range of technology fields and countries. The
increased interest in measurements of energy production, consumption, and
impact has been spurred by the binding targets for RE that many countries
adhere to, and ongoing discussions on the extent to which they should sign
up for these tar-gets. Moreover, RE now makes up a substantial share of total
energy production. This share is rising globally and in some countries much
higher than in others. We point in this section to important sources of infor-
mation on energy consumption, energy innovation, and energy production.
In the fifth section we resume a discussion of the available statistics, but in
relation to investors and investments in energy.
Energy statistics have been developed in many countries to map the devel-
opment of the energy systems, especially with regard to energy consumption
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and energy production, whereas energy innovation is less well covered. Har-
monization and measurement is further guided by the “Renewable Energy
Directive 2009/28/EC” (EUROSTAT, 2013). Some of the relevant statistics
may be found in national accounts; however, this will usually be inadequate
in quality and coverage, and much of the information needed for informed
decision-making is non-existent. The majority of EU-28 countries also pro-
vide more disaggregated data on energy sources produced, such as RE.
International comparisons of such data are important for many reasons,
such as in the negotiations on climate emissions and targets for RE pro-
duction and consumption. There are international organizations that col-
lect and compare national statistics. The Eurostat data on energy R&D is
valuable, but operates at a high level of aggregation, rendering analyses of
renewable energy somewhat inadequate (Wiesenthal et al., 2012). The pri-
mary statistics in the field are collected in a joined and harmonized effort
by OECD/IEA1/Eurostat and by UNEP. The World Energy Outlook, from
the International Energy Agency (IEA), is another example of statistics that
cover part of the field, even though it is only based on information from its
28 member (OECD) countries, leaving out a range of countries that are not
member of the OECD. The resulting statistical bias is illustrated by the fact
that public spending on energy R&D in Brazil, Russia, China, India, Mexico
and South Africa totaled 13.6 billion USD, which corresponds to the amount
of all the IEA members combined (Gallagher et al., 2011). In Europe, 19 of 27
EU-member states are covered in the IEA statistics, which is a relatively small
share; however, the coverage is around 99% of in-vestments when measured
in volumes (Wiesenthal et al., 2012).
While we therefore do have some statistics in the area, there is a need to
extend the focus beyond input and production, to also pay more attention
to environmental impacts. Thus, some observers point out that accelerated
rates of technological innovations are needed to cope with environmental
challenges (Gallagher et al., 2011; Grubb, 2004). However, what is needed in
relation to this is an adequate measurement of how such technologies work,
how they impact to alleviate environmental impacts, and how this improved
environmental impact relates to the inputs they require. This accentuates
the need for a more developed energy innovation statistics than the ones
available today.
1IEA, International Energy Agency, was established in 1974 as an autonomous entity within
the OECD. It was established in the wake of the first oil crisis and had (has) a primary objective
related to improve oil supply systems. However, its activities span a wide range and include
alternative energy sources.
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Whereas RE production technically is possible to measure, even with dif-
ficulties, the measurement of environmental impact and the application of
energy efficiency technologies pose special challenges. Data must relate to
not only improved knowledge on the input side in terms of innovations and
R&D in private firms that could have an impact on the environment, but also
to the precise measurement of this impact. The fact that the energy market is
to a large extent decentralized and a large proportion of RE is not traded on a
market further complicates production of adequate statistics on efficient en-
ergy usage. For example, photo voltaic, solar heating, thermal heating/heat
pumps, wood fuel etc. are extensively used in individual, private households
but rarely measured. In addition, although energy efficiency is an important
factor in reducing total carbon dioxide emissions, as well as a source of re-
duced costs for companies, the measurement of energy efficiency is poorly
developed (Rennings, 2013).
The development of a sustainable energy system not only requires the
environmentally friendly production of energy, but also a more efficient use
of it. Energy efficiency is a feature of a wide range of different products
and applications. Moreover, Rennings (2013) argues that energy efficiency
should be seen as relative to existing practices. This complicates the goal of
establishing a general and comparable way of measuring the application of
energy efficiency products. It is, however, possible to partially measure en-
ergy efficiency, if we measure on a higher level of aggregation. The change in
energy consumption compared to GDP change is a rough indicator of energy
efficiency and is used as such in statistics compiled by IEA, Eurostat and the
OECD. Although these statistics now follow a specific guideline2, there are
technologies that the statistical system is not yet geared to capture, one exam-
ple being heat pumps.3 To analyze disaggregated patterns of energy usage
across countries and industries, the World Input-Output Database (WIPO, cf.
Dietzenbacher et al., 2013; Timmer et al., 2015) could be used as a valuable
resource. It provides data on inter-industry input-output relationships (in-
cluding energy input) of 40 major economies dating back to 1995, and thus
can be utilized to capture the effect of technological change and/or policy
measures on energy usage, and how this effect might differ across industries
and countries.
Regarding empirical evidence on sub-industries, a number of more spe-
cialized organizations compile statistics focused on specific sources of RE. For
example, the Global Wind Energy Council is the international trade associa-
2The Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC
3Which, as illustrated by Jurowetzki (2015), is an integral part of e.g. the Danish smart-grid.
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tion for the wind power industry and publishes statistics on the global trends,
for in-stance, in installed capacity (http://www.gwec.net/global-figures/
graphs/). Another example is the European Photovoltaic Industry Associ-
ation that likewise does specialized studies, market outlooks and statistics.
As an umbrella organization for these sub-industry organizations, the Eu-
ropean Renewable Energy Council (EREC) represents the entire renewable
energy sector and has statistical information based upon national statistics
and Eurostat.
A growing interest in more environmentally sustainable energy produc-
tion has led to further recent attempts to develop indicators and measurement
of sustainable production. These include (Kemp and Pearson, 2007), and the
OECD (2011b). To take one of these examples, the OECD lists indicators for
monitoring green growth including, amongst others, GDP per unit of energy-
related CO2 emitted, share of RE in electricity production, RE in percent of
energy related R&D and carbon market financing. (OECD, 2011b). In total
they list 23 such groups of indicators, many of which have more than one
sub-category of indicator. They may in turn be used in statistics, for exam-
ple, to list ex-ports/imports of RE, employment in energy technology sectors
and development of public RD&D budgets (Borup et al., 2013). Generally, in-
dicators are well-developed in some areas, but often suffer from fundamental
definitional problems when it comes to transferring indicators to statistics, as
we shall discuss later.
It is not the purpose of this article to go into detail with the specific num-
bers in the RE area, as mentioned above. Rather, we point out what is there,
what is missing, and we illustrate two selected issues. First, regarding the
European development in RE, figure A.2 shows two primary things: except
for a small dip in 2011, a steady increase in both the production of energy
from renewable sources and the share of electricity consumption stemming
from RE sources,4 and secondly, that there are vast differences in the con-
tributions from the different sources. Among sub-sources, wind energy has
shown the highest growth.
Although not illustrated in figure A.2 just as there is heterogeneity among
energy sources, there are vast differences among countries in several respects.
4The growth in energy production stemming from renewable sources has been relatively slow
and the share of RE production remains at an aggregate level relatively small despite increased
investments because there are still also investments in non-renewable installations, which typ-
ically are large, capital intensive, and with long operating lives (Geels, 2013). This potentially
creates a lock-in of the existing structures where transition to a new system is difficult and it has
made some observers denote the renewable energy technologies as “niche-innovations” (Geels
and Schot, 2007).
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Fig. A.2: Electricity generated from renewable energy sources, EU-28, 2002–12, Source: Eurostat
Data
They differ in the share of RE in total energy production and consumption,
in the targets the countries have for RE, and in the efforts they pursue. They
also differ considerably in the source of RE, which in turn is dependent on
natural endowments. Thus, by far the majority of RE sources in Norway,
Austria and Sweden is hydropower; Denmark, Ireland and Spain specialize
in wind energy; Portugal in solar energy, Italy in thermal heating (due to
the volcanic activity in the country). There is also industrial specialization
among these countries; for example Denmark in wind energy, Scotland in
wave technologies, Germany in photo voltaic etc. The heterogeneity of en-
ergy sources and the specialization of certain countries in different forms
of energy production not only results in different interests in energy statis-
tics and energy innovation, it also has implications for the specialization and
types of relevant investors and investments, a problem area we elaborate on
in section 5 on measurement challenges and statistics on the investment side
of RE. We showed above that there is vast heterogeneity in the growth within
RE (biomass, wind, geother-mal, hydropower etc.) amongst sub-industries,
but also between countries in how they specialize in these sub-industries. As
a consequence, statistics in this field need to be relatively fine-grained and
may render poor information if used on too aggregate a level. While we use
the case of RE for illustration, this is likely to be true for other target areas of
what is now termed social responsible investments and impact investments
(Renneboog et al., 2008b; Sparkes and Cowton, 2004) in complex and diverse
sectors, such as global food supply or medical supply.
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3 What is special about Investments in Energy?
Understanding investments in the energy sector requires understanding its
distinct characteristics (Grubb, 2004). The first such feature of energy invest-
ments is that they are highly dependent on systems and infrastructure. The
production, innovations and technologies in the sector are often connected
to and dependent on other, complementary elements and technologies in the
energy sector (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). Consequently, changes in one
part of the sector are often linked to changes in other parts of the sector and
the feasibility of new products and processes depends on their compatibil-
ity with the existing energy infrastructure. In many respects it is possible to
talk about energy “systems” rather than just “sectors”. In such complex and
interdependent systems with a number of elements that collectively fulfill a
single or various goals (Simon, 1969), the development of new components is
compounded by the ex-ante unpredictability of other components’ reactions
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Frenken, 2006). This perspective has impli-
cations for measurement as it accentuates the importance of indicators and
statistics on interaction and cooperation in the system. Likewise, it points to
the relevance of what might be termed “throughput indicators” (Borup et al.,
2013).
Large technological systems usually adapt gradually to changing inter-
nal and external needs (Hughes, 1987). However, some features of the en-
ergy system are related to the capital-intensity of infrastructure, the insti-
tutional setup and industry structure create inertia and lack of abilities to
respond to external pressure to change. First, sunk costs and long amorti-
zation periods slows down technology adaption, since existing equipment
such as power plants and transmission lines are replaced only every couple
of decades. Current energy infrastructures in the majority of countries are
formed around fossil fuel technologies (gas, oil and coal) and the particular
needs of a carbon based energy system, such as centralized energy generation
and stable system load. Modern low-carbon technologies often diverge from
this paradigm, making them difficult to integrate. Further, the major share of
this infrastructure is controlled by large established energy cooperatives with
vested interests in preserving the status quo in a form of “incumbent capital-
ism” (Khosla, 2011) by exercising their influence in industry and policy (Hain
and Jurowetzki, ming; Tsoutsos and Stamboulis, 2005).
As a consequence, this tendency to preserve the established pat-terns of
investments in equipment as well as in research leads to a lock-in of the en-
ergy system at its cur-rent state (Unruh, 2000, 2002). Technological progress
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and economies of scale enjoyed by incumbents further reinforce this pro-
cess as negative environmental externalities caused by carbon based energy
production remain un- or under-priced (Brown, 2001; Rennings, 2000). Re-
garding measurement, it has been suggested that indicators of energy sys-
tems should consider this lock-in, for example by including the R&D budget
for fossil fuels (eg. Grubb, 2004) or infrastructure ownership and energy co-
operatives’ governance structures as an indicator of what could be termed
a carbon-lock in. Because the development and integration of new energy
technologies typically takes decades, measuring should not only focus on the
state of affairs but also on the relevant learning and competence build-up
taking place. Similarly, it has been argued that indicators should be for-
ward looking because of large time-lags between actions and consequences
and because of the high uncertainty related to the outcome of both present
actions and technological developments (Garnåsjordet et al., 2012; Stiglitz
et al., 2010). In the next section we discuss this problem and suggest some
forward-looking measures of industry and technology development.
Compared to many other industries, the energy industry in many coun-
tries is characterized by a heavy involvement, often even dominance and
ownership, of the public or semi-public organizations. For many reasons,
political as well as economic, energy systems are important policy targets
and subject to intense public regulation. Even if public policy and regula-
tions are not directly subject to energy measurement, it provides important
frameworks for energy production and consumption. Therefore, measures of
public investments and public procurement of energy can also be meaning-
fully quantified.
Even though the conditions in the RE sector appear to be unique in make-
up, some of the characteristics of energy investments can be observed in sev-
eral other sectors. Examples are the enormous capital intensity of the R&D
process and the long amortization time in pharmaceuticals, the reliance on
infrastructure and state regulation in telecommunications, and the limited
economics of scale and technical complexity of aerospace. Consequently, this
macro-, meso and micro heterogeneity of industry dynamics calls for lower
levels of aggregation in quantitative analyses than, for example, in “manu-
facturing”. Hence there is a need for more fine-grained data.
With the findings in this section and in the second section in mind, it
is clear that the pure definition of renewable energy remains unclear, and
therefore a number of studies focus on indicators Andersen (2006); Kemp
and Pearson (2007). The boundaries of the technologies and the industry as
such mentioned in figure A.2 are not clear when considering their complex-
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ity and inter-dependencies as well as the dual use of RE technologies and
conventional technologies in the same product, equipment, or process. A
number of other problems add to the blurred definitions, such as whether
energy storage, transmission, and energy efficiency measures should be part
of the industry.
In summary, we argue that new energy technologies are often integrated
in a highly complex and interdependent energy system (Jacobsson and Bergek,
2011). The systemic character of energy production in turn poses challenges
to investors in assessing the opportunities of such new technological de-
velopments, as investment due diligence not only requires deep and inter-
disciplinary technological knowledge but also knowledge of the system in
which opportunities regarding new products and processes should be im-
plemented. Moreover, RE technologies are in most cases very capital intense
in development as well as deployment (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009), and
consequently require long term capital commitment (Kenney, 2011). Finally,
investment opportunities and their returns are heavily dependent on state
regulations on different levels, and are thus subject to high policy risks (As-
tolfi et al., 2008).
4 Measurement Challenges in the Renewable En-
ergy System
4.1 Industry heterogeneity
Above we pointed to definitional and system characteristics of energy invest-
ments and the problems these characteristics pose for investments and mea-
surement. In this section we emphasize a dynamic perspective as we point to
different delimitations of the industry in different stages of the evolution of
energy technologies and sub-industries. Again, sub-industries display great
heterogeneity in this respect. Some industries, such as windmill production,
have already reached a high degree of maturity, are dominated by multi-
national enterprises, and are characterized by enormous capital intensity in
development and production. Other industries such as fuel cells, smart grid
and energy storage solutions are in early phases of their development without
an established dominant design, allowing for experimentation, disruptive in-
novation and entrepreneurial activities but also substantial technological and
market risk. In addition, applied technologies differ substantially in their rel-
evant characteristics, not only between but also within industries. To take one
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example, there are very different capital requirements, risk projections and
potential investor characteristics for traditional technologies in comparison
with vertical axis windmill technologies. Similarly, the competences involved
in on-shore and off-shore wind production differ substantially.
Figure A.3 illustrates the multitude of actors involved in the financing
of energy investments as well as the industry and technology landscape in
different stages of development and maturity.5 The upper half of the figure
depicts the actors directly involved in the process of technology development,
which in this model commonly commences in university and research labs,
then is picked up by entrepreneurs or corporate R&D, diffused in the market
and finally commercialized in full scale by large enterprises. Regarding the
corresponding investors in the bottom part of the figure, they are specialized
and ordered according to their investment capacity and willingness to engage
in investments of different maturity and risk pro-files. While capital require-
ments usually increase during the process of technological evolution they do
not necessarily have proportional impact as small investments in early stages
can have disproportional catalytic effects.
The above process perspective on technology development and corre-
sponding types of actors, in-vestments and investors offers valuable insights
for understanding the dynamics of RE investments and in turn for policy
making. First, mismatches between actor and technology characteristics, on
the one hand, and on the other hand, investor capabilities and preferences
can cause financial bottlenecks at any of these stages and seriously jeopardize
further technology development. Commonly such bottlenecks are referred to
as “valleys of death” in which technologies “die” due to underinvestment.
According to figure A.3, valleys of death are likely to occur for RE technolo-
gies in the post-lab but pre-market stages. To advance RE technologies from
the lab to a full-scale demonstration project can require substantial amounts
of cap-ital. At the same time, public funding to fund early research gets
scarcer at this stage. Hence, scaling up RE technologies often reaches another
potential valley of death, when the capital requirements exceed the capac-
ity of early stage investors but technology risk is still unacceptably high for
most institutional investors with suitable investment capacity. Addressing
such market and system failures by preventing mismatches requires disag-
5For the sake of simplicity, the figure depicts a linear innovation and technology development
process, where inventions originate from the outcomes of basic research, are adopted by corpo-
rate applied R&D followed by demonstration and finally diffusion in the market. Nowadays
it is well understood that technology development is by no means linear but characterized by
feedback loops between the different stages (Freeman, 1996), better described as a “chain-linked
model” (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).
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Fig. A.3: Segmentation of predominant firms and investors. Source: adapted from Wüstenhagen
and Menichetti (2012) and Grubb (2004)
gregated information on firm, technology and investor characteristics. How-
ever, because this information is interrelated and not confined to the energy
system, for example the identification of the firm population, deployed tech-
nologies and RE investments, it remains problematic to establish adequate
measurement tools hence a comprehensive knowledge foundation for invest-
ments into that RE sector. In the remainder of this section we will therefore
discuss the challenges we face to identify and measure firms and technolo-
gies.
4.2 Identifying RE firms
The boundaries of industries are traditionally defined by their industry clas-
sification, such as NACE, SIC etc. based on the activities of firms. It should,
in principle, be possible to identify the population of firms within an indus-
try using their industry classification. However, a number of problems for
the accurate identification of an industry remain. Some of these problems
stem from the imprecision of classifications, some stem from more generic
problems in assigning firms to specific industries (Christensen, 2013; Klitkou,
2013; Shapira et al., 2014). One of the most severe problems relate to the
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cross-disciplinary and cross-industrial character of activities, which means
that firms often have activities within several different industries. Such mea-
surement problems are multiplied when considering narrow segments of in-
dustries such as RE. Many firms outside the energy industry perform activi-
ties within RE, but firms in conventional energies (oil, gas etc.) are also very
active in RE. The option of reporting several industry codes to account for
multiple activities in practice does not alleviate these problems, and gener-
ally it is not mandatory for firms to report disaggregated levels of activities.
As a consequence, register-based industry definitions of RE are highly uncer-
tain. This has led Wiesenthal et al. (2012) to suggest a bottom-up approach
to measuring R&D investment low-carbon energy technologies, where ad-
ditional information and estimations are included to come up with a more
reliable estimate of R&D investments. However, it remains difficult to delimit
the industry in terms of the population of firms, which leaves us with prob-
lems in the production of reporting based statistics and surveys. (Shapira
et al., 2014) describe flaws in existing methods to identify “green” firms and
suggest identifying the population of “green” firms by way of a search-based
method where textual searches of business databases produce information on
the firms who have “green” products, independent of their SIC classification.
However, the majority of the fundamental problems remain.
4.3 Measuring Industry Dynamics and Technological Change
We posited above that currently we have highly inadequate statistics in this
field and we face a number of challenges in measuring investments in energy
innovation. For example, the study by Gallagher et al. (2011) points out that
there is an urgent need to improve the quality of energy innovation statis-
tics in a number of areas including measuring a) the R&D in private firms;
b) technology specific investments; c) non-OECD country statistics. It has,
though, been increasingly common and important to also measure industry
dynamics in terms of the innovation activities in the industry (Grupp, 1998).
Therefore, we focus this section on the measurement of energy innovation.
We approach this by discussing three types of indicators that are usually used
in this connection; R&D expenditures, patents and innovations.
Indicators of innovation inputs in terms of R&D statistics and of out-
put in terms of patents are valua-ble, and often used, in innovation studies.
However, they do not capture all innovation inputs and outputs. Similarly,
national accounts measure factors like production volumes, energy sources
and energy prices. These accounts are important, but largely inadequate for
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energy innovation. Hence, we are currently in a position where the statistics
on investments in innovation and the output of innovation processes in the
industry are based on inadequate indicators, especially when it comes to in-
vestments beyond the RD&D phase. Organizations such as The OECD have
compiled information on “green” innovations in special studies6that do com-
pare data, for instance on patents, for member countries as well as discuss
other measurement issues. Likewise, several organizations now perform a
more systematic registration of “green” patents, illustrated by the fact that
the EPO now has a patent tag covering technologies for mitigating climate
change. Patents are relevant from an investment perspective because patents
have now become an important parameter in both the decision to invest and
in the subsequent possibilities to exit from the investment.
Another source of information is survey-based methods. For example, in
their national innovation surveys (Community Innovation Surveys), a num-
ber of countries implemented questions on environmental issues more broadly,
some of which are informative regarding energy innovation as well. Survey-
based approaches to identifying green firms and uncovering industry dy-
namics in terms of innovation activities suffer from disadvantages as well,
such as their general weaknesses in response rates and establishing the rel-
evant initial sample. The empirical evidence on innovation produced from
survey-based approach-es also suffers from comparability problems, lacks
harmonized definitions of energy innovation and fails to make a clear delin-
eation of the energy sector, as many firms are involved in energy innovations
even if belonging to another main industry in the official classifications. This
makes it difficult to analyze the total activities (Shapira et al., 2014).
In this section, we argued that data on public and private sector innova-
tion activities are important for technology forecasting, as a basis for public
authorities to decide how to allocate research grants, for investors to spot
promising investment targets, and for firms to allocate innovation budgets.
Although the R&D statistics and patent statistics do indicate aspects of in-
dustry dynamics, the measurement of industry and technology evolution
poses additional challenges. We discussed innovation measurement in RE
and pointed out that innovation statistics, and other measures of industry
dynamics, are relatively new and not yet fine-grained enough to make it suit-
able for comprehensive studies of RE innovation.
6For example, OECD, 2008. Environmental Policy, technological innovation and patents.
OECD studies on environmental innovation, Paris, and OECD, 2011. Fostering innovation for
Green Growth, OECD Green Growth studies. OECD Publish-ing, Paris.
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5 Investors and Investments
As illustrated above, there exists a variety of aggregated data on certain
measurable aspects of the global energy system. Most assessments of pol-
icy measures as well as the regional, national and global progress of CO2
reduction and RE agendas are illustrated by statistics on installed capacity
or electricity generated from RE sources (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Toke
et al., 2008). However, in line with one stream of research in energy policy
studies (e.g. Dinica, 2006; IEA, 2003; Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012), we
argue for the need to additionally consider more emphasis on investment
data. We propose this focus for several reasons. First, investment represents
real-time responses of industry and investors, enabling us to predict future
technological progress and installed capacity. Second, RE investments differ
in their characteristics and impact, as they are highly interdependent (sys-
temic) (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). A lack of particular investments can
cause bottlenecks and “valleys of death”, which may jeopardize further de-
velopment and deployment of technologies. Third, the investment patterns in
society mediate resources from savings to future production, as underscored
in the introduction. Hence, investment pat-terns are the primary predictors
of possible industrial transformation. We start with a discussion on the basic
principles related to financing RE. We then take stock of existing informa-
tion sources for decisions on energy investments, which span a wide array of
different compilations of statistics of varying quality.
In general, investors primarily aim to adjust the risk-adjusted returns of
their investments. The risks investors commonly consider are related to the
firm/project invested in, the technology deployed, the market it sells in, and
policies that might influence it. Where the first is specific to the investment,
the latter are systemic.7As a simple rule, investors will require higher returns
for riskier investments in order to maintain a certain level of average returns.
Yet, it is seldom that simple. First, not only the average, but also the variance
of returns matter. Assuming investors per se are risk averse, given the same
risk adjusted returns, they will tend to choose the investment with lower
variance. Second, different investors will have different risk preferences and
specialize in investments with certain risk-return-variance levels. For exam-
7It must be mentioned that all systemic risks are usually high in RE investments due to the
high complexity and in-terdependencies of deployed technology, price shocks on the market, and
high regulation and policy influence. Prices on substituting products/energy have historically
had a huge impact, best illustrated by the upsurge of RE after the oil prices surged in 1973 and
1979.
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ple, while institutional investors such as pension funds usually show a very
low risk tolerance and require only modest returns, venture capitalists in-
vest in highly risky targets but therefore require ex-extraordinary returns.
Third, a long tradition of research on behavioral finance tells us that this
risk/return assessment is less of an objective optimization process by fully
rational agents, but rather a heuristic one by agents acting under “bounded
rationality” (Simon, 1955). Since the set of information needed to fully as-
sess risk adjusted returns on an investments in most cases is incomplete and
the agents processing power are limited, their judgment will often be based
on simple heuristics, rules-of-thumb and intuition (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). Further, this judgment is also subject to a set of cognitive biases (Mc-
Fadden, 2001) caused by the agents’ beliefs, historical experiences and so-
cial influences. Thus, investment decisions are made based on “perceived
risk”, which will differ between agents according to their existing knowledge,
available information and cognitive biases. Besides optimizing the perceived
risk-adjusted returns of their portfolio, some investors in RE also integrate
social, environmental and ethical considerations into their decision making
(Renneboog et al., 2008a,b). Moreover, in the financial literature, financial
constraints are said to stem from problems derived from asymmetric infor-
mation between borrowers and lenders (Akerlof, 1970). Because energy sys-
tems are highly integrated and interdependent, these problems are likely to
be multiplied.
Decision making under uncertainty, bounded rationality and asymmet-
ric information requires investors to specialize in certain types of invest-
ments, firms or technologies. While venture capitalists usually prefer to
invest in early stage technologies with high growth potential, most PE are
not willing to bear high technology risk; banks and prudent institutional
investors will only invest in mature and “safe” firms and technologies, but
they therefore require lower returns and can cope with higher investment
sums. Consequently, information needs as well as reactions to policy mea-
sures are idiosyncratic among investor types. An institutional investor might
be more concerned about indicators of individual and systemic in-vestment
risk, while venture capitalists focus on long-term market potential. The het-
erogeneity of technologies and industries associated with RE obviously leads
to a higher need for investor heterogeneity compared to other industries.
To sum up, investors care about risk-adjusted returns and their variance,
have different risk tolerance, and assess individually “perceived risk” un-
der bounded rationality. Though still subject to imperfect information and
cognitive biases, this assessment will become more precise when investors
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undertake the effort of gathering a more complete set of information on in-
vestments and context, and applied heuristics improve with increasing in-
vestment experience and knowledge relevant for the particular investment.
Therefore, capital markets are characterized by a division of labor and spe-
cialization, which is expedient when investors need to cope with complex and
asymmetric information in the market. Investors might specialize in invest-
ments in firms with certain characteristics (start-ups, mature firms), deployed
technologies (ICT, biotech, RE), asset classes (VC, PE, loans, project finance),
risk profiles (low, high) etc. Specializing in one or more of these investment
characteristics results in a particular set of relevant in-vestment targets and
information needed for their assessment. Thus, we argue that to obtain a
proper analysis and understanding of investments in RE or elsewhere, we
need a nuanced and disaggregated reflection of the structural composition of
investors and investments in our statistical evidence.
To fulfill this objective we face a couple of challenges. As discussed earlier,
the diversity of the RE sec-tor makes it challenging to draw its boundaries
and decide which technologies and firms should be assigned to it. Conse-
quently, quantifying investments in RE faces the same problem. Further, the
majority of investors invest in multiple industries, and are thus equally hard
to identify. While there exist some investors exclusively committed to RE
such as politically motivated associations, endowments and foundations, for
most others, such as institutional investors, RE represents only a small share
of their portfolio. Likewise, even if the venture capital investors, for exam-
ple, have gained interest in the clean tech industry generally, and energy in
particular, the number of dedicated venture capital funds indicates that they
are a very small minority.8
Currently, reasons such as limited mandatory disclosure of certain fi-
nance vehicles limits available in-formation on investments to sporadic stud-
ies and reports by national and international energy agencies (e.g. IAE, IPCC,
UNEP), associations, NGOs, research institutes promoting the sustainable
transition (e.g. IIASA), and financial institutions and information providers
(e.g. Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Reuters). Such reports on RE usually
provide investment data on different levels of disaggregation, which may be
broken down by technology, asset class, region and over time. They often
differ in their definition and measurement of RE-, sustainable-, clean-, or
green-investments, yet they provide some valuable insights. We briefly illus-
trate such statistics. An example of such statistics is provided in figure A.4,
8Moreover, after a period with increasing interest from investors in this area, there are now
indications of less attention from funds to clean tech investments as also indicated by figure A.4.
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which depicts the development of global investments in RE by asset class and
offers some broad indications on tendencies in energy investments.9
Fig. A.4: Global new investments in RE by asset class, 2004-2014, BN USD, source: UNEP
Among others, it illustrates the predominance of asset financing10 stem-
ming from the enormous capital intensity of the energy sector. In contrast,
early stage financing sources like venture capital and government R&D re-
main a small fraction of the total investments. Atypical for capital intense
industries, public market finance is also of minor importance in RE. In spite
of the small share of total investments, early stage public R&D investments
are said to have disproportionally high impact on the development of radi-
cally new technologies, as they fund early stage research that is often outside
the scope of private investors (Ebersberger, 2005). It should be noted that the
financing instrument does not necessarily reflect a specific financing source
or agent. Even if there is a specialization and division of labor on capital
markets, agents may still use multiple financing instruments simultaneously.
As discussed earlier, investments in RE are subject to a set of market fail-
ures and system failures, of which some are generic and some stem from the
particularities of the energy sector. Aggregated investment accounts such as
the one in Figure 3 and Figure 3 at first glance might serve as a good indica-
tor for the efficiency of such measures. However, while the question of how
and where investments in RE are allocated across countries, industries and
technologies has received growing attention in recent years, the question of
9See Geels (2013) for a more comprehensive illustration of the available investment statistics
produced by the above-mentioned organizations.
10A form of debt finance backed by asset collateral.
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who ultimately invests and why they do so has received much less attention.
During the course of this section, we argued that applying an investor per-
spective reveals a set of reasons why more granular policy measures as well
as indicators are needed.
The relevant question is where such needed information might be avail-
able for policy, research and investors. Besides the already mentioned reports
by the IAE, UNEP, EUROSTAT, Bloomberg etc., investor organisations such as
the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) provide an overview of RE
in-vestments on different levels of aggregation. While it remains a problem
to develop an adequate methodology to identify firms active and technolo-
gies deployed in the RE realm, there are indeed some sources of exhaustive
micro data on investments, and means of identifying investors. Since data
on equity deals are of high value for professional investors, who are willing
to pay for it, there exists a huge variety of commercial databases on different
forms of equity investments, such as VC, PE, M&A and FDI. Popular exam-
ples are Thompson & Reuters “VentureONE”, Bureau van Dijk’s “ZEPHIR”
or S&Ps “CapitalIQ” investments databases. They usually contain rich longi-
tudinal data on investment target, investor and investment characteristics. In
addition to common industry classifications such as NACE codes, they often
contain their own sector or industry classifications, including classes such as
“RE”, “energy transmission” and the like, which might be used to identify RE
firms and investments, although they still suffer from the above-mentioned
problems of precise classification procedures. Alternatively, free open access
finance and business databases such as “crunchbase” have significantly im-
proved in accuracy and coverage over the last few years, and nowadays can
be seen as a true alternative to the commercial databases. However, because
of the structure of most private equity, these databases only contain informa-
tion on the direct shareholder (general partner), and not the initial provider
of capital (limited partner). While such in-formation was hard to obtain due
to corporate secrecy and very limited disclosure requirements, some newer
databases have started to collect information on the true origin of equity
investment capital, the limited partners. Among the few examples are the
“PreQuin” investor intelligence and the DowJones “LP Source” database.
While there exists plenty of information on equity investments, limited
disclosure regulations make data on debt forms of finance very hard to ob-
tain. One of the few databases is Thomson Reuters “DealScanner”, which
provides information on the global syndicated bank loan market, which,
though important, is only a small fraction of overall debt finance. Since the
major share of investments in RE actually takes place in the form of (debt
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based) project finance, such data is urgently needed. One exception provid-
ing detailed information on energy projects, installations, power plants and
their investors is the commercial “Power” database provided by GlobalData.
To sum up, the heterogeneity of investors and investment targets calls
for micro-level data able to clearly identify them and isolate their particular
rationales. Overly aggregated statistics are likely to “average out” possible
problems and opportunities alike. Even though there is micro-level informa-
tion on most types of RE investments, it usually has to be obtained from a
variety of disconnected and mostly commercial data sources.
6 Outlooks and challenges
Finance of energy innovation is an important part of the overall discussion
of different, more environmentally friendly modes of production. Policy is
instrumental in such transitions as underscored in several papers (Bolton and
Foxon, 2015; Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2012; Perez, 2013). The advancement
of actions towards establishing green, sustainable production is, however,
dependent not only on political will, but also on whether empirical evidence
in the area is commonly agreed upon and of a good standard. Policies for
unleashing the potentials of green investments was not our primary focus
area but indirectly the empirical evidence we have is important in relation
to policy as well as it provides the knowledge foundation for societal tran-
sition. In this sense also the data we produce and the statistical system we
install are subject to value premises and choices based on societal interests
(Garnåsjordet et al., 2012). We focused instead on a particular aspect of this
discussion as we highlighted the state of affairs and remaining challenges
in our measurement of RE and RE investments. It was found that despite
recent improvements we are still not in a position to fully understand RE
investments using existing statistical sources. Several areas of empirical evi-
dence need improvements.
Among the deficiencies in the current available empirical evidence on
RE, we firstly pointed out that the lack of historical, publicly available data
addressing RE investment risks is one of the greatest challenges in engag-
ing untapped capital. For example, there is an immediate need for publicly
available performance data for investments in RE technologies both within
and outside of equipment warranty periods. Additionally, historical data on
default rates by the energy purchaser are seen as critical to assessing creditor
risks.
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A second general requirement for statistics is that we need to recognize
the interdependent character of the energy system, which calls for indicators
oriented towards throughput and interactions among agents in the system.
We are even not sure how to delineate the energy sector as activities span
across traditional industrial classifications, which in turn makes it difficult to
produce adequate statistics (Shapira et al., 2014) but definitions and statistics
in fact also impact the allocation of investments (Inderst et al., 2012).
A third area in which more empirical data is needed is on the invest-
ments and investors. A number of much-needed information was pointed
to in figure 5, ranging from the identification of investors to the micro-level
information on the investments. Fourth, by far the majority of statistics on en-
ergy production and consumption covers already-produced and -consumed
energy. Because of the intense discussions on climate change and other en-
vironmental challenges and problems, a number of scenarios for the future
have been established as well. RE is characterized by limited storage possibil-
ities; therefore statistics rarely reflect a stock or potential future production
trend. The installed capacity will, of course, reflect future production, but
generally we point to the need for other and more forward-looking indica-
tors and statistics. We think that such indicators should also give us a picture
of how technologies are likely to evolve. Even though we are skeptical about
reliance on technologies to “save the planet”, we do believe that predictions
about technological evolution are important to statistics on energy. In turn,
such statistics are important as a platform for informed decision making,
both for investors and policy makers.
It is unlikely that the statistical profession will ever be able to cover all
parts of our even non-exhaustive wish list above but, although it is an ambi-
tious requirement for future standards of data to solve all of these problems,
steps towards a better statistical understanding of the (financial) dynamics of
the industry require that some of these issues be addressed. We would also
argue that because the energy system is undergoing changes and because it
is subject to heavy political discussions and influence, the statistical system
itself needs to be dynamic and capable of adapting to the needs of users.
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Abstract
Access to external financing represents a critical factor in determining industrial
evolution and technical change as well as firm’s ability to survive, grow, and engage
in innovative activities. However, firm characteristics such as being young, small
and engaged in innovation projects, are said to cause information asymmetries be-
tween financiers and finance seekers, making them less likely raise necessary external
capital to fund innovation projects. Yet, there is little known about how different
combinations of these characteristics affects their access to external financing and
how contextual, time-variant factors matter. Deploying a two-stage Heckman probit
model on a panel data set spanning the period 2000-2013 and covering 1,169 Danish
firms, we test hypotheses derived from the literature regarding the impacts of firms
structural, behavioral and outcome characteristics on the firm’s likelihood to get con-
strained in their access to external innovation finance. We find that indeed the type of
innovation matters, but in a nuanced way. While incremental innovation activities
have little negative effect on the access to external finance, radical innovation activi-
ties tend to be penalized by capital markets. This appears to be particularly true for
small innovators. We link these findings to how capital markets assess information
flows.
JEL classification: O31, G23, G24, L25
Keywords: Financial constraints, financing innovation, asymmetric information
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Preface
Before exploring further the network dynamics of industrial change, in this
chapter my co-author Jesper Lindgaard Christensen and I do groundwork
by first investigating some more generic issues of financing the essence of
technological change, innovation. In detail, at the Danish context I empiri-
cally study what enables firms, some of the the main carriers of innovation
(Schumpeter, 1942), to access external finance. Generally, access to such exter-
nal sources of funding represents a critical factor in determining their ability
to survive, grow, and engage in innovative activities (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). Yet, it is broadly accepted that investments in innovation per se
appear to embody certain characteristics making them substantially different
from other investments (Hall, 2010). From a financier perspective, investing
in radically innovative firms vis-á-vis their not or only moderately innovative
counterparts is foremost associated higher information asymmetries between
firm and finance, and related with higher risk and uncertainty of investment
outcomes (Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988). This tension is supposed to increase
when innovation activities are not based on incremental improvements of ex-
isting products, processes or services, but happen in a more radical way, fun-
damentally diverging from current business-as-usual. In addition, some char-
acteristics associated with the futures innovative and entrepreneurial high
growth ventures, such as being young, small are said to cause cause further
information asymmetries between financiers and firms, making them likely
to experience financial constraints when seeking external capital to fund in-
novative endeavors Revest et al. (2010).
While I later mostly discuss how networks among and between firms and
investors might mitigate imperfect and asymmetric information, I here an-
alyze first in isolation the interplay between external finance, firms’ quality
and quantity of innovation activities, and its structural and outcome char-
acteristics. I thereby proposing that not a single but rather certain combi-
nations of characteristics and context makes firms more likely to not find
their financial needs met. The findings of this papers aim to broadly facili-
tate the research on the finance of technological change in later chapters by
providing a theoretical and empirical foundation on generic issues of innova-
tion finance. While important for research on technological change gin gen-
eral, understanding the dynamics of finance, firm characteristics and types
of innovation activities is of particular importance for understanding techno-
economic transitions in large technological systems such as the energy sector,
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where progress in areas radically diverging from the current fossil-fuel based
paradigms are needed.
Fig. B.1: Positioning the paper in the theoretical framework
Investor Space
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The work on this paper start in the early period of my Ph.D. fellowship
and was first presented on the “35th DRUID Celebration Conference” 2013
in Barcelona, then on the “36th ISBE Conference” 2013 in Cardiff, where was
selected for the best paper award in the “Venture Capital, Finance and Taxa-
tion”. It was furthermore presented at several internal and external research
seminars, such as the Aalborg University workshop in academic writing and
the SCANCOR seminar series in Stanford. Since it has been submitted to the
Journal for “Industrial and Corporate Change”, where it is currently under
review.
90
1. Introduction
1 Introduction
For many firms access to external financing represents a critical factor in
determining a firm’s ability to survive, grow, and engage in innovative ac-
tivities (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Mina et al., 2013; Musso and Schi-
avo, 2008). Likewise, industry evolution and technological change requires
adequate funding, and the structure and governance traditions of financial
systems may impact the direction of industrial and technical change (Dosi,
1990; Mazzucato, 2013; Tylecote, 2007). A large proportion of firms do not
demand external finance and of those who do a large proportion are able to
raise the funds they need (Nightingale and Coad, 2014). Particularly such
being young, small, and engaged in innovation and other activities charac-
terized by uncertainty, are said to cause information asymmetries between
financiers and finance seekers, making them less likely to raise the necessary
external capital to fund innovation projects (Carreira and Silva, 2010; Freel,
2007; Hall, 2010).
We investigate how access to external financing for innovation activities
is affected by firm-specific structural, behavioral and outcome characteristics.
We propose that not a single but rather certain combinations of characteristics
and context makes firms more likely to not find their financial needs met.
We attempt to identify combinations of firm characteristics associated with
potentially innovative ventures that lead to a disproportionate likelihood of
credit rationing, while also taking into account the heterogeneity of financial
needs. Moreover, in addition to incorporation the demand for finance and
focus on combinations of potential characteristics, behavior and outcomes
as potential explanations on financial constraints we differentiate our study
from existing studies in that we use yearly, consistent innovation and finance
surveys over a long time span (14 years). In this sense we contribute to a
better understanding of the dynamics of the financing of entrepreneurship
and innovation, an area that is generally under-researched (Hall, 2010; Hall
and Lerner, 2009). Despite being generally under-researched, a number of
earlier studies have investigated this problem area.
Traditionally, financial constraints are said to stem from asymmetric and
imperfect information leading to a high perceived uncertainty and the need
for banks and other financiers to gather firm-specific soft and private in-
formation for a proper assessment of creditworthiness (Berger et al., 2001;
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Hall, 2010; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Because
of the difficulties associated with such assessments, financiers employ differ-
ent strategies in their screening procedures. Such strategies include repeated
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contracts and relationship banking, specialization, monitoring and indepen-
dent auditing and screening, milestone financing, and collateral. However,
not only are these measures costly to the financier, they are also insufficient
to reveal all relevant information or compensate for what remains unknown.
Financiers are therefore particularly skeptical at the outset of the financing
process when assessing proposals from firms that either have characteristics
that amplify information asymmetry or are historically associated with high
default risk. As a result, firms with a certain set of characteristics appear to
be consistently penalized by capital markets, namely those that are young,
small, and engaged in innovation activities with uncertain outcomes (e.g.
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Canton et al.,
2013; Colombo and Grilli, 2007; Giudici and Paleari, 2000).
Using a 2-stage heckman probit model accounting for the heterogeneous
need for external finance, we test hypotheses derived from the literature re-
garding the impact of firms structural, behavioral and outcome characteris-
tics on capital access. We use a unique firm-level dataset composed of lon-
gitudinal survey data coupled with performance indicators, allowing us to
incorporate micro-level firm characteristics. While the vast majority of exist-
ing studies rely on cross-sectional data, our panel data structure also allows
us to control for contextual time-variant factors, such as the impact of busi-
ness cycles. The data comprise a yearly survey of innovation activities and
financial constraints that covers 14 years, from 2000 through 2013, with con-
sistent question structure on both demand and supply of external financing.
Compared to traditional innovation surveys (such as CIS), the data include
more frequent rounds of surveying and a more detailed set of questions on
finance.We find evidence that the effect of innovation on capital demand and
supply is not uniform, but rather interdependent with other firm character-
istics. Specifically, we find that the type of innovation is an important factor.
While incremental innovation activities have little effect on the access to ex-
ternal finance, radical innovation activities tend to be penalized by capital
markets. This appears to be particularly true for small innovators. We link
these findings to how capital markets assess information flows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we
first survey the existing literature with respect to earlier, general studies of
financial constraints, and derive a set of testable hypotheses on the interplay
of innovation intensity, other firm characteristics and contextual factors.. The
empirical strategy, data, and variables are presented and explained in section
3. Section 4 reports and discusses the results, followed by a conclusion in
section 5.
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2 Financial Constraints - Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Innovation, information asymmetries, and financial con-
straints
Investments in innovation - mostly associated with R&D expenditures - ap-
pear to embody certain characteristics making them substantially different
from other investments in several respects (Hall, 2010; Hall and Lerner, 2009).
From a financier perspective, investing in radically innovative firms vis-á-vis
their not or only moderately innovative counterparts, is foremost associated
with higher information asymmetries between firm and financier, and related
with higher risk and uncertainty (Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988) of investment
outcomes.
Asymmetric information has been long recognized as a generic source
of market failure in buyer-seller (Akerlof, 1970) commodity markets as well
investor-investee (Myers and Majluf, 1984) capital markets. Such informa-
tion asymmetries can be assumed to increase with rate and radicalness of
the firm’s innovation activities. This is because the information required to
correctly assess innovative ventures is usually (i) private, and thus only given
voluntarily (Moro et al., 2014) since firms may fear misuse and be reluctant to
share it (Anton and Yao, 2002); (ii) complex, thus requiring in-depth knowl-
edge regarding applied technologies or market circumstances; (iii) to a large
extent tacit, thus requiring spatial proximity and face-to-face contact with
financiers in order to be transferred (Arrow, 1962; Von Hippel, 1994); and
(iv) innovation processes are reliant upon and embedded in human capital,
which is often volatile and not easily maintained in the firm. The intangible
nature of many innovation processes, and the fact that they have long time
lags from initiation to returns, means that financiers are faced with projects
for which they have little possibility of estimating the returns, as well as poor
options to cover the risk by way of collateral.
Due to these informational deficiencies, and their often weaker balance
sheets and frequent lack of fixed assets that could act as collateral, innova-
tive firms are said to have a greater need to communicate their merits to
financiers. The means of doing this vary greatly. In the literature on rela-
tionship banking (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002), it is argued that repetitive
communication and transactions lead to the building of trust, which in turn
facilitates smooth communication and reduces both information asymmetries
and the likelihood of moral hazard. An emerging literature on financial sig-
naling focuses on the patenting behavior of firms as a mean of overcoming
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these informational barriers (Harhoff, 2011; Häussler et al., 2014), especially
in the early stage of development (Hoenen et al., 2014).
The proposition that innovative firms are somewhat more likely to face
financial constraints is supported by a growing body of empirical evidence.
Westhead and Storey (1997) identify the most technologically sophisticated
firms as much more likely to report that continual financial constraints had
impeded firm growth. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) report similar find-
ings especially for small R&D intensive firms. Freel (1999) identifies innovat-
ing firms as more likely to seek but less likely to obtain bank loans. Later,
Freel (2007) added to earlier results, clarifying that even though a little inno-
vation seems to be a good thing, more intensively innovating and small firms
appear to be less successful in obtaining external financing.
The majority of studies have used firms in R&D-intensive industries, patent-
ing firms, or the simple separation of firms into innovative and non-innovative
categories as proxies for innovation. For example, Hall (2010) argues that us-
ing R&D as a proxy for innovation is justified because it makes up a major
portion of innovation expenditures in firms in CIS-like surveys. However,
despite the fact that R&D expenditures are a substantial part of innovation
expenditures, only a minority of innovating firms has any R&D at all. Many
of the changes in products, processes, and services are incremental, new-to-
firm innovation. Consequently, it is important to recognize that innovation
is ubiquitous and depends often on modes of doing and using technologies
rather than being based on science or R&D (Jensen et al., 2007). Similarly, it
is likely that these problems are exacerbated by the innovation intensity of
firms, rather than being dependent on whether firms are innovative or not.
This is easily seen if the perspective of the financier is taken: in a mediocre in-
novative firm where innovation activities make up a small share of turnover,
the information asymmetries and uncertainty related to innovation will not
pose substantial difficulties in assessment of creditworthiness. This changes
when investing in firms generating a major share of their turnover with out-
comes of recent innovation projects. It can be concluded that the relationship
between innovation and financial constraints might be more nuanced than
commonly depicted (Bellucci et al., 2014), particularly with respect to the
intensity and type of innovation activities, and the combination with other
firm characteristics. From this discussion we derive that we should not ap-
proach the analysis of innovation as innovation or not, rather the innovation
intensity is likely to impact financial constraints. Moreover, the radical inno-
vation projects involve additional asymmetries of information and time-lags
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between investments and outcome, again meaning a higher likelihood of fi-
nancial constraints.
Hypothesis 1
a: Firms with a higher innovation intensity show a higher probability of being finan-
cially constrained.
b: This effect is more pronounced for firms engaged in radical vis-á-vis incremental
innovation activity
2.2 Structural Characteristics: Innovation and the Liability of
Newness and Smallness
Though it is often highlighted as a major barrier to business development
(Bottazzi et al., 2014; Musso and Schiavo, 2008), the mere existence as well as
economic significance of credit rationing, and so-called debt gaps for SMEs,
is also contested (Berger and Udell, 2003; Cressy, 2012; Levenson and Willard,
2000). However, literature stemming from the strand of SME finance consis-
tently identifies two characteristics of firms as being associated with asym-
metric information, and consequently more financial constraints: being (ii)
young or (iii) small. Reasons put forward are among others the liabilities of
newness and size limitations, asymmetric information, agency problems, and
the high, fixed costs of screening and monitoring such firms when compared
to the potential profit for the financing institution (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt,
2006; Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Carreira and Silva, 2010; Fazzari et al.,
1988; Murray, 1999).
As illustrated above, in the case of innovation-intense firms, traditional in-
vestors with only a limited understanding of firms’ processes, products, and
markets face huge difficulties in assessing the quality of their innovation pro-
cesses without undertaking substantial efforts in gathering tacit information.
Until this point, we assumed the financier to be in need of understanding
the very essence of the firm’s innovation activities. However, traditional fi-
nanciers such as banks, representing the major source of external capital to
firms, also rely to a high degree on the available factual, or “hard”, informa-
tion, such as a firm’s financial history, capital structure, and available collat-
eral, when assessing creditworthiness. By doing so, they leave the selection
of opaque innovation projects to the firm, if the firm fulfills other require-
ments based on hard information. In this sense, hard and soft information
regarding the firm can serve as imperfect substitutes for an assessment of
creditworthiness without directly taking the nature of its innovation projects
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into account. Yet, in the case of small and/or young firms, which tend to be
more opaque to financiers (Berger et al., 2001), salient hard information such
as rated debt, certified financial statements, annual reports, and other forms
of codified signals and track records are often not available (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi
and Lancaster, 2003). In the absence of both hard and soft information, firms
may face substantial obstacles in obtaining external financing, especially for
their innovation projects. Consequently, we expect the effects of size, age,
and the frequency of innovation projects to interact in a multiplicative rather
than additive way, thus more than proportionally worsening a firm’s access
to external financing.
Hypothesis 2
a: Firms that are young and innovative show a disproportionally high probability of
being financially constrained.
b: Firms that are small and innovative show a disproportional high probability of
being financially constrained.
c: Both the effect of newness and smallness are more pronounced for firms engaged
in radical vis-à-vis incremental innovation activity
2.3 Outcome: Innovation, Performance and Expectations
Whether a firm obtains external financing or not could in a world with per-
fect information be a simple function of self-assessed economic performance.
In the absence of information asymmetries, a firm’s expectation regarding
its future financial performance is a perfect forecast and coincident with the
banks assessment. However, in a real world asymmetric information and
moral hazard drive a wedge between the borrowers and lenders ability to
assess creditworthiness, and thus between supply and demand for external
capital. Assuming the firm to be in possession of the most complete informa-
tion set available to evaluate the performance of its innovation projects (Kon
and Storey, 2003; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), the own projection of current and
future financial performance should still serves as suitable approximation for
its creditworthiness.
As a major source of information asymmetries, we expect a firms’ inno-
vation intensity to increase the wedge between a firm’s self-assessed current
and future financial performance and the access to external finance. We ex-
pect this to be particularly true for the case of positive performance projec-
tions, which are only partially received by the financier and lead to a situ-
ation of capital undersupply, as illustrated in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
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model. However, this might also work the other way. Since this informa-
tion is discounted by financiers and determines the lending decision and its
conditions, firms have an incentive to act opportunistically and find ways to
bias financiers in their favor, such as overstating progress in new product
development or concealing critical strategic or technical details. This would
lead to a situation such as the one depicted in the (De Meza and Webb, 1987)
model, in which financiers arbitrarily provide credit to good and bad borrow-
ers and lead to an oversupply of capital. It could be argued that financiers are
primarily concerned with the financial performance of their portfolio firms.
However, information on this is not easily available to the financier ex ante.
We therefore posit that:
Hypothesis 3
a: A firms’ current and projected economic performance influences their likelihood
to meet financial constraints.
b: The relationship between economic performance and financial constraints is weaker
in firms with higher innovation intensity.
Performance is here seen as how firms report their short-term profit ex-
pectations. A major merit of operationalizing financial performance accord-
ing to the firm’s own perceptions and expectations is that, in the case of
innovative firms, this fully captures all their knowledge and their belief in
the profitability of their innovation project, which cannot be captured by ex-
post financial statements due to endogeneity issues. Innovation intensity is
operationalized as firms’ number of innovations which are new to the market
as opposed to innovations only new to the firm (see also section 3 on variable
description).
3 Econometric Modeling of Credit Demand and
Supply
3.1 Data sources and context
Our primary data come from surveys of the management teams of a repre-
sentative panel of private firms with at least five employees in North Jutland,
Denmark. Respondents were interviewed1 about their views of the past and
1In 1999–2010, data were collected through telephone interviews, whereas they were there-
after collected by means of a web-based questionnaire. This change has affected response rates
negatively while not necessarily affecting representativeness to the same degree.
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future development of variables like production, employment, profit, inno-
vation activities, and access to financial capital. To ensure a shared under-
standing, the questions on innovation were posed only to a sub-sample of the
population of private sector firms, such as those in the manufacturing indus-
try and business services. The phrasing of the questions largely followed the
form in which Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) pose questions on inno-
vation and finance (e.g. Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Pellegrino and Savona,
2013), making the results comparable to studies based on CIS data. The data
are not fully representative of the total private business sector in the region,
but within the sectors, there is a good match between the realized sample
and the population of firms. Due to the focus of the survey, we only included
firms reporting that they currently engage in innovation activities or plan to
do so in the future.
Our case region is located in the north of Denmark, which is character-
ized as a peripheral area. This is illustrated by the fact that it has been an EU
support Objective 2 area for years. There is one urban center, Aalborg, and
the industry structure is somewhat different within the region, with the ma-
jority of R&D-based firms being in the Aalborg area. The total population in
the region is around 600,000. One previous study on financial constraints in
this region (Christensen, 2007) resembles our study; however, it was focused
on a pre-crisis period and did not incorporate all constraints and statistical
controls.
3.2 Variable description
The following subsection briefly describes the variables utilized in the em-
pirical analysis and gives suggestions regarding their impact. An exhaustive
description of all variables can be found in table ??.
Dependent Variables
Our main dependent variable of interest (constraints) is dichotomous and de-
rived from the survey answers whether the firm experienced constraints in
raising external capital to finance innovation projects in the corresponding
period (0:No, 1:Yes). Adittionally, in our selection model we consider a vari-
able (demand finance) represents the firms’ general need for external capital to
finance innovation projects. On a five-point Likert scale, firms where asked
to rate the importance of external finance for their innovation activities (5:
very high, 4: high, 3: medium, 2: low, 1: very low/none). We transformed it
in a dichotomous variable taking the value of one for firms that report exter-
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nal finance to have at least some importance. We employ this variable in the
first step of our analyses to take into account endogenous selection of firms
seeking external finance Mina et al. (2013).
Independent variables
Behavioral variables: Innovation intensity In the survey, firms list whether
they have introduced new products, processes, or services that are either new
only to the firm (incremental innovations) or to the market/world (radical in-
novations)2 and if, how many. Since incremental innovations are in contrast
to radical innovations already to some extend known to the market, we asso-
ciate them with less uncertainty and a greater capacity to be understood by
the financier. As such, they are expected show a somewhat smaller effect on
the firm’s access to external financing.
However, we do not posit a linear relationship of innovation intensity and
the following structural variables (size, age) and the likelihood of facing finan-
cial constraints, but rather one with decreasing marginal effects. Once a firm
develops a track record for a number of years, asymmetric information prob-
lems stemming from a lack of historical data are likely to be alleviated, and
further benefits from aging only manifest in possible reputational effects and
increasing strength of the financier-firm relationship. We suggest the same
pattern for size, where at a certain size legal disclosure requirements and the
establishment of professional finance and accounting management eliminate
a substantial share of information asymmetries. While innovation is consid-
ered as a source of information asymmetries, we also expect this effect to
soften with increasing innovation intensity. Firms that frequently engage in
a high number of innovation projects are likely to develop routines to man-
age this process in a more structured way, which may be associated with
increasing documentation and therefore higher transparency. Therefore, the
variables incremental and radical innovation intensity are used in all models
as the logarithmic transformation of the number of new products, processes,
or services introduced in the corresponding observation period.
Structural characteristics: Firm size and age We include the firm spe-
cific structural characteristics most commonly associated with financial con-
straints, size (in number of employees) and age (in years), and coined these
two variables respectively the liability of newness and liability of smallness.
2This distinction is in line with what is commonly used in innovation studies using CIS
surveys.
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As discussed above, to account for assumed decreasing marginal impact as
well as the skewedness of the variables distribution, size and age enter the
model in their natural logarithm.
Outcome: Perceived current and future performance Firms were asked
about the development of their realized profits in the current period (in-
creased, same, decreased). A reported realized increase in profits in the ob-
servation period obviously represents a positive signal for financiers, which
should decrease the firm’s likelihood of being financially constrained, and
vice versa.3 We code this question in two dummy variables, first real result +
indicating positive, and real result − indicating negative self-reported re-
sults in the current period. We introduce a dynamic perspective on external
innovation finance by way of also incorporating the firm’s self-reported ex-
pected future performance of the firm. Here, we utilized another question,
where firms reported their predicted development of profits for the next pe-
riod (increase, same, decrease), which we also code in two dummy variables,
indicating positive (exp result +) and negative (exp result −) profit expecta-
tions. Assuming the firms to have the most complete set of information to
make prediction regarding their future performance, in absence of informa-
tion asymmetries we associated positive profit expectation with less financial
constraints.
Conditions for innovation We further utilized the answers to additional
questions on general opinions and impressions of the firm that might provide
insights regarding the type of innovation likely to be produced. Imp. tech
represents a dummy variable taking a value of one if the firm believes that
technological knowledge is of high or highest importance to its business (on
a five-point Likert scale), indicating that the firm is technology based. Imp.
IPR relates to the firm’s assessment of the importance of intellectual property
protection, and is an indicator for more technology-based firms operating in
an environment where innovation outcomes can be codified and protected.
Finally, Imp. market is about the belief that market knowledge is vital for the
firm, indicating competitive, complex, and changing market conditions.
Control variables
3However, this only holds true for the minimum level of documentation and accounting
transparency that enables a firm to convincingly prove its credibility to external financiers.
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The region: First, the firm’s environment is assumed to influence its
access to external financing. Denmark’s North Jutland region can be catego-
rized as a fairly peripheral one. Modern instruments of innovation finance
such as private equity and venture capital are scarcer there, which leaves debt
as the predominant form of external innovation finance. Since the assessment
of small, young, and innovative firms can be facilitated by tacit knowledge
exchange and social proximity, we expect firms in regions outside the Aal-
borg region, North Jutland’s urban core, to be more likely to face financial
constraints. Therefore, in some models we also include further dummy vari-
ables indicating the firm is located in the inner Aalborg metropolitan region
(region 1), or the larger, relatively less densely (but compared with the rest of
northern Jutland still high) populated region around Aalborg (region 2).
The industry: Firms in the manufacturing industry usually embody a
higher share of tangible assets suitable to serve as collateral, and thus are
favored by asset-based creditability evaluation techniques. Furthermore, pro-
duction processes and their output may be better understood and valued than
the somewhat intangible work of service firms. Therefore we suggest firms
in the manufacturing industry to be less likely to face financial constraints.
Ownership structure and legal form: We also expect the firm’s owner-
ship structure to matter. If it is a subsidiary, it may be nurtured by its parent
company, and thus be less in need of external financing. Additionally, it may
draw on the reputation and credibility of its parent company, which eases the
way to obtaining external financing. The firms’ legal form makes them likely
to differ in demand and access to external capital. Publicly traded companies
obviously finance themselves on public capital markets for the most part and
therefore have less demand for other sources of external financing than firms
of other legal forms. Among privately owned businesses, we assume limited
liability firms to be more likely to experience financial constraints than sole
proprietorship, in which the firm’s credit is backed by the private wealth of
the entrepreneur.
3.3 Data Analysis and Descriptive Statistics
The refined data set represents an unbalanced panel containing 8,447 obser-
vations of 2,723 unique firms. Only a subpopulation of firms was asked to
answer the set of innovation and financial constraints-related questions rele-
vant for this study, which leaves us with 2,822 observations of 1,169 unique
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firms, whose participation in the different survey waves ranges from 1 to 12,
where about 25% of firms participated in 2 or fewer and 95% in 7 or fewer
waves. The participation by wave ranges from 135 in 2013 to a peak of 316
in 2010. The distribution of firms over years, regions, and industries can be
found in table B.5 in the appendix.
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
need finance 2,822 0.63 0.48 0 1
constraints 2,093 0.17 0.38 0 1
Independent Variables
sizecount
∗ 2,822 49.78 95.79 1 1600
agecount
∗ 2,822 17.66 12.68 1 135
planned inno 2,822 0.68 0.47 0 1
inc. innocount
∗ 2,822 4.06 10.6 0 100
rad innocount
∗ 2,822 1.59 6.3 0 99
imp. tech 2,822 0.09 0.29 0 1
imp. ipr 2,822 0.09 0.29 0 1
imp. market 2,822 0.23 0.42 0 1
real result + 2,822 0.39 0.49 0 1
real result - 2,822 0.23 0.42 0 1
exp result + 2,822 0.39 0.49 0 1
exp result - 2,822 0.16 0.37 0 1
Control Variables
region 1 2,822 0.40 0.49 0 1
region 2 2,822 0.58 0.49 0 1
firm subsidiary 2,822 0.23 0.45 0 1
∗ : For the sake of clarity, firm size (employees),age (years), incremental and radical innovation intensity (innovation count) in
full number and not in logarithmic transformation.
Table B.1 provides some descriptive statistics at the firm level through the
different waves. 63% of the firms in our sample express the need for external
finance at all, while the others prefer to finance innovation projects by inter-
nal means. 17% report that they experienced financial constraints in external
innovation finance in the corresponding observation period, which is about
a quarter of firms expressing financial needs. This result roughly match with
comparable studies. The average firm has slightly fewer than 50 employees
and an age of about 17 years, where both characteristics skew high and pos-
itive. Over 40% report that they introduced at least one product, process, or
service new to the firm in the corresponding period, while a slightly higher
percentage introduced innovations new to the industry and the market, and
roughly 70% planned to start new innovation projects in the next year, what
sums up to an average of 4.06 incremental and 1.59 radical innovations per
firm and year . About a quarter of the firms consider knowledge on market
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conditions as crucial to their success, whereas only 9% think so regarding
technological knowledge and IPR.
tarble B.5 in the appendix provides a breakdown of the firms need for
finance, experienced financial constraints, and incremental and radical inno-
vation activity by year, region and industry. Financial constraints show to
peak in the years 2003 and 2009, when (related) demand for external finance
for innovation projects is also at it’s high as is the average intensity of radical
innovation . The manufacturing industry appears to be the most innova-
tive and therefore has also the highest demand for innovation finance. The
results of a bivariate analysis, presented in a pairwise correlation matrix in
Table 3, provide the first insights into the general interplay among innovation
intensity, the need for financing, and credit constraints.
Table B.2: Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
need fi-
nance
constraints region_2 size age subsidiary inno inc
(1) constraints 0.451∗
(2) region 2 -0.065∗ -0.060∗
(3) size -0.080∗ -0.106∗ -0.044∗
(4) age -0.062∗ -0.054∗ -0.037 0.230∗
(5) subsidiary -0.108∗ -0.0779∗ 0.023 0.045∗ 0.076∗
(6) inno inc 0.008 -0.007 0.026 0.194∗ 0.051∗ 0.013
(7) inno rad -0.006 0.037 0.020 0.060∗ -0.031 -0.038 0.430∗
(8) imp tech 0.007 -0.015 0.028 0.006 0.008 0.017 -0.004
(9) imp ipr 0.033 -0.002 0.033 -0.003 -0.070∗ -0.039 0.060∗
(10) imp market 0.012 -0.034 0.015 0.054∗ 0.012 -0.002 0.072∗
(11) real result + -0.065∗ -0.042∗ 0.055∗ 0.008 0.004 -0.045∗ 0.031
(12) real result - 0.060∗ 0.075∗ -0.055∗ 0.000 -0.008 -0.014 0.039
(13) exp result + 0.035 0.039 0.072∗ -0.027 -0.099∗ -0.017 0.094∗
(14) exp result - 0.008 0.010 -0.047∗ -0.020 0.031 -0.037 -0.030
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
inno rad imp tech imp ipr imp mar-
ket
real re-
sult +
real re-
sult -
exp re-
sult +
(8) imp tech 0.005
(9) imp ipr 0.105∗ 0.142∗
(10) imp market 0.049∗ 0.114∗ 0.251∗
(11) real result + 0.053∗ 0.011 0.012 0.017
(12) real result - 0.005 0.015 -0.015 0.003 -0.430∗
(13) exp result + 0.097∗ 0.017 0.025 0.028 0.115∗ 0.116∗
(14) exp result - -0.033 -0.015 -0.040 -0.013 -0.020 0.129∗ -0.341*
∗ : p < 0.01, two-tailed Pearson correlation
As expected, both age and size are negatively correlated with the need for
external finance as well as with financial constraints. Surprisingly, neither the
intensity of incremental nor of radical innovation shows non-negligible cor-
relation coefficients in magnitude or significance. This is in line with (Chris-
tensen, 2007), who in a bivariate setting found no evidence that innovative
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firms are particularly affected by financial constraints. No strong correlation
indicating collinearity can be found.
3.4 Model Setup and Empirical Strategy
Our data set represents an unbalanced panel, where roughly half of the firms
participated in one wave and the other half in two to twelve, regressively de-
veloping. Since the methods available for unbalanced panel data regressions
with selection and dichotomous dependent variables are very limited, we in-
stead choose to use pooled data and include year dummies to capture year
effects. To address the issue of serial correlation among multiple observations
of the same firm, we relax the assumption that standard errors are indepen-
dently and identically distributed by clustering them at the firm level, which
allows for within-group correlation. Furthermore, we used multivariate im-
putation techniques in the rare cases of missing data on firm characteristics
and survey question replies of the independent variables, where for every
single variable less then 5% of observations show missing cases.
The dichotomous nature of our dependent variable and the very nature of
our survey data suggest the use of a probit model. To analyze the interplay
between supply and demand for external financing for innovation, we chose
a two-stage model with endogenous selection, which allowed us to construct
a consistent model for decisions both to seek and to obtain financing for in-
novation projects, where the former obviously represents the prerequisite for
the latter. This is done with a technique equivalent to the well-established
two-stage Heckman correction in linear models (Heckman, 1979), applied for
bivariate probit models (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) and estimating a
firm’s likelihood to experience financial constraints by full maximum likeli-
hood.
We execute our econometric analysis as follows. Model one includes con-
trol variables for the corresponding year, the firm’s industry affiliation and
its legal form, some basic firm characteristics, its incremental and radical in-
novation intensity (hypothesis 1 a and b), and its perceived importance of
some factors associated with innovation. In model two, we add an interac-
tion term between the firms’ incremental innovation intensity and its struc-
tural characteristics size and age (inc. inno*sizere f , inc. inno*agere f ). To test
the interplay between innovation intensity and the liability of newness and
smallness, we reverse the magnitude of both age and size to have high values
for young and small firms, and vice versa. We do the same in model three
for radical innovation intensity (rad. inno*sizere f , rad. inno*agere f ). In both
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models we test if young and small firms are over-proportionally affected by
the assumed negative impact of innovation intensity on the access to external
finance (hypothesis 2 a and b), and by their comparison if the type of inno-
vation activity matters (hypothesis 2 c). Then in model four we add first the
firms reported increase (real result +) or decrease (real result -) in profits in the
current period, and in model five the firms expectation for the next period
(exp result +, exp result -) to test the interplay between realized and perceived
firm level outcomes and different forms of innovation intensity (hypothesis 3
a and b ).
4 Results and Discussion
table B.6 reports the results of the probit models with endogenous selection
(where the first stage is reported in ?? , testing for the likelihood that a firm
experiences financial constraints in financing innovation projects conditional
to its demand for external financing.
4.1 Demand for external innovation finance
In the first stage of the model to be found in table ?? in the appendix, we test
the likelihood of having demand for external capital to finance innovation
projects. Even though this stage is not of main interest for our analysis, it
is necessary for endogeneity reasons and results may be interesting in them-
selves. Surprisingly, demand for external innovation finance appears at first
glance to be quite inelastic to firm characteristics and innovation intensity,
which holds true for incremental and radical innovation alike. Firms that are
a subsidiary have a significantly lower demand for external finance, probably
because they are likely to be supplied with funding by their parent company.
The variable region2 (firms in the wider, less densely populated Aalborg area)
has a negative sign and is significant in all models indicating that demand
for external finance of innovation is not as widespread among firms in these
regions as is the case in the inner urban area. Realized positive profits de-
creases the demand for external finance. This indicates that, in line with the
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), firms indeed prefer to finance
innovation activities with internal funds such as accumulated profits. Con-
trary to initial expectations, the firm’s size and age have no significant effect
on its demand for financing, which appears puzzling at first glance, since the
majority of theories and evidence claim that small and young firms are in
greater need of external financing. Overall, we see a somewhat limited ex-
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planatory power of traditional firm characteristics and innovation indicators
alike for the financial needs of firms in our sample. It should, however, be
reiterated that the bulk of the earlier literature has focused on the supply side
rather than on demand. Yet, while appreciating the importance of consider-
ing the interplay between demand and supply of capital, our focus in this
analysis lays on the constraints firms meet to their innovation financing.
4.2 Supply for external innovation finance
In the second stage, we test the firm’s likelihood to experience financial con-
straints. In model one, we see that size matters to obtaining financing, as
increasing size reduces the chances of being constrained, significant at least
at a 5% level. In line with hypothesis 3a, radical innovation intensity is asso-
ciated with a higher probability of being financially constrained, significant
on 5% level. Yet, this holds not true for incremental innovation, which shows
a negative but not significant coefficient, lending support to hypothesis 3b,
and at the same time calling for more nuanced understanding of the relation-
ship between different types of firm level innovation activities and financial
constraints.
In model two, we introduce interaction terms with the structural char-
acteristics age and size (reversed) and the behavioral variable, incremental
innovation intensity (inc.inno ∗ sizerev, inc.inno ∗ agerev). While the interaction
with age shows no statistical significance (leading to a rejection of hypothesis
2a), the interaction with size (reversed) indeed shows a positive coefficient
significant at the 5% level, indicating in favor of hypothesis 2b that high in-
novation intensity and smallness indeed amplify each others negative effect
on access to external finance. The same holds true in model three for the
interaction with radical innovation intensity. As speculated in hypothesis 2c,
this effect appears to be higher in the case of radical innovation.
In model four we test for the additional effect of being a firm reporting to
be a good or a bad performer, operationalized by positive or negative devel-
opment of profits in the observation period. While good performance in this
model leads to no benefits in accessing external finance, bad performance
indeed appears to be penalized by capital markets. The coefficient for nega-
tive profit development shows significance at 10% level, lending partial and
weak support to hypothesis 3a. However, while realized outcomes appear to
at least slightly matter, we see no significant effect at all for the firms profit
expectations introduced in model five. Interestingly, when including realized
and expected outcome characteristics, in both model four and five the coef-
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ficient as well as significance of radical innovation intensity decreases. This
might indicate a more nuanced relationship between innovation activity and
outcome related to technology.
4.3 Robustness tests
To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we carried out additional robust-
ness tests. First, we ran only the supply model (stage 2) in a fixed effects
probit model. For our structural and innovation variables, we also tried dif-
ferent transformations (other than the here applied logarithmic one) such as
the squareroot, and also the non-transformed terms. For our outcome vari-
able, we also replaced the self reported profits by balance sheet data from
Danish register data (which is unfortunately only available for a subset of
firms). While mostly not as pronounced, all results point in a similar direc-
tion. The period we analyze span across the financial crisis and it can be
presumed that this has an effect on conditions for obtaining external finance
(Cowling et al., 2012; Vermoesen et al., 2009). In our empirical analyses we
included year dummies to capture potential effects from changes in business
cycles but additionally we introduced a number of macroeconomic business
cycle indicators but found no effect from this.
5 Conclusion
Our approach in this study was to build on previous theories and studies on
demand and constraints for financing for different types of firms and to add
new, improved ways of analyzing this problem area. Our hypotheses were
built to render a more nuanced picture of the financial constraints problem
than has been presented to date. We were able to analyze this problem area
from a longitudinal perspective, and although our overall results are in con-
trast to some previous findings in the literature we did find new insights that
contribute an additional understanding of financial constraints.
It has been claimed that by and large firms who apply for credit gets it
(Nightingale and Coad, 2014) but that some types of firms may be financially
constrained. Regarding the demand side our results indicate weak systematic
patterns in which types of firms are demanding external finance. Unsurpris-
ingly, the realized, positive economic results decreases demand for external
finance as does the firms’ status as subsidiary. The main, second stage analy-
ses showed that the effect of innovation per se on capital demand and supply
is not uniform, but rather interdependent on other firm characteristics. We
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furthermore find the type of innovation to matter. While incremental inno-
vation is rewarded by financiers, the results for more radical or technology-
based innovations are more ambiguous.
It is likely that in a small and dense region, where innovation activities
are primarily incremental and not science-based, financiers are better able
to cope with asymmetries of information and other reasons for credit ra-
tioning. Hence, static, non-innovative firms are, in our analyses, financially
constrained, while firms with some innovation are rewarded, and technology-
based, high-tech innovation firms are constrained. This is congruent with
some earlier studies that posit that “some, not too much, innovation is good”
(Freel, 2000, 2007).
Our findings lead us to question the generalization of existing theories in
the field. Whereas financial markets are often seen as prime examples of full
information and extended mobility of production factors, our results indicate
that the demand and supply of the finance nexus is nuanced and highly con-
textual. As mentioned, another, complementary interpretation is that capital
markets work differently in small, dense environments because information
flows more easily and networks of firms and of financiers facilitate both mit-
igating information asymmetries and the insourcing of knowledge on capital
market reactions (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). This is consistent with (Bel-
lucci et al., 2014) who find that when financiers have well-established lend-
ing relationships with firms, they evaluate innovation positively, whereas the
innovation variable has a negative impact on access to credit for firms that
are more likely to suffer from information asymmetries. Proximity is, in turn,
a facilitator of reducing asymmetric information, hence increasing access to
financing. It is likely that the regional context is a powerful explanation as
to why existing theories do not seem to fit our case. This does not disprove
these established theories, but points to the need to take contextual factors
into account and to evaluate these theories differently in different regional
settings.
The findings not only complicate the theoretical understanding of access
to financing, but may also have policy implications. Most public support
programs for access to financing place restrictions on eligibility; most often
their financing is available only to firms that are young, small, innovative, or
some combination thereof, at least in some regions. The results of our study
indicate a need for careful consideration of these criteria.
A number of limitations apply to how far we can go in drawing univer-
sally valid conclusions. The study was confined to a small region in a small
country. As we have argued, entrepreneurial finance is to a large extent con-
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textual (Ning et al., 2015), and the results may have been different in another
financial system. We also treated financiers and types of financing as if they
were homogeneous. In reality, there are vast differences between, for exam-
ple, venture capital and bank financing, and different results might be seen
if the analyses were confined to only one type of capital (Brown et al., 2012).
For further research, we suggest continuing to explore the impact of in-
novation types on financial constraints. For example, the latest round of CIS-
survey results show that North Jutland has now moved up from the bottom of
the rankings to become the most innovative region in Denmark, despite still
being the one with the lowest rate of R&D activities. Furthermore, these sur-
vey results show that the major difference between other regions and North
Jutland is that the latter’s firms have been engaged in organizational change
to a larger extent. The capital markets may view such innovations particu-
larly positively.
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Appendix
Table B.4: Variable Descriptions
Variable Type Description
Dependent Variables
demand finance dichotomous Firm in need for external finance
constraints dichotomous Firms experienced finance constraints
Behavior: Innovation intensity
inc. inno continuous Firms number of introduced incremental innovation, natural logarithm: ln(1+x)
rad. Inno continuous Firms number of introduced radical innovation, natural logarithm: ln(1+x)
inno planned dichotomous Firm plans innovation in next period
Structure
size continuous Firms employees, natural logarithm: ln(x)
age continuous Firms age in years, natural logarithm: ln(x)
Outcome: Performance
real result + dichotomous Firms realized profits positive
real result − dichotomous Firms realized profits negative
exp result + dichotomous Firms expected profits positive
exp result − dichotomous Firms expected profits negative
Behavior: Innovation intensity
imp. technology dichotomous Perception: High importance of access to technology
imp. IPR dichotomous Perception: High importance of IPR
imp. market dichotomous Perception: High importance of market knowledge
Controls
region 1 dichotomous Firm located in the central Aalborg region
region 2 dichotomous Firm located in a metropolitan region
industry dichotomous Firm industry, (0) others, (1) manufacturing, (2) service, communication and finance
legal f orm categorical Firm legal form, (0) others, (1) public traded, (2) limited liability, (3) private
subsidiary dichotomous Firm is a subsidiary
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Table B.5: Descriptive Statistics by Categories
Category N Percent demand
finance, mean
constraints,
mean
inc. inno
intensity, mean
rad. inno
intensity, mean
Total 2822.00 100.00 0.63 0.17 4.06 1.59
Distribution and characteristics of firms by year
2000 207.00 7.34 0.71 0.18 3.20 1.13
2001 200.00 7.09 0.74 0.16 4.45 2.24
2002 179.00 6.34 0.69 0.11 3.41 1.53
2003 188.00 6.66 0.76 0.21 5.80 2.90
2004 196.00 6.95 0.61 0.18 5.62 2.06
2005 187.00 6.63 0.66 0.13 4.57 1.32
2006 193.00 6.84 0.66 0.12 4.34 1.20
2007 179.00 6.34 0.67 0.12 4.18 1.46
2008 200.00 7.09 0.72 0.18 4.80 1.30
2009 260.00 9.21 0.76 0.25 7.44 3.71
2010 316.00 11.20 0.48 0.18 2.47 0.82
2011 212.00 7.51 0.48 0.16 1.89 0.69
2012 170.00 6.02 0.48 0.23 1.41 0.61
2013 135.00 4.78 0.48 0.15 2.69 0.83
Distribution and characteristics of firms by industry
manufacturing 1442.00 51.10 0.68 0.17 4.73 1.89
service & finance 555.00 19.67 0.48 0.19 3.18 1.26
others 825.00 29.23 0.65 0.16 3.50 1.29
Note: incremental and radical innovation intensity (innovation count) in full number and not in logarithmic transformation.
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Abstract
In this paper, we study the influence of incumbent firms on the structural dynam-
ics research networks in technological niches at the case of public funded research
projects. The protected space of technological niches offered by such public research
funding offer firms an environment to experiment in joint learning activities on
emerging technologies shielded from the selection pressure on open markets, thereby
facilitating socio-technological transitions. Generally, the engagement of large in-
cumbent actors in the development of emerging technologies, particularly in joint
research projects with entrepreneurial ventures, is positively perceived, since their
resource endowment enables them to stem large projects and bring them all the way
to the market. However, growing influence of incumbents might also alter niche dy-
namics, making technology outcomes more incremental and adapted to the current
socio-technological regime. Potential influence on rate and direction of the tech-
nological development can to a large extend be explained by an actor’s position in
the network of the niche’s research activities. We create such a directed network of
project consortium leaders with their partners to analyze if network dynamics of joint
research projects in technological niches favor incumbent actors in a way that they
are able to occupy central and dominant positions over time. We deploy a stochastic
actor-oriented model of network evolution at the case of Danish public funded “smart
grid” research in the 2009-2012 period. We indeed discover path-dependent and cu-
mulative effects favoring incumbents. Our findings suggest a development of the
network towards an incumbent-dominated structure.
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Preface
This thesis mostly focuses on the effect of networks within the finance sphere
or between finance and research/industry, threatening network pattern and
dynamics in the research sphere as exogenous. I argue that, for the sake of
simplicity, one can – at least in the short run – assume analytic orthogonal-
ity between the dimensions of technological change. Yet, ample empirical
evidence suggests that a firm’s strategic positioning in interorganizational
networks may affect its innovative performance (e.g. Baum et al., 2000; Pow-
ell et al., 1996), and the structure of the overall network affects the innova-
tion output on the aggregated (Fleming et al., 2007) and firm level (Kudic,
2014; Schilling and Phelps, 2007) alike. Consequently, understanding net-
work dynamics in research helps us to discuss the impact finance may play
in facilitating the formation of favorable network structure.
In this chapter, my co-author Roman Jurowetzki and I therefore investi-
gate the dynamics of heterogeneous firm strategies, resulting network pat-
terns, and the rate and direction of technological change in public funded
R&D projects in danish smart-grid research. Since such networks are to a
large extent constructed by policy and the resulting grant allocation pattern,
it provides an interesting setting to discuss how “policy-motivated investors”
are able to influence network dynamics in research. We here focus on a the-
oretical as well as political tension, namely the role of large incumbent firms
in such research projects and networks.In innovation system literature and
many policy initiatives, engagement of large incumbent actors in the devel-
opment of emerging technologies, and especially joint research projects to-
gether with young SME’s, is generally positively perceived as they have the
capabilities to fulfill necessary systemic functions in a better way than new
start-up firms (Bergek et al., 2013a; Bulathsinhala and Knudsen, 2013). Yet,
literature on socioeconomic transition and the multi-level perspective (Geels,
2002) provides a more critical perspective, arguing the involvement of in-
cumbents might however alter niche dynamics making technology outcomes
more incremental and adapted to the current unsustainable socio-technical
regime. This is particularly evident if the emerging technology is a potential
substitution to the existing solutions (Bower and Christensen, 1995b). The
incumbents’ ability to influence the trajectory of technological development
can, to a large extent, be explained by their position in the niche network of
early stage research. A stochastic actor based network analysis suitable to in-
vestigate the path dependent evolution of actor driven networks reveals that,
in fact, large incumbent companies over time become increasingly dominant
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in the networks of actors that develop the Danish smart grid. Main forces
behind this development we find on the supply side of public grant alloca-
tion, for instance the preferences of public authorities towards certain firms,
technologies, project types. In addition, I identify demand side effects related
strategic motives of incumbents to participate in technological niches.
By emphasizing governance and influence related aspects combined with
firm characteristics and strategies, I provide an alternative – and perhaps
more critical – perspective on research and innovation networks, and the role
of the state in their coordination. Methodologically, I demonstrate the rich-
ness of novel techniques of evolutionary network analysis to answer such
questions by modeling collaboration decisions on actor level, and relating
them to macro outcomes of structural network evolution. This chapters aims
to generally enhance our understanding of the hidden strategic choices of ac-
tors, their effect on the resulting network structure, and technological changes
achieved rate and direction of technological change as an outcome. In the
guiding framework of the Ph.D. thesis, it mainly focuses on the dynamics
within the research space, but also links to outcomes in technology space
and the influence of the institutional framework. The consideration of such
strategic motives within research networks is of particular importance in sec-
tors where incumbents generally enjoy large influence, and long life-cycles
and high capital intensity of infrastructure investments offer potential incen-
tives to enforce the current “status quo”.
Fig. C.1: Positioning the paper in the theoretical framework
Investor Space
Technology Space
Research Space
Institutional Environment
Part I
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Part II Part III
Chapter 2 Chapter 3
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This paper was developed by merging ideas from one of my working
papers on the evolution of danish energy research networks (Hain (imeo),
presented at the DRUID winter academy 2013, Aalborg) and Roman’s re-
search on the influence of incumbents in energy research projects (Jurowetzki
(2013b), presented at EMEAEE 2013, Nice). It was firstly presented at the the
“1st ENIC workshop” 2013 in Halle, afterwards at the “6th AIE conference”
2014 in Oxford, the “15thISS conference” 2014 in Jena, and several other oc-
casions at internal and external research workshop. It was submitted to the
ISS book proceedings of the Journal of Evolutionary Economics, where it just
got accepted for publication conditional of the consideration of the reviewers
(which are not implemented in the version to be found in my Ph.D. yet).
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1. Introduction
1 Introduction
The multidisciplinary literature on system innovation, often empirically fo-
cused on sustainability transitions, outlines the significance of niches for the
protection and development of path-breaking technologies in early stages
(Geels, 2002, 2004; Hoogma et al., 2004; Kemp et al., 1998). Public funded
research, development and demonstration (R&DD) protects represent such a
protected space, offering firms an environment to experiment in joint learn-
ing activities on emerging technologies.
Even though the niche is not an explicit concept within the innovation sys-
tems literature, the Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) approach high-
lights the importance of creating protected spaces to foster market formation
and diffusion (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007b).
Both streams of literature share a systemic understanding of innovation
and acknowledge evolutionary phenomena such as path-dependency, lock-
in, nonlinearity and multiple interdependency. However, there is arguably
one significant difference between the frameworks: The TIS approach has
been criticized for being “inward looking” (Markard and Truffer, 2008), in
a way that it underplays the potential tension between path-breaking inno-
vations and established technologies, or more broadly the selection environ-
ment.
The engagement of large incumbent actors in the development of emerg-
ing technologies, and especially joint research projects together with young
SME’s, is generally positively perceived as they have the capabilities to fulfill
necessary systemic functions in a better way than new start-up firms (Suurs
and Hekkert, 2005). Apart from the direct effect of the engagement, it is likely
to have a positive signaling effect. Thus, it might contribute positively to the
status of the niche, improving financial credibility and triggering interest of
other companies (Smith et al., 2005). Arguably, the involvement of incum-
bents might, however, alter niche dynamics, making technology outcomes
more incremental and adapted to the current unsustainable socio-technical
regime. This is particularly evident if the emerging technology is a potential
substitution to the existing solutions (Bower and Christensen, 1995a; Tush-
man and Anderson, 1986). The incumbents’ ability to influence the trajectory
of technological development can, to a large extent, be explained by their
position in the niche network. A firm’s strategic positioning in interorga-
nizational networks may affect its innovative performance (e.g. Baum et al.,
2000; Powell et al., 1996), and the structure of the overall network affects the
innovation output on the aggregated (Fleming et al., 2007) and firm level
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(Schilling and Phelps, 2007; ?) alike. If path-dependent and cumulative char-
acteristics such as reputation, age, or size of actors are main drivers of change
in these networks, evolutionary processes will enable them to obtain central
and dominant positions and thus shape the niche’s further development by
their will.
Networks are by no means static constructs in time and space, but rather
constantly rearrange in an evolutionary process (Doreian and Stokman, 2005;
Powell et al., 2005) and call for more dynamic and evolutionary approaches
in empirical innovation network research (e.g. Ahuja et al., 2007; Cantner and
Graf, 2011). More recent studies provide sound reasoning and empirical evi-
dence as to how cumulative and path dependent forces strongly influence the
actor composition, structure and outcome of networks. If the current network
structure impacts its possible future development, the network evolution be-
comes a path dependent and endogenous process (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003).
Existing ties often tend to become more persistent over time (Burt, 2000), and
preferential attachment makes the likelihood of creating new ties influenced
by the actors stock (Barabási, 2005) – leading to a process of structural rein-
forcement (Gulati, 1999).
In the terminology of innovation and transition literature, that relates to
the development of a niche into a “proto-regime” (Geels and Raven, 2006)
with increasingly established institutions and emerging stabilization mecha-
nisms. Actors in central positions of such networks are likely to have a high
influence on the rate and direction of future research through their higher
social influence and their role as “knowledge hubs”. In public funded R&DD
networks, consortium leaders of such projects based on public grants addi-
tionally have the opportunity to determine the content of research as well
as the inclusion of further organizations. However, an actor’s ability to suc-
cessfully obtain research grants is also said to develop in a cumulative and
path dependent manner (Viner et al., 2004). While these stabilization mech-
anisms are well-known features of social networks (e.g. Barabási and Albert,
1999), we know very little about how the characteristics and rationales of
central actors affect the outcome of such networks. Incumbent actors, who
over time carried out fixed investments in infrastructure, developed tech-
nological competences and secured market shares have a high incentive to
protect and replicate the old regime’s logic and reinforce existing techno-
logical trajectories rather than develop new ones (Geels, 2011). This reflects
a more critical and nuanced consideration of network structures in research
collaborations, which may not necessarily be fully cooperative and consensus
oriented, as mostly envisioned in innovation system and networks oriented
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approaches. Following that argumentation and first empirical evidence (c.f.
Jurowetzki, 2013a), actor driven network dynamics in technological niches
can be assumed to lead to more incremental outcomes which reinforce old
technological paths if (i.) the network evolution is driven by endogenous and
cumulative effects, such as the actors size, age, reputation or network posi-
tion; (ii.) incumbent actors embodying such characteristics are involved; and
(iii.) there exist possible new niche trajectories which lead to an underutiliza-
tion of their accumulated resources.
Empirically, this paper explores the evolution within the Danish electric-
ity grid-infrastructure network of joint participation in public funded R&DD
projects in the period 2009 until 2012. Companies and projects were identi-
fied by exploring the Danish research project database. The Danish case is of
particular interest because of the explicit political aspiration to become a Eu-
ropean technology hub for the development and testing of advanced energy
grid technologies (KEMIN, 2013). A national smart grid strategy from May
2013 emphasizes the importance of interaction between research institutes,
utilities and technology producers, and the development of various technolo-
gies. A number of research programs were established to support R&DD
projects from basic research to large-scale demonstration and commercializa-
tion.
The purpose of the present paper is to study structural dynamics and
path dependencies of research networks in technological niches at the case of
public funded research projects. In particular, deploying a stochastic-actor-
based model (Snijders et al., 2010a), we analyze if network dynamics of public
funded R&DD in technological niches favor incumbent actors in a way that
they are able to occupy central and dominant positions. Against the empir-
ical and theoretical background, we conceptualize the research network as
consisting of directed ties between the actors, assuming the project-leader to
project-partner link as a hierarchically ordered relationship. By doing so, we
are able to analyze up to now unobserved cumulative and self-reinforcing
effects of network dynamics.
As a result, we indeed find such path-dependent and cumulative effects
in the development of the research network that favor incumbent actors, in
the long run leading to a a reinforcing process of structural stabilization with
central and influential positions.
The remainder of this paper is composed as follows: The following section
2 aims at linking different streams of literature that advocate for the creation
and protection of technological niches with network theory. This connection
is made to understand strategies of different niche actors and possible macro
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outcomes of their behavior. Section ?? provides an overview of the techno-
logical and policy context of the smart grid development in Denmark. In
section ?? we introduce the stochastic actor-based model deployed to identify
the evolution in the niche-network, and describe the research networks data
used for the analysis as well as our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the
results, and the final section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Inertia at micro and meso levels
The achievement of the sustainability goals in highly dependent on the deter-
mination and ability to transform a number of large technical systems (LTS’s)
worldwide. LTS’s, such as the energy grid, the transportation or the agri-food
sector build complex, extremely interwoven technical, economic, institutional
and administrative structures (Hughes, 1987). Such sectors heavily build and
rely on existing tangible and institutional infrastructures (e.g. development
and trial systems, supplier and distribution networks, energy transmission
grids, and other complementary assets). This dependence leads to high en-
try barriers in aforementioned industries and explains why key players are
likely to be large companies (e.g. electric utilities, car manufacturers, railway
operators).
Incumbent firms with substantial shares of their resources bound in an
established technological regime are said to struggle in maintaining a certain
level of innovation activity - particularly when facing radical, discontinuous
technological change (e.g. Bower and Christensen, 1995b; Wagner, 2010).1 In
case of competence-enhancing technological innovation, established firms have
incentives to actively engage in and support the development of the technol-
ogy updating the existing (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) regime.Competence-
destroying innovation in turn appears as more likely to be pioneered by new-
comers (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
Over time, incumbents might also develop adoptive capabilities, enabling
them to absorb knowledge on more radical novelties and combine it with
their stock of knowledge to develop superior products and processes (Bergek
et al., 2013b). This can be done i.a. by engaging in joint R&D projects with
1One can broadly distinguish between competence-enhancing innovation building upon exist-
ing technological and organizational structures, and competence-destroying innovation turning
them obsolete (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). This distinction to a certain extent reflects the
notions of incremental and readical innovation.
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entrant firms or the acquisition of their technology (e.g. Wagner, 2010). How-
ever, once internalized, the absorbed novelty is likely to be aligned with ex-
isting resources in a complementary way. Therefore, when engaging in joint
R&D projects, we assume that established firms – given the power – will
influence technological trajectories in a way that makes the outcomes more
compatible with their established assets and therefore potentially less radical.
Once a LTS has gained momentum these strategies become part of the re-
sistance mechanisms against change on the system level (e.g. Van der Vleuten
and Raven, 2006; Walker, 2000). In the most extreme case, this leads to inertia
and lock-in (Arthur, 1989), as one might observe in our current fossil fuel
dependent energy system Unruh (2000, 2002).
2.2 Large technical systems transition and lock-in
As these systems gain momentum, they also develop effective resistance
mechanisms against change (e.g. Van der Vleuten and Raven, 2006; Walker,
2000). The resulting set-up creates a power and capability imbalance between
usually small enterprises that are pioneering the development of sustainable
solutions and incumbent actors (Hockerts and Wustenhagen, 2010). As long
as production and distribution processes within existing trajectories are eco-
nomically favorable, incumbents will not see urgent reasons to make large
investments and reorganize existing production structures. On the contrary,
they are most likely to defend the system against change (Walker, 2000). In
the most extreme case this leads to inertia and lock-in (Arthur, 1989), as one
might observe in our current fossil fuel dependent energy system Unruh
(2000, 2002).
2.3 System innovation thinking
Technological change embedded in large systemic context has been concep-
tualized and analyzed throughout the past three decades. The technologi-
cal innovation system TIS sub-orientation (Bergek et al., 2008; Carlsson and
Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert and Negro, 2009) within the innovation system
(IS) literature is increasingly used for the analysis of emergent industries on
the basis of radically innovative technologies and the institutional and orga-
nizational changes that accompany the technological development (Truffer
et al., 2012). A number of system functions (Hekkert et al., 2007b) focusing
on the support and nurturing of emerging technologies are seen as inter-
mediate variables between the structure of the system and its performance,
emerging out of the interplay between actors and institutions (Jacobsson and
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Bergek, 2011). While it is acknowledged that incumbent players may em-
ploy strategies to prevent disruptive innovation (Hekkert et al., 2007b), their
participation in the TIS is generally seen as fruitful – highlighting their re-
sources, knowledge integration capabilities (e.g. Bulathsinhala and Knudsen,
2013) and the positive signalling.
In the recent decade, a second stream of literature situated closer to the
science, technology and society (STS) tradition gained considerable atten-
tion. The multi-level perspective (MLP) at the center of the transition liter-
ature explains socio-technical transitions by the interplay of three systemic
concepts. The landscape on the macro-, the socio-technical regime on the
meso-, and niches on the micro-level respectively (Geels, 2002, 2005). The
character and intensity of the interplay between the three levels define the
paths, which a socio-technical transition might take. The key concept of
the MLP is the regime, which represents a coherent, stable structure at the
meso-level, combining established products, technologies, and institutions
(routines, norms, practices). The regime is characterized by a high level of
“structuration” (Coenen and Díaz López, 2010), well articulated rules, and
hence path-dependency and mechanisms for self-stabilization. It corresponds
in many respects to the selection environment in terms of evolutionary eco-
nomic theory and generates entry barriers for innovative technologies.
2.4 Niches & protected spaces
Niches are conceptualized as spaces that shield path-breaking innovations in
early stages of development from selection pressure on mainstream markets
(Hoogma et al., 2004; Kemp et al., 2001; Schot, 1992). Due to alternative selec-
tion criteria, population and interaction dynamics, niches can develop own
technological trajectories substantially differing from the established regime.
Selecting the appropriate level of protection and upholding a continuous
assessment might be crucial, in order to prevent protection of poor innova-
tions (Hommels et al., 2007) or on the other hand a too low level of protection
(Smith and Raven, 2012). The latter can happen when actors belonging to the
established unsustainable technological regime achieve dominance in spaces
that are actually meant for the development of solutions that are potentially
meant to replace parts of the current regime.
The direct funding of R&DD in selected technologies of interest repre-
sents an integral component of modern innovation policy. Shielded from the
selection pressure of open markets, these research projects present an ideal
platform for a broad, experimental and long term oriented search for new
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technologies. Nurtured with public investments, new entrants and incum-
bents alike are able to stem projects which would, due to their high tech-
nological uncertainty and long payoff periods, not be carried out otherwise.
Given the proper institutional set-up, public R&DD financing offers a pow-
erful tool to directly influence rate and direction of research activities (Pavitt,
1998) and to create technology niches.
2.5 A network perspective on technological niches
Cooperation and interaction between various actors involved in processes of
technology development such as universities, firms, intermediate, and end
users, are said to be of high importance for the smooth functioning of inno-
vation systems (e.g. Hekkert et al., 2007a; Lundvall, 1992; Malerba, 2002). A
major task for science and innovation policy is therefore to facilitate the de-
velopment of favourable R&D network structures (Carlsson and Jacobsson,
1997), triggering interaction between heterogeneous actors and the genera-
tion of technological variety. Organizations form collaborative alliances in
order to get access to their partners’ technological assets and capabilities.
Potentially fruitful interaction with other corporations come at the risk of
opportunistic technology appropriation by the counterpart, making careful
selection of partners crucial (Li et al., 2008).
One can broadly distinguish between two categories of information that
actors can use in cooperation decisions. First, reputation, mostly stemming
from past performance in similar settings (Shapiro, 1983). Second, informa-
tion about an actor’s position in relevant networks (Benjamin and Podolny,
1999; Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). Both appear to be highly interdepen-
dent, since an actor’s reputation can be influenced by the reputations of past
and current exchange partners (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993)
and collective reputations can be transferred to the a groups individual actors
(Schweizer and Wijnberg, 1999). In addition, in our case we assume that it is
the leaders of the particular projects that higher influence on the composition
of the collaborations. They are usually the ones applying for and holding the
largest share of the corresponding grant. Consequently, they determine most
of it’s content, and selecting partners.
2.6 Summary
Overall, the above presented streams of literature draw a similar picture from
their respective point of view: Innovation is particularly complex and costly
in systemic set-ups. Path dependencies are especially pronounced in sectors
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with a high share of infrastructure. Frameworks that inform policy measures
to spur change in these areas agree on the need to actively create techno-
logical and market niches in order to foster alternative technologies and in
general solutions. Yet, the role of incumbent player within these niches needs
more inquiry.
Innovation paths that are compatible with regime technologies are attrac-
tive for established firms. Resulting innovations can address some of the
existing problems on the MLP-regime level without compromising existing
socio-technical structures. Established firms are therefore likely to initiate or
engage in niche activities, such as R&DD projects, which investigate such ap-
plications.
Facing radical or architectural technological change, they will not directly
support the early development of path-breaking innovations, but rather aim
at gaining control, acquiring, and integrating novel and existing technologies
(Bergek et al., 2013b; Pavitt, 1986). Strong ties to the existent structures and
technologies on the one hand and technological uncertainty, on the other lead
to a relatively late but determined entry of incumbents into the development
of these technologies. We assume that this may alter the particular innova-
tive technology towards a less radical solution. In the case of sustainable
technologies that would mean that generally more desirable superior solu-
tions are possibly devaluated as they become compatible with the existing
unsustainable system. From a policy perspective, and in the particular con-
text of public research funding, that also raises the question related to outcome
additionality.
3 Sociotechnical context of the smart grid develop-
ment in Denmark
In order to understand and assess the structural dynamics of Danish en-
ergy R&DD projects, it is important to consider the technological and policy
context of the smart grid development. This section will introduce the fun-
damental technological concepts, components, and challenges related to the
ongoing paradigm shift in the Danish and many other energy systems. Fur-
thermore, the second part of this section will provide a brief overview of the
policy ambitions that inform and guide the setup of publicly funded research
programs. While we fully acknowledge that funding programs and specified
calls are likely to direct the technological trajectories of research projects, and
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to some extent predetermine their composition, certain types of evolution of
the combined network might indicate politically unintended developments.
3.1 Paradigm shift in energy grids
The traditional architecture of the electricity grid assumes a unidirectional
energy flow from centralized energy plants via the transmission and distri-
bution grids to consumers, where energy production levels are constantly
adjusted to match the over time fluctuating energy demand (Farhangi, 2010;
Fox-Penner, 2010). Embracing the renewable energy paradigm, centralized
energy production is gradually replaced by decentralized energy farming.
The harmonization between production and consumption has to move from
the traditional generation side into the transmission and consumption areas.
ICT technologies will play a central role in supporting this process (Mattern
et al., 2010).
In the Northeuropean set-up, two options are possible and currently dis-
cussed. Firstly, the construction of a European transmission super-grid to
allow, for instance, energy exports from Denmark to Germany in wind-peak
times. Secondly, the development of a national smart grid, that is able to
transmit energy and information in both ways, thus allowing for harmoniza-
tion by the means of flexible consumption. This requires the upgrade of the
existing grid by adding a layer of intelligence - advanced measurement, com-
munication and control technology - thus making the grid able to handle a
higher share of decentralized renewable energy generation and the recently
evolving consumption patterns (Elzinga, 2011). If flexible consumption can
be activated by the introduction of smart functionality, costly investments in
the reinforcement of the distribution system can be moved into the future or
avoided (Forskningsnetværket, Smart Grid, 2013).
3.2 Danish smart grid research and aspirations
Denmark is already today counting the largest amount of R&DD projects
within the smart energy area in Europe (Giordano et al., 2011, 2013). The
extremely high ambition of the national energy agreement, passed by the
government in 2012, targets a wind-power share of 50 percent by 2020, and
the more recently announced Smart Grid Strategy sees the country as a Eu-
ropean laboratory for innovative energy solutions (KEMIN, 2013). In their
latest inventory report Giordano et al. (2013) outline, that compared with
other European countries, Denmark manages to develop a large amount of
smaller projects which spurs technological diversity (Borup et al., 2013). Fig-
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ure C.2, adopted from (Jurowetzki, 2014), shows the various technology areas
that can be summarized from an analysis of 99 research project descriptions.
The tagclouds, indicating particularly important keywords for the respec-
tive clusters, suggest that R&D projects can be broadly gathered in 10 groups.
Projects in communities 8 and 9 are less technical, but rather focused on the
interaction with the energy users and their ability to flexibilize consump-
tion. Communities 5 and 7 examine different problems on a energy-sytem
macro-level. Many of these projects develop models and simulations related
to problems that stem from large scale renewable energy integration. The
smaller communities, 0 and 1, summarize projects on data-transfer and ad-
vanced battery technology respectively. The communities 6 and 2 gather
different projects related to electric mobility and its compatibility with the
energy grid. Finally, the clusters 4 and 11 examine the role of the heating
sector within the evolving grid infrastructure. Space and water heating is
responsible for a great share of energy consumption, and due to its nature
heating can be used as a source of flexible energy consumption and poten-
tially also for energy storage. Research projects in this area mainly focus on
the integration of mature heating technologies such as district heating and
heat pumps into the emerging smart grid infrastructure.
While the obvious technological diversity can be interpreted as a sign of
successful niche development and the gradual merge of the electricity and
heating systems into one smart energy system (Copenhagen Cleantech Clus-
ter, 2014), this context also offers entry and influence opportunities for dif-
ferent types of established actors. This study aims at exploring this issue,
employing an evolutionary network study approach. At the core of this re-
search is the question of whether public funded R&DD activities are able to
provide necessary shielding in order to develop and introduce the needed
amount of technological variety in the changing energy grid sector.
4 Modelling Network Evolution
4.1 Data
Network Data
As a source for public funded research projects, we utilize the database pro-
vided by Energiforskning.dk. Combining data from several energy technology
research and development programs, this database represents the most com-
prehensive source for public funded energy research in Denmark, covering
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projects funded by the Strategic Research Council, ForskEL, ForskNG, ForskVE,
ELFORSK, Green Labs DK, Danish High Technology Foundation and the European
Union. For the current analysis records from the smart grid and systems cate-
gory were exported containing information on projects from 2009 to 2012 on
yearly basis – overall 75 projects with 277 participants, and 132 single firms.
Among those actors we identify 27 incumbent firms and 21 research insti-
tutions with the rest being either established diversifier companies or new
entrants2. A graphical presentation of the network under observation and its
change over time is provided in Table C.3 in the appendix. On first glance,
a formation of structural clusters around some incumbent actors can already
be seen over time.
In order to utilize models of network dynamics, the dataset under obser-
vation has to fulfill certain properties in line with the underlying assumptions
of this model class. First, the network has to show some variation between its
periods. However, too rapid changes indicate that the assumption of grad-
ual change – compared to the observation frequency – is violated. To ensure
the validity of the gradual change assumption, we consult the Jaccard index
to be found in table ??, a common measure of similarity between two net-
works.3 Snijders (2002) suggest this index to be higher than 0.3 and never
drop beyond 0.2, which is given in our data. Overall, after a first preliminary
inspection, the network data appears to have suitable properties in line with
the assumptions of stochastic actor oriented models. Some further descrip-
tive statistics on structural network measures and their development over
time are provided in table ?? in the appendix.
Actor Data
Data on firm characteristics, such as their age, size, legal form et cetra was
extracted from the Danish firm database Navne & Numre Erherv (NNE).
For additional information about firms’ technological capabilities and their
range of activity where gathered by studying annual reports, press articles,
corporate websites et cetra.
2A detailed description of the applied classification methodology is described below
3The Jaccard index as a measure of similarity between two network waves is computed by
N11
N11 + N01 + N10
, where N11 represents the number of ties stable over both waves, N01 the newly
created and N10 newly terminated ties in wave 2 (see Batagelj and Bren, 1995).
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4.2 Modeling network dynamics
Our attempt is to analyze the dynamics of interorganisational networks of
joint participation in public funded research projects. In particular, we are
interested in which firms over time move towards central positions in the
network. The analysis of such dynamic networks represents an empirical
challenge which calls for distinct statistical models and methods. The main
problem stems from the very nature of social network formation processes.
Many drivers of individual tie-formation decisions, such as transitivity, reci-
procity, and popularity effects, by their very nature lead to endogeneity and
dependencies of observations (Rivera et al., 2010), since multiple characteris-
tics of the current network structure influence its future development. This
usually violates the assumptions of most standard statistical model types at
hand (Steglich et al., 2010).
The class of stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOM) originally devel-
oped by Snijders (1996) represents an attractive solution to address the inher-
ent endogeneity problems of longitudinal network analysis, which scholars
have lately started to deploy in the context of inter-organizational innovation
networks (e.g. Balland, 2012; Balland et al., 2012; Buchmann et al., 2014; Giu-
liani, 2013; Ter Wal, 2013). At its core, a SAOM combines a random utility
model, continuous time Markov process estimation procedures, and Monte
Carlo simulation. Originally, SAOM was developed in a sociological context
and designed to model group dynamics in interpersonal networks (e.g. Van
De Bunt et al., 1999). However, actor-oriented modeling has also proven to be
suitable to depict the interaction between macro outcomes and firms’ micro
choices (Macy and Willer, 2002; Whitbred et al., 2011) in inter-organizational
alliance formation process. Here, structural change of the network is driven
by individual firms’ collaboration decision derived from a random utility
model. Firms are assumed to observe the current network structure and char-
acteristics of its population, and reorganize their ego-network in an utility-
optimizing manner. Given the context of the study, we consider SAOM as
the most suitable class of dynamic network models and deploy it for the
empirical analysis to follow.
Snijders (1996) firstly proposed to address the problem of multiple endo-
geneity in the evolution of social network with transforming discrete datasets
of panel waves into a continuous set of micro-changes (single reconfigu-
ration decision) to be estimated by Markov-chain Monte Carlo simulation
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(MCMC).4 Unobserved changes between the panel waves are simulated as
continuous actor choices at stochastically determined points of time. For-
mally, following a Poisson function of rate λi, the actors (in our case, individ-
ual firms) are allowed to create, maintain, or dissolve ties until the network
is transformed to the new structure χ. The decision of actor i to change the
state of one tie to another actor j leads to a new overall state of the network
χ, where the probability Pi for an actor choosing this structure is given by:
Pi(χ0,χ, βk) =
exp( fi(χ0,χ′, βk))
∑
χ′∈C(χ0)
exp( fi(χ0,χ′, βk))
(C.1)
It technically resembles a multinomial logistic regression, modeling the
probability that an actor chooses a specific (categorical) new network config-
uration Pi as proportional to the exponential transformation of the resulting
networks objective function fi(.), with respect to all other possible configu-
rations. The parameters’ coefficients are stepwise adjusted by Monte Carlo
simulation techniques in order to obtain convergence between the estimated
and observed model, and finally, held fixed to allow their comparison and
post-estimation analyses. The objective function contains actor i’s perceived
costs and benefits of a particular network reconfiguration leading to a net-
work state χ,χ, which are represented by the random utility model:
fi(χ0,χ′, βk) =∑
k
βksi(χ0,χ, νi, νj, ci,j, e, r) (C.2)
It depends on the current state of the network χ0, the potential new one χ,
the ego i’s and alter j’s individual covariates νi and νj, their dyadic covariates
cij, exogenous environmental effects e, and a random component r capturing
omitted effects. The underlying assumption is that the actors observe the
current structure of the network χ0 and the relevant characteristics of its
actor set and make their collaboration decisions in order to optimize their
perceived current utility (Jackson and Rogers, 2007).
4.3 Empirical Strategy
Theoretical considerations
We model the tie creation process between ego i (project consortium leader)
and alter j (project partner) as unidirectional from i ⇒ j. Thus, existing ties
4Besides all its merits, the usage of estimations based on continuous-time Markov processes
also has its drawbacks. It by definition does not allow for path dependencies. Yet, it is still
possible to include variables aggregated over time to the current state.
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do not have to be reciprocal – a characteristic we find in many real-life net-
works such as friendships, mentorship, or producer-consumer relationships.
Since we are interested in the ability to steer technological development of
public funded research networks, we assume project consortium leader to
have a significantly higher influence on the project’s content than other par-
ticipants. From this point of view, the directed network resembles the gov-
ernance structure of there networks, and the actors outdegrees can be inter-
preted as a measure of influence. In our case, this appears as reasonable since
the leaders of such projects are usually the ones applying for the correspond-
ing grant, determining most of it’s content, and selecting further partners. We
chose a unilateral confirmation setup, where tie creating is only conditional
to the ego’s – but not the alter’s – choice. By doing so, we assume potential
partners to automatically join research projects when invited. This appears
as a strong, but realistic assumption. Such a participation represents a safe
source of income (and potentially knowledge), where the main upfront work,
such as the grant application and determination of the content, is mostly car-
ried out by the project leader. SAOM usually model tie creating as well as
tie dissolution, where actors might choose to break up ongoing relationships
which turn out to now offer negative utility. Since in our case the timeframe
research projects is determined ex-ante, we only model the creation of new
ties, where we exclude egos with already existing collaborations from the
ego’s choice set.
There undoubtedly exist some caveats when mapping networks based the
common participation research consortia funded by public research grants.
First, these networks only to some degree evolve naturally, since they are
subject to a selection by the responsible public authorities. Selection crite-
ria may be found, among others, in (i.) the reputation and credibility based
on past performance and other forms of accumulated advantage of consortia
members, (i.) the characteristics of the project such as the applied technol-
ogy, (iii.) or the favoritism of certain consortia constellations. Second, since
the actors are anticipating a selection according to these criteria, they have
an incentive to consciously form consortia according to them. Thus, consor-
tia formation are subject to selection biases ex-ante and ex-post to the project
application. Consequently, the results have to be interpreted not as the out-
comes of natural network evolution, but rather the channeled evolution in
a socially constructed selection environment designed by public authorities,
which might be subject to criteria (ii.). With the choice of the study’s empir-
ical context, we attempt to minimize systematic biases caused by criteria (ii.)
and (iii.). First, Danish research funding in renewable energy technology is
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designed to generate the broad technological variety necessary for the sus-
tainable transition of the energy system (Lund and Mathiesen, 2009), where
favoritism of certain technology should explicitly be avoided. Second, by
including several research funding programs of independent governmental
and non-governmental agencies in Denmark and the EU, spanning different
industries as well as preferred development stages of funded projects, we
avoid systematic bias caused by preferences of particular programs or policy
initiatives.
Yet, the development of the network in quest is driven by two forces. The
supply side of public authorities making grant allocation decisions, as well
as the (somewhat under-conceptualized) demand side capturing the firms
decision to apply for grants, and their selection of partners. In our research
setup, we will not be able to empirically disentangle them, which leaves us
with intuition and anecdotal evidence.
Dependent Variable
We Model collaboration choices driving the evolution of the network are the
outcome of the actors’ mutual attempts to optimize their expected utility
with respect to their own and their potential alters’ covariates, and the cur-
rent network structure. Thus, our model’s dependent variable represents the
probability Pi that the focal actor i chooses a reconfiguration of the own net-
work that leads to a tie with a corresponding alter j.
Independent Variables
Actor covariates: This set of variables represents the effect of individual
actor characteristics on their likelihood to establish new ties with other orga-
nizations.
In order to examine the role of actors in the combined network, we use
a set of industry experts. We differentiate between three roles, where we are
particularly interested in the role of energy incumbents and the strategic de-
viations of these actors as compared to other actors involved in smart grid
research projects. Role incumbent: This category aims at grouping actors
with an origin in the energy sector that have an vested interest in protect-
ing the established infrastructure from significant change. The experts were
asked to identify “firms with a strong background/track-record and stakes
in the traditional energy sector”. This includes utilities, producers of trans-
mission and distribution infrastructure, and producers of measuring devises.
Apart from the utilities that went through a Europe wide policy induced or-
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ganizational restructuring process, companies were founded before 2000. New
Entrant: This group summarizes companies which were mostly founded af-
ter 2000 and have their main activity in the energy sector. The firms provide a
broad range of products and services. Many of the firms develop ICT related
solutions for the envisioned communication structure of the smart grid. An-
other large share are technology consultancies that are often responsible for
analysis and system integration. It, however, also includes mature firms from
other fields diversifying in the energy sector. Role Others: This class con-
tains private and public actors that have shown interest in the development
of a new grid infrastructure by participating in a research project. Actors
are rather heterogeneous and have not had a background in the energy grid
sector. This set of actors represents the reference group.
The size of a firm is also supposed to influence it’s capabilities of suc-
cessfully obtaining research grants, as well as to occupy central and domi-
nant position in the resulting research networks. However, size is difficult to
compare between different forms of organizations such as private companies,
public organizations and research institutions. Therefore we only use a rough
categorical classification of small (up to 25 employees, firm small), medium
sized (up to 100 employees, reference groups), and large organizations (more
than 100 employees, firm large).
While maturing, firms are able to increase their competences in how to
successfully formulate a research grant application, establish an intensify for-
mal and informal relationships to industry partners and public authorities,
and develop routines how to manage research partnerships. Since we expect
these benefits to increase with decreasing marginal effects, and furthermore
the distribution of firm age in our sample is highly skewed (start-ups as well
as traditional firms established over a hundred years ago), we use the natural
logarithm of the ego’s age in years instead as control variable.
Some further descriptive statistics of these actor-oriented measures are
provided in table C.6.
Local (ego) network effects: This set of variables captures structural char-
acteristics of the actor’s ego-network, which include dyadic and triadic tie-
configurations with other actors. Literature suggests these effects to be among
the most important driving forces of network dynamics. Given the context
of our study, however, they mostly represent control variables and are not
emphasized in the following analysis. Reason therefore is the local nature of
these variables, referring to effects only in and on the close neighbourhood
in the network space.
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The most basic effect is defined by the outdegree of actor i, represent-
ing the basic tendency to form an arbitrary tie to possible alters j, regardless
of their individual characteristics. Since most social network structures ob-
served in reality are rather sparse (meaning their density is way below 0.5),
this effect tends to be negative, meaning the costs of establishing a tie per
se in absence of a particular beneficial characteristic outweigh the benefits if
no further characteristics make this tie particularly attractive (Snijders et al.,
2010a).
Another basic feature of most social networks is reciprocity, the ten-
dency of an actor to respond to an i ⇒ j with the establishment of an j ⇒ i
tie (c.f. Wasserman, 1979), or in our context to be invited to join a research
project led by an organization formerly participated in a project led by the
current organization.
Transitivity is a measure for the tendency towards transitive closure,
sometimes also called the clustering coefficient. Formally, it determines the
likelihood a connection between i ⇒ j and i ⇒ h is closed by a connection
between j ⇒ h and/or h ⇒ j, or in other words that “partners of partners
become partners” (e.g. Davis, 1970). In our case we make use of the measure
for transitive triads, which measures transitivity for actor i by the number
of other actors h for which there is at least one intermediary j forming a
transitive triplet of this kind.
Global network effects: Global network (or degree-related) effects express
global hierarchies in a way that they reflect actors positions in the overall net-
work. They capture the tendency of actors to form and receive ties according
to their amount of out- and in-degrees, independent of their particular posi-
tion in the network. They are of particular interest against the background of
our study, since they are in contrast to commonly applied triadic measures
suitable to analyze the tendency of certain actors to establish central and,
thus, dominant positions in the network structure.
Out-degree popularity captures the reputation and social recognition
effect of the network on the activities of actor i. A positive parameter in-
dicates that actors sending a higher amount of ties are also considered as
more attractive to receive them. This effect leads to a convergence of in- and
outdegrees on actor level. In our case that indicates that actors leading many
research projects also happen to often get invited to become research partners
in other projects. These “knowledge integrators” (Bulathsinhala and Knud-
sen, 2013) are likely to accelerate the diffusion of knowledge and support
other projects with their accumulated knowledge and other resources.
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Of particular interest for this study is the Out-degree activity, which
is the tendency of actors with high outdegrees to establish even more. A
positive parameter indicates a self-reinforcing mechanism leading to an in-
creasing dispersion of out-degrees in the network (Barabási and Albert, 1999).
It can be interpreted as the in network-structuralic impersonation of what is
called the “Matthew Effect” (c.f. Merton, 1968, 1988), cumulative advantage
(Price, 2007) or preferential attachment (Barabási and Albert, 1999). Net-
works driven by this effect tend to stabilize towards a core-periphery struc-
ture around some very central, well connected, and influential actors.
To avoid collinearity with local network effects, both Out-degree popularity
and Out-degree activity are used in their square root. We thereby also as-
sume decreasing marginal effects of additional ties. Finally, we also include
an interaction term between Out-degree activity and role incumbent, to
test if the posited Matthew effect works particularly strong for incumbents.
Model Specification
To analyze the influence of actor characteristics and endogenous structural
effects, we run a set of three models. All of them contain a set of stan-
dard structural dyadic and triadic ego-network control variables. Model I
traditionally tests for ego (project leader) covariates, which are assumed to
affect the capabilities of creating new outgoing ties. Model II instead tests
for degree-related structural effects. In comparison to the set of dyadic and
triadic structural effects, degree related effects are related to the overall num-
ber of in- and out-degrees of alter and ego, independent of their position in
the others network. Thus, while the first set of controls refers to the local
hierarchy of the actors ego network, degree related effects refer to a global
hierarchy in the overall network. Finally, in model III we test for the joint
effects of actor covariates and degree related effects simultaneously.
All parameters are estimated under full maximum likelihood according
to the algorithm proposed by Snijders et al. (2010b), which has proven to
be more efficient for small datasets. Technically, we make use of the SAOM
application of SIENA (Ripley et al., 2013), a package for the statistical envi-
ronment of R.
5 Results
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Goodness-of-fit evaluation
As a first goodness-of-fit measure one can consider the t-convergence val-
ues of the parameters, indicating whether the simulated values deviate from
the observed values. For a good model convergence, Snijders et al. (2010a)
suggests to only include parameters with t-values of convergence between es-
timated and observed parameters below 0.1, what is given for all parameters
in all corresponding models. The values in general show better convergence
in later models, which confirms the effectiveness of our applied forward-
selection strategy of model choice. Since the class of stochastic actor-oriented
models is still under development, there exists no direct equivalent to the R2
indicator of least squares regression models. Latest advances, however, offer
a set of instruments to asses the model fit in stochastic settings. Score tests
for each variable proposed by Schweinberger (2012), lead to overall satisfying
results and gradually increased from model I to III. To account for changing
dynamics over time, i.e. due to different policy focus and overall funding
available, we carry out the test for time heterogeneity proposed by Lospinoso
et al. (2011), which indeed shows a significant effect. As a result, an interac-
tion term between year dummies and the actors outdegree is included in all
models.
Also, we perform the Monte Carlo Mahalanobis Distance Test proposed
by ?. Here we test the null hypothesis that auxiliary statistics such as inde-
grees, outdegrees and geodesic distance of observe data is distributed the re-
sults of Monte Carlo simulations on the estimated coefficients of our SAOM
model, using the network in period one as point of departure. The pur-
pose is to evaluate how well our stochastic model simulates transformation
from the initial to the final network in terms of different degree distribu-
tions. We thereby also provide first validation of the ability of our model
to predict future developments of research networks based on our estimated
coefficients. The results are illustrated in figure ??. The results suggest that
our model is very well suited to predict the indegree and geodesic degree
distribution, where the simulation results are very close to the observed val-
ues. Same holds for most forms of triad constellations. The only weakness
of the model up to now appears to be the inconsistent identification of low
outdegrees. While the model performs very well for high outdegrees, the
simulated statistics for nodes with zero up to two outdegrees deviates highly
from the observed values. However, since we are primarily interested in the
distribution of the high degrees (the dominant nodes in the network), we
consider the accuracy of prediction on the low end only as second priority.
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SAOM regression models
Table C.1 reports a set of SAOM on the probability of ego i to establish a new
outgoing tie, depending on the egos characteristics, ego network, and global
degree related effects. In our context that means that a project consortium
leading firm i establishes a collaboration with some project partner firm j.
Table C.1: Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model: Probability of Tie Creation Ego→Alter
Model I Model II Model III
Variable Coef. Std. Er. Coef. Std. Er. Coef. Std. Er.
Structural ego-network effects
outdegree -4.314∗∗∗ 0.540 -5.913∗∗∗ 0.342 -6.264∗∗∗ 0.453
reciprocity 1.143 0.622 1.411∗∗ 0.582 1.034 0.594
transitivity 1.791∗∗∗ 0.345 0.319 0.228 0.229 0.191
Actor level effects
size small 0.990 0.873 1.601∗∗ 0.681
size large 2.644∗∗∗ 0.832 1.629∗∗ 0.726
role incumbent 3.424∗∗∗ 0.611 2.759∗∗∗ 0.476
age (ln) -0.793∗∗ 0.267 -0.448∗∗ 0.227
Degree related effects
out-pop (√ ) 0.085∗∗ 0.029 0.077∗∗ 0.030
out-act (√ ) 0.372∗∗∗ 0.047 0.413∗∗∗ 0.073
out-act (√ ) ∗ role
incumbent
1.430∗∗∗ 0.347
Note: ∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level, two-tailed
In the first model we jointly test for basic ego-network and ego-characteristic
effects. The outdegree effect shows, as in most real-life sparse social net-
works, a negative coefficient. The positive and significant coefficient for
transitive ties indicates local clustering over time, when partners of “part-
ners become partners” on their on. Actors of size large establish signifi-
cantly more outdegrees than their peers of size small or the size medium
reference group. This might reflect the preference of grant allocation deci-
sion makers for more stable large firms leading research consortia, or just
the higher resource endowments of large players enabling them to manage
the coordination of multiple research projects simultaneously. The age of
the firm, however, ceteris paribus manifests in decreasing outdegrees. Alloca-
tion preferences towards stable project leaders again should lead to favoring
older firms not subject to the liability of newness and the associated high
failure rate (Freeman et al., 1983). An explanation could instead be found
on the demand side, when aging firms loose their innovative drive and stop
engaging in early stage research. An interesting finding is the high positive
and significant coefficient of role incumbent, providing first evidence that
the smart grid research network indeed over time tends to be dominated by
incumbent actors. Since we are not able to disentangle supply and demand
effects of public research funding, this finding again offers different explana-
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tions. First, it can be interpreted of revealed preferences of public authorities
for consortia led by incumbents, possibly reflecting incumbents strategic ad-
vantage of infrastructure ownership or their exercised influence on policy
making. On the other hand, it is also possible that incumbents actively strive
for consortia leadership positions enabling them to influence early stage re-
search on the future energy grid infrastructure – possibly to preserve the “old
regime”.
In model II, we test for ego-network and global network degree-related
effects. An interesting finding is that, after introducing global degree related
network effects, the coefficient of transitive ties drops in magnitude as
well as significance. This finding demonstrates the usefulness and addi-
tional insights of including degree related effects when analyzing directed
networks. Since actors increasing high out- or indegrees, they naturally will
also have more potential to form reciprocal ties in their choice set. However,
in this case global centralization outweighs local clustering in the further evo-
lution of the network, indicating the development towards a core-periphery
rather than a small world like structure. Both outdegree popularity and
outdegree activity show a high positive an significant coefficient, where
outdegree activity dominates.5 These findings indicate that the current
selection environment in the technological niche of public funded smart grid
R&DD indeed shows a tendency to develop towards a global hierarchy. This
network-structural “Matthew Effect” over time leads to a development of the
network towards a centralized network structure with a high dispersion of
degrees. In such network structures, some actors continuously move in a
reinforcing manner towards dominant positions. Such tendencies can be ob-
served in many real-life networks. For instance, in a comparative analysis of
different sectors of the Danish renewable energy research, Hain (imeo) finds
universities to over time occupy central hub positions in the windpower as
well as hydrogen research community. Thus, the question is which actors
benefit from this effect.
Therefore, in model III we jointly test for the impact of ego-characteristic
and global degree related network effects on an actor’s establishment of
further outdegrees. While ego-network effects remain roughly unchanged
compared with the former model, the investigation of actor level effects re-
veal some interesting insights. Again, the effects of size large and role
incumbent are significant and show positive coefficients, even though with
decreased magnitude. However, among the degree related effects outdegree
5Note that all parameters in SAOM are standardized (divided by their mean), thus making a
direct comparison of their magnitude difficult within a model, but easier between models.
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popularity and outdegree activity both remain positive and significant,
where the latter even increases in magnitude. Thus, outdegree-activity
appears to be a major driving force in the evolution of public funded smart
grid research networks, an effect that appears to be even stronger when con-
trolling for firm characteristics.
Overall, the results of this final model suggests incumbents indeed to
be in a favorable position to inherit dominant roles in the research net-
work over time. While they are generally more likely to establish outgo-
ing ties, preferential attachment and accumulated advantages reinforces this
tendency over time, both in terms of in- and outdegrees. Finally , the in-
teraction term role incumbent ∗ outdegree activity also shows a high
positive coefficient, significant at one percent level, providing further evi-
dence for the advantageous effects incumbents enjoy in the development of
their network position. Finally we introduce an interaction term between
outdegree-activity and role incumbent to test if degree-related effects
work particularly in favor of incumbent firms, which appears to be the case.
Here we are able to provide evidence not only of the benefits incumbents per
se in leading research consortia, but also that powerful mechanisms of net-
work evolution work in their favor. If these effects are driven by the demand
or supply side of public research funding can only be speculated. So may it
be that incumbents due to factors like their political influence and ownership
of the energy grid infrastructure are generally more successful in grant ap-
plications, but the ones who decide to massively exercise their influence on
energy grid technology development will enjoy structural forces of network
evolution supporting them to do so.
This process can easily be forecasted in a simple Monte Carlo simula-
tion of network evolution using the parameters estimated in our SAOM for
calibration. After 10 period, such a network already shows a very strong
core-periphery structure, where the core is almost exclusively populated by
incumbents.
Robustness test
Our results are primarily dependent on a correct classification of the actors’
roles, which in our case is determined by the categorization of industry ex-
perts. To cross-validate these sensible results, we re-run all models with
alternative classification strategies. First we apply a simple subjective classi-
fication strategy similar to the one used by Erlinghagen and Markard (2012),
where we determine incumbents by certain combinations of NACE codes,
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size, and age of an actor. However, a classification exclusively based on these
objective measures would often fail to identify actors. The list below presents
the description of the three classes of actors. Second, we use a computational
approach, where we collected approximately 550 Danish industrial publica-
tions related to energy system topics from the period 1995-2000 and used a
fuzzy string matching approach in order to identify actors from the analyzed
research projects within the texts. We assume that actors that appear in a
“energy context” can be considered established in the industry. In all cases,
the results point in the same direction but are less pronounced, which speaks
in favor of using industry experts for the identification of nuanced roles such
as energy incumbents.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the influence of incumbent firms on the structural
dynamics of research networks in technological niches at the case of public
funded research projects. Drawing from innovation system, sociotechnical
transitions, and network evolution literature, we identify a set of structural
– as well as firm-characteristic – effects that might enable incumbents over
time to move towards dominant positions in the research network. These
effects generally originate from the supply side of public grant allocation,
for instance the preferences of public authorities towards certain firms, tech-
nologies, project types. In addition, we identify demand side effects related
to strategic motives of incumbents to participate in technological niches, and
draw implications for the rate and direction of technological change as an
outcome of research network dominated by incumbents.
To do so, we conduct a stochastic actor-oriented network analysis, where
we model the hierarchy and power structure in the network with directed ties
between research project leader and partners. We assume the leader of such
projects as mainly influencing the context of conducted research as well as the
selection of further participants, thus strongly influencing the development
of technological trajectories in such niche networks. In contrast to mostly
pronounced function of “knowledge diffusion” in research and innovation
networks, we focus on governance structures as a result of project leadership.
By doing so, we are able to analyse up to now unobserved cumulative and
self-reinforcing effects of network dynamics and relate them to firm strategies
and vested interests.
Our results indicate path-dependent and cumulative effects of firm char-
acteristics such as size, and degree-related “Mathew effects” in the develop-
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ment of the research network, which over time lead to a centralization of
the network structure. While we find incumbents per se to enjoy benefits
in establishing new outgoing ties, we find path-dependent effects to work
particularly in their favor. Overall, the observed dynamics suggest a devel-
opment of the network towards a structure where incumbents occupy the
most central positions.
By emphasizing governance and influence related aspects combined with
firm characteristics and strategies, we provide an alternative - and perhaps
more critical - perspective on research and innovation networks, and the
role of the state in their coordination. Methodologically, we demonstrate
the richness of stochastic actor-oriented models to answer such questions by
modeling collaboration decisions on actor level, and relating them to macro
outcomes of structural network evolution. We further contribute to a more
nuanced discussion on the role and behavior of incumbents in sociotechni-
cal transitions by identifying which firm-characteristics and structural forces
of network evolution facilitate them to - for the better or the worse - in-
crease their influence in the formulation of early stage research agendas. Our
findings also provide implications for policy. Whether these increasingly
incumbent-dominated networks are favorable or not is a rather normative
discussion, which would go beyond the scope of this research.
However, the here unveiled interplay between firm characteristics, strat-
egy and network dynamics have to be considered carefully, since they are
to some extent policy orchestrated and not fully subject to natural evolution.
The supply side selection environment is subject to ex-ante biases of grant
allocation preferences of public authorities, as well as ex-post biases of firms
observing these preferences and probably optimizing their project constel-
lation patterns. Further, demand side effects related to firm strategies and
vested interests affect the extent to which they participate in public funded
research projects or choose other forms of collaboration, and which positions
they prefer in such projects. While we derive some suggestions from theoret-
ical reasoning and existing (mixed) evidence, we are not able to analytically
disentangle supply and demand side effects. Even though this is supported
by prior results on the same data (c.f. Jurowetzki, 2013a), we yet do not pro-
vide a direct analytic link between the identified structural change of research
networks and outcome characteristics in terms of more radical or incremental
innovation.
Consequently, we consider future research separating supply and demand
side effects of public funded research network formation as a promising av-
enue for further research. Here, the combination of rich supply side data,
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such as evaluations of project grant applications together with firm-level data
on motives and strategies appears to be particularly promising to disentan-
gle supply and demand side effects in public funding of R&D and the re-
sulting network dynamics. While the empirical link between the network
structure and innovation outcomes can be – and has been – established us-
ing network data to explain innovation output measures such as patents, the
link between micro-level actor behavior and network dynamics with macro-
level outcomes faces some empirical challenges. One obvious challange is
the endogeneity caused by interdependence of actor behavior and network
position. Co-evolutionary models of networks and actor behavior as pro-
posed by Snijders et al. (2007) and applied by Checkley et al. (2014); Steglich
et al. (2010); Veenstra and Steglich (2012) could be an attractive solution. Fur-
thermore, additional empirical cross-country and cross-industry evidence is
needed to clarify the role of incumbents in research networks and sustain-
able transitions in general. We hope our work stimulates further work on
this issue, which we consider as a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix
Fig. C.2: Research project graph and cluster level TFIDF-Keywords.
Note: Projects range from 1996 until 2013, what exceeds the later used data by approximately a third. The underlying analysis combines natural
language analysis, vector space modelling and community detection within networks. A detailed methodology description and analysis can be found in
Jurowetzki (2014)
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Fig. C.3: Test for time-heterogeneity following Lospinoso et al. (2011)
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Table C.3: Network Development in Public Funded R&D in Smart-Grid Research
Network 2009 Network 2010
Network 2011 Network 2012
Note: Research network on basis of joint public funded research projects. Ties are directed from project-leader⇒ project
partner. Circles represent incumbents, squares all remaining types of organisations. The graphical presentation was done with
the R package Igraph.
Table C.4: Network turnover frequency
Periods 0⇒ 1 1⇒ 0 1⇒ 1 Jaccard
1⇒ 2 22 3 42 0.627
2⇒ 3 30 2 62 0.660
3⇒ 4 53 39 53 0.366
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Table C.5: Network density indicators
Periods 1 2 3 4
density 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
average degree 0.341 0.485 0.697 0.803
Network rate 0.383 0.490 1.406 -
number of ties 45 64 92 106
Mutual ties 0 2 4 3
Asymmetric ties 45 60 84 100
Table C.6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
size small 0 1 0.356 0.481
size large 0 1 0.432 0.497
Role: Incumbent 0 1 0.182 0.387
Role: Newcommer 0 1 0.106 0.309
Firm age 1 110 22.437 22.130
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Table C.7: Goodness-of-Fit: Monte Carlo Mahalanobis Distance Test
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statistics of observe data is distributed according to plot.
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“Violin plots” show simulated value of statistic as kernel density estimate and box plot of 95% interval.
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Abstract
Frequent and open interaction between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs
is necessary for venture capital investments to occur. Increasingly, these investments
are made across jurisdictions. The vast majority of these cross-border investments are
carried out in a syndicate of two or more VCs, indicating the effects of intra-industry
networks needing further analysis. Using China as a model, we provide a novel
multidimensional framework to explain cross-border investments in innovative ven-
tures across developed and emerging economies. By analyzing a unique international
dataset, we examine worldwide venture capital investment flows from 2000-2012
and consider the effects of geographical, cultural, and institutional proximity as well
as institutional and relational trust. We find trust to mitigate the negative effects
of geographical and cultural distance; where institutional trust is more relevant for
investments in emerging economies, relational trust is more relevant for investments
in developed economies.
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Preface
Owing to the increased techno-economic opportunities within knowledge-
based economies (Foray and Lundvall, 1996), going hand in hand with the
strongly felt uncertainties of scientific and technological innovation (Dosi,
1982, 1988), specialized financial intermediaries dealing with these challenges
emerged during the last decades. Venture capitalists (VCs) are a classical -
but not the only - example of such intermediaries who combine their unique
blend of technological and financial expertise to provide both financial and
managerial support for entrepreneurs in innovative ventures. It has been es-
tablished by extant research that such specialized “innovation investors” not
only promote innovative activities (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, 2000; Samila
and Sorenson, 2010, 2011), but they also provide additional value-added sup-
port to enable innovative products or services to be rapidly brought to mar-
ket (Black and Gilson, 1998; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992), thereby influencing
rate as well as direction of technological change.
In a connected world where capital as well knowledge is dispersed around
the globe, such investments in innovative and entrepreneurial ventures in-
creasingly are made across borders and jurisdictions, in locations with cul-
tural norms, market dynamics and business practices quite distant from the
investors local markets. Not surprising, attracting such foreign investments
and thereby taping in global pools of capital and knowledge has become an
integral goal of recent innovation-related public policies (Beck et al., 2008; Ko-
rtum and Lerner, 2000), yet with widely varying outcomes (Cumming, 2010b,
2011). Successful examples who succeeded in the development of a vibrant
venture capital industry from scratch are often attributed to network-based
strategies, encouraging cooperation between local and foreign investors (Avn-
imelech et al., 2006; Xiao, 2002).
In this chapter, my co-authors Sofia Johan and Daojuan Wang and I an-
alyze how venture capitalists mitigate information deficits associated with
investments over long geographical, institutional and cultural distance by
mobilizing knowledge and capabilities of partners within their formal and
informal network of informants (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Fiet,
1995a). While based on micro-level actions of investors, we mostly focus
on macro-level outcomes on country and country-dyad level, in particular
we aim to explain the amount of bilateral flows of equity (VC) investments in
innovative ventures. We further contrast cross-border venture capital invest-
ments in developed and emerging economies, as many emerging economies
have been actively supporting their own venture capital markets pursuant to
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the perceived success of VC contribution to innovation in more developed
jurisdictions (Bruton et al., 2004, 2005). These same economies are seeking
not only to attract foreign funds but more specifically foreign expertise as it
is thought that not only would local entrepreneurs benefit from specialist VC
skills, but also that local VCs would benefit from the transfer of knowledge
from the more sophisticated foreign venture capitalists. However, underde-
veloped investor and property protection, high cultural distance, diverging
business ethics and practices, and the perception of corruption in certain ju-
risdictions are obstacles to the development of these markets.
Incomplete and asymmetric information issues of innovation finance are
a – if not the – main guiding topic of my Ph.D. thesis. In this chapter I empir-
ically investigate how investors adjust their strategies to minimize asymme-
tries, and how these micro-choices manifest in macro-outcomes. Claiming ge-
ographical, institutional and cultural distance apparent in most cross-border
transactions to be a major obstacle for investments in innovation and tech-
nological change, we identify how they can be mitigated by the investors
cooperation strategies, and how they differ given the institutional setup of
host and target country. I thereby also demonstrate the importance of explic-
itly taking the institutional context of innovation investments into account,
which greatly impacts their quantity as well as quality. In the guiding frame-
work of this Ph.D. thesis, it primarily focuses on network dynamics within
the investor space, but also links to the associated technological change of
investments as an outcome of these dynamics.
The origins of this paper reach back to my master-thesis, where I also con-
ducted research on cross-border venture capital syndication networks with
roughly the same dataset. In its current framing, it was firstly presented at
the “UK IRC Early Career Researchers Workshop” 2013 at the University of
Cambridge. Since it has been presented at numerous internal and external
research seminars, such as the IKE seminar series at Aalborg University and
the IDEOS workshop 2013 in Marburg. Latest, it has been presented at the
“JBE special issue conference on Business Ethics in Greater China” 2014 in
Tibet. Currently, it has been accepted for publication in the corresponding
special issue of the “Journal of Business Ethics”.
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1 Introduction
Venture capitalists (VCs) are specialized financial intermediaries who com-
bine their unique blend of technological competence and financial skills, to
provide both financial and managerial support for entrepreneurs in innova-
tive ventures. It has been established by extant research that VCs not only
promote innovative activities (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, 2000; Samila and
Sorenson, 2010, 2011), but they also provide additional value-added support
to enable innovative products or services to be rapidly brought to market
(Black and Gilson, 1998; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). It is not surprising,
therefore, that the creation of flourishing venture capital markets has become
an integral goal of recent innovation-related public policies in many devel-
oped and emerging economies (Beck et al., 2008; Cumming, 2006; Kortum
and Lerner, 2000). Although some initiatives have reached their goals, many
such policies have not been found to be successful (Cumming, 2003, 2010a).
While research has determined varied reasons for such failures, we believe
that one of the main reasons for the lack of success in encouraging venture
capital investment is local bias. Local bias has long been considered inherent
in financial intermediary activity, as financial intermediaries feel a strong
need for spatial proximity and rely heavily on local expertise (Coval and
Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; French and Poterba, 1991; Parwada, 2008) to mitigate
agency problems. Local bias is, thus, a significant hurdle to breach as markets
seek to accelerate development by tapping foreign sources of knowledge and
capital (Avnimelech et al., 2006). Local bias can be even more significant for
venture capital, as investment in innovative activities involves considerable
uncertainty and is characterized by asymmetric information at the outset and
agency problems during the investment process.
Frequent and open interaction between investor and investee within close
proximity appears necessary for these investments to succeed (Cumming and
Dai, 2010; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996). A
new, growing body of literature, however, suggests a paradigm shift towards
a more globally distributed venture capital investment pattern (Baygan and
Freudenberg, 2000; Guler and Guillén, 2005, 2010; Kendall and Aizenman,
2012; Wright et al., 2005). This paradigm shift is not only of interest to gov-
ernments seeking to further develop local venture capital markets by attract-
ing both foreign funds and expertise; researchers, too, have an interest in
deciphering this changing paradigm (Avnimelech et al., 2006; Bruton et al.,
2004, 2008, 2005), as this suggests well-recognized institutional challenges
that seem to have been surmounted for cross-border investments - such as
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underdeveloped investor and property protection (Peng, 2001), high cultural
distance, diverging business ethics and practices (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006;
Dai and Nahata, 2013), and the perception of corruption in certain jurisdic-
tions (Johan and Najar, 2010). One possible explanation catching the atten-
tion of researchers is network effects, specifically the growing tendency for
foreign VCs to team up in a syndicate with domestic partners to take advan-
tage of their local expertise and to ensure interaction (Dai and Nahata, 2013;
Manigart et al., 2002; Nahata et al., 2013). In this paper, we analyze these
network effects and their effect on local bias.
An example of a jurisdiction that has benefited from this paradigm shift is
China. China’s institutional environment encompasses the above mentioned
weaknesses and has at times been called “peculiar” (Bruton and Ahlstrom,
2003; Lu et al., 2013; Tan and Tan, 2005). In addition, with regard to in-
stitutional trust, which we take to indicate overall trust in the institutional
structure and the honest behavior of citizens in a particular country, China
ranks particularly low. However, China has been able to not only build a ven-
ture capital market from scratch since 1984 (Xiao, 2002) but has been able to
develop it to the success it possesses today. China’s success at attracting both
local and foreign venture capital has been previously attributed to network-
based strategies, also known as a form of relational trust, or guanxi, utilized
by market participants (Peng, 2003; Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2007; Su
et al., 2007). In this paper, we posit that while institutional trust is not at-
tached to a particular relationship, it serves to ease the way in establishing
one, as it mitigates the effects of lack of proximity in cross-border invest-
ments. As the relationship is established and relational trust is built, the
perceived uncertainty of the investments gradually declines while a mutual
understanding develops, and both parties move towards a more symmetric
information base. Thus, even in the absence of relational trust, we expect
countries with high institutional trust to hold higher venture capital inflows
and syndication activities, despite potential social and geographical distance.
We refer to China as a model for this paper, as we seek to augment existing
research in the pattern of international alliances and syndicates in the venture
capital industry. We believe that for a more thorough understanding of the
balance between institutional factors and network effects, our research must
take into account numerous jurisdictions, both developed and emerging, for
legal, lingual, political, and market capitalization and cultural differences to
be appropriately analyzed. More importantly, few jurisdictions possess such
pronounced institutional characteristics as China.
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We begin by acknowledging that although geographical and cultural norms
may differ across countries, one thing that remains unchanged is the secretive
and high-risk nature of nascent, innovative start-up firms. To mitigate the ad-
verse selection risk in start-up investment, frequent, persistent, and open ex-
change of both codified and tacit information (Polanyi, 1966) is necessary be-
tween the creators of the innovation and their cross-border financiers (Cum-
ming, 2006). The frequency, openness, and quality of the social exchange
among parties is naturally dependent upon proximity. For the purposes of
this paper, we use several measures to analyze the effect of geographic, in-
stitutional, lingual, and cultural proximity, along with corruption levels and
political instability.
Along this process of exchanging both codified and tacit information
among market participants, institutional trust must be established; as the
number of interactions increase, relational trust also increases. We recognize
that institutional and relational trust differ in their influence, depending on
the participant composition of the investments (foreign only vs. foreign and
domestic VCs) and the institutional setup of the destination country (devel-
oped vs. emerging economy).
We find that the higher the geographical and cultural distance, the lower
the likelihood of cross-border investment. High-market capitalization and
low corruption levels in the destination country encourage VCs to overcome
local bias and consider an investment in that country. When focusing on
investments in emerging economies, we also find a particularly strong neg-
ative effect on corruption. Venture capital flow does appear to move from
high-growth countries to low-growth countries; therefore, it appears that VCs
are willing to take on the higher risk of investment in emerging economies.
Our findings suggest that VCs mitigate the investment risk with social ex-
change among a syndicate comprising at least one local VC to overcome lack
of proximity. Our findings also suggest that relational trust helps overcome
high geographical, cultural, and institutional distance. We find, however, that
institutional trust has a more positive impact on cross-border venture capi-
tal flows from developed to emerging economies. This may be because VCs
may prefer to rely on their familiarity with established institutional factors in
making investment decisions and do not necessarily view relational trust as a
substitute for institutional trust. Sophisticated VCs with sectoral experience,
for example, may believe they are sufficiently capable to assess the viability of
an innovative firm. The viability of investing in a certain jurisdiction with the
institutional information they have gathered ex-ante and is not reliant on the
information gathered from social exchange with less sophisticated local VCs
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ex-post, though such information may still mitigate investment risk. Another
explanation for institutional trust having more of an impact on cross-border
venture capital flow from developed to emerging markets is that VCs from
the developed economies would prefer not to dilute their reputational capital
by investing with less reputable VCs from emerging economies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we pro-
vide a theoretical background, review seminal academic work, and develop
a socio-economic framework of cross- border venture capital. Empirical tests
are discussed in section 3. Section 4 concludes and derives implications for
practitioners, policy-makers, and scholars.
2 Theory and Hypothesis
Prior research has sought to explain the patterns of global venture capital
allocation with reference to general macroeconomic conditions. Most of the
research concludes that certain characteristics, such as high market capitaliza-
tion (Black and Gilson, 1998), growth rates (Romain and Van Pottelsberghe,
2004a,b), and sophisticated institutions which ensure the protection of in-
vestors rights (Guler and Guillén, 2005, 2010; La Porta et al., 1998, 2000,
1997) create favorable investment conditions that ultimately lead to higher
cross-border venture capital. While such determinants that capture differ-
ent aspects of a country’s aggregated economic activity can somehow trigger
cross-border venture capital flows, we believe they are somewhat limited in
explanatory power. In particular, they fail to acknowledge the inherent fea-
tures of innovation, which makes its finance distinctively challenging (Hall,
2010; Hall and Lerner, 2009). Innovation, by definition, is the creation of
somewhat qualitatively different, novel, and unproven products, processes,
or business models. The financing of innovation is surrounded by uncer-
tainty, stemming mainly from incomplete information and a limited ability
to interpret incomplete information (Knight, 1921). Such incomplete infor-
mation leads to high adverse selection risks borne by the financier of in-
novation. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs or innovators usually have more
complete information than the venture capital investors (Cumming, 2006).
In the case of start-ups, this problem is further amplified as historical data
enabling the projection of future performance are neither available for the
applied technology nor the firm (Berger and Frame, 2007; Berger and Udell,
2002; Freel, 2007). Unlike other forms of traditional financing, such as bank
or public market financing, the quality of both quantitative and qualitative
information necessary to evaluate the financing of an innovative start-up firm
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is so poor that VCs have to resort to spatial proximity and local expertise or
knowledge to gather the information required to mitigate their significant
financial risk (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; French and Poterba, 1991).
This information gathering may be significantly more challenging in cross-
border investments, especially between developed and emerging economies;
therefore, local bias in inevitable.
Polanyi (1966) classifies human knowledge as consisting of codified (or
explicit) and tacit elements. Where codified elements are easily transmittable
using a standardized formal and systematic language, such as mathemat-
ics, tacit elements are context-dependent and personal, hard to formalize
and transmit over distance, necessitating face-to-face and interpersonal in-
teraction (Arrow, 1962; Von Hippel, 1994). Information required to mitigate
traditional financial risk and ascertain return optimization, such as balance
sheets or performance records, are of a codified nature and readily avail-
able. We noted earlier that for venture start-ups, such information is rarely
available. Even where such information is available and codified, with cross-
border investments, the information may not necessarily be easily decipher-
able, not completely understood, as though in a different language or subject
to an unfamiliar institutional context. In addition, tacit knowledge includes
the personal characteristics of an entrepreneur or an understanding of novel
product concepts; tacit knowledge is not readily available and gradually un-
folds in a timely process of interaction between individuals. Hence, the very
act of gathering tacit information requires the establishment of a relationship
and continuous interaction between (co-) investors and entrepreneurs. As a
consequence, we suggest concepts usually used to explain the emergence and
performance of interpersonal and organizational relationships to be of high
explanatory power when analyzing cross-border VC investments. In particu-
lar, we draw from proximity concepts (Boschma and Frenken, 2010; Boschma,
2005) and theories on institutional and relational trust.
We know that spatial proximity and local expertise or knowledge is used
by VCs to identify the existence of innovative ventures and to gather the
information required to mitigate their significant financial risk (Coval and
Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; French and Poterba, 1991). We believe that geograph-
ical proximity, which indicates the physical distance between the VC and the
innovative start-up firm, is necessary for frequent and open interaction be-
tween the VC and the entrepreneur (Cumming and Johan, 2007). Open inter-
action facilitates the gathering of both codified and tacit information required
by VCs to determine the existence of innovative ideas and the viability of an
investment in an innovative venture. We know that geographic proximity is
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especially important in the pre-deal selection, due-diligence, as well as the
post-deal monitoring and value-adding phase of a venture investment (Cum-
ming and Dai, 2010; Davila et al., 2003; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Jääskeläinen
et al., 2006; Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Sapienza et al., 1996). This is mainly
because the advice and monitoring provided to the startup firm is made at
board or management meetings at the firm office; therefore, geographic prox-
imity allows VCs to easily travel to the firm office within the VC’s constrained
time limitations (Cumming and Johan, 2006b). Note that a VC would have
more than one investee firm in his portfolio; traveling between large geo-
graphic distances would therefore affect the frequency of interaction between
the entrepreneur and the VC.
In addition to geographic proximity, institutional similarities and differ-
ences in legal systems are also likely to influence cross-border VC investment
activity. Venture capitalists do their best to mitigate the agency costs of ven-
ture investment (Avnimelech et al., 2006; Fiet, 1995a,b, 1996; Shepherd and
Zacharakis, 2001) with the use of effective contracts and governance struc-
tures (Cumming and Johan, 2013). The differences in legal systems increase
information asymmetries, the cost (legal and contractual), and the risk of in-
vestment. Seminal work by La Porta et al. (1998, 2000, 1997) has shown that
law quality can significantly affect the costs and benefits associated with mon-
itoring the entrepreneur. Briefly stated, more efficient legal systems lower the
costs associated with monitoring the entrepreneur and, thereby, increase the
scope for the VC to maximize private benefits or profits. More dissimilar and
inefficient legal systems are known to impede the ability of a VC to finance
firms and, thus, hamper the rate of investment. In addition to legality differ-
ences, other institutional factors - including levels of corruption and political
instability - will also affect investment (Davis and Ruhe, 2003; Johan et al.,
2013; Johan and Najar, 2010). Furthermore, sharing a common language may
be a necessary precondition for knowledge transfer. We take into considera-
tion lingual distance, as we believe that codified elements of information are
worthless if indecipherable due to lingual distance.
Cultural dimension is also of high importance when explaining how busi-
ness is accomplished in general (Hofstede and Bond, 1984; Hofstede et al.,
2010). Cultural distance, another proximity measure, can be associated with
diverging values, business ethics, and codes of conduct. As recent studies
show, countries with higher cultural distance show higher mistrust (Guiso
et al., 2008), and discourage risk sharing (Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012) among
potential investors. Since the selection, evaluation, monitoring, and man-
agement support of VC investments necessarily requires frequent and open
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interactions between involved participants, high cultural distance can be ex-
pected to represent a major obstacle for cross-border investments. Tacit ele-
ments of information gathering are context dependent, and cultural distance
may make this significantly more difficult among parties.
To overcome the limitations of proximity, VCs seeking to cross borders
when investing in innovative ventures do so within syndicates. Some choose
to syndicate with local VCs, as cross-border syndicates between domestic and
foreign investors are said to reduce transaction costs (Tykvová and Schertler,
2008) and bridge high cultural and institutional distance (Dai and Nahata,
2013; Tykvová and Schertler, 2013).
We, therefore, hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 4
a: Geographical, cultural and institutional distance negatively affect venture capital
investment activity between countries.
b: The negative effects of geographical, cultural and institutional distance negatively
are less pronounced in cross border investments syndicated with a domestic VC.
We noted in an earlier section that VCs do their best to mitigate the
agency costs of venture investment with the use of effective contracts and
governance structures to protect themselves against opportunistic behavior
(Avnimelech et al., 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Fiet, 1995a,b; Shepherd
and Zacharakis, 2001). Such risks, however, can never be completely elimi-
nated (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Farmer and
Winter, 1986; Sahlman, 1990). It is especially difficult to mitigate such agency
costs with the use of contracts and governance structures in view of less ef-
ficient laws and corporate structures across different borders (Cumming and
Johan, 2006a; La Porta et al., 1998, 2000, 1997). In situations where residual
uncertainty stemming from incomplete contracts and asymmetric informa-
tion cannot be eliminated through contracts and protection through formal
institutions, trust among parties is imperative in facilitating investment ac-
tivities, which is particularly true when it comes to investment in innovation
(Nooteboom, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, we distinguish between
institutional and relational trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). Institutional trust is
present ex-ante to the interaction and refers to the trust in the institutional
environment, which includes institutional factors related to the legal frame-
work and its enforceability as well as soft factors, such as a society’s attitude
to behave fairly and honestly. In contrast, relational trust ex-post unfolds
177
Paper D.
gradually through repeated interactions over time (Blau, 1964; McAllister,
1995).
We argue that institutional and relational trust are both very important in
cross-border venture capital deals, but they differ in their influence, depend-
ing on the participant composition (foreign only vs. foreign and domestic
VCs) of the investments and the institutional setup of the destination coun-
try (developed vs. emerging economy). Our arguments are based on prior
research, which finds that in high-trust societies, parties must spend fewer
resources to protect themselves against opportunistic behavior. Parties mak-
ing investment and production decisions more focused on the long run have
higher incentives and return on the accumulation of human capital (Knack
and Keefer, 1997) and are more likely to share knowledge (Dovey, 2009) and
participate in open innovation projects (Nooteboom, 2006). Trust between
countries also positively influences their economic exchange in terms of stock
market investments (Guiso et al., 2008), foreign direct investments, and bilat-
eral trade (Guiso et al., 2009).
Recently Duffner et al. (2009) and Bottazzi et al. (2011) also provide em-
pirical evidence showing a strong statistical and economic significance of
trust on venture capital investments, reporting generalized and personalized
trust ex-ante to reduce doubts regarding an investment decision and ex-post
to provide a good foundation for efficient and effective communication and
interaction between them. For stand-alone foreign investments, we assume
that the VC and the entrepreneur maintain no relationship prior to the in-
vestment; thus, they have no way to build up endogenous forms of trust.
Here, the role of institutional trust ex-ante is of significant importance, pro-
viding the foundation for building up a critical mass of initial trust to enter a
relationship involving proximity. Once the relationship is initiated, the par-
ties build up relational trust, resulting from frequent and open information
sharing. We note, however, that relational trust ex-post unfolds gradually
through repeated interactions over time, and the extent of proximity will af-
fect the absorption rate of social exchange; therefore, for investments with
greater distance between developed and emerging economies, for example,
institutional trust would play a greater role at the outset.
The relationship between the entrepreneur and a VC would differ from
one VC to another. The VC community is small, and reputation is key (Hsu,
2004; Nahata, 2008; Nahata et al., 2013). Information regarding unprofes-
sional or dishonest behavior diffuses quickly and influences a VC’s future
deal flow opportunity substantially in quantity and quality. As a conse-
quence, VCs theoretically have an incentive to consistently behave honestly
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and fairly with their investees and syndicates in order to maintain or build
up their valuable reputation. However, for cross-border relationships, prox-
imity may temper the dissemination of reputational quality. Also, the quality
of VCs from emerging economies may not be up to par in relation to VCs
from more developed jurisdictions (Nahata et al., 2013). However, VCs work-
ing as a syndicate or a network are able to build up, over time, persistent
long-term relationships. As a result, relational trust eventually emerges be-
tween former syndication partners, lowering the uncertainty when joining
further investment invitations with the same partners. Still, we expect this
effect due to differences in reputation effects and experience/quality to be
of lower magnitude for foreign-domestic syndicates in emerging economies.
Thus, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 5
a: Institutional and relational trust positively affects bilateral venture capital invest-
ment activity and diminishes the negative effects of geographical, social, and insti-
tutional distance.
b: The positive effects of institutional trust appear stronger for investments in emerg-
ing compared with developed economies.
c: The positive effects of institutional trust appears weaker for cross-border invest-
ments syndicated with domestic VCs.
d: The positive effects of relational trust appear weaker for investments in emerging
compared with developed economies.
3 Empirical Setting
3.1 Variables & Data
In the following section, we briefly describe our data sources, empirical
model, employed variables, and their construction. Supplementary, table
D.10 in the appendix provides an exhaustive overview on all variables, their
composition and source. In the following, the subscript i identifies the source
country (SC), j the destination country (DC). ∆i,j labels the variable to be the
destination country’s j minus the source country’s i corresponding variable
value.
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Data on Cross-border Venture Capital Deals
For our empirical analyses, we draw from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr databases
on global equity investments.1 We include all venture capital identified deals
between 1998 and 2013, where the first two years are only used to create
lagged variables of investment activities. To minimize noise caused by one-
off investments, we exclude investments of VCs that carried out only five
or less investments during the final observation period, 2000-2013. We ag-
gregate these deals on the level of the dyad between source and destination
country. In deals with investors from multiple source countries, the deal is
accounted once for every involved country-dyad, independent of the number
of investors. For example, if two French VCs and one German VC invest in
syndicate in an Irish portfolio firm, the country dyads FR-IE and DE-IE both
get one additional count for this deal. Our final dataset contains 30,650 deals,
of which 11,665 cross-national borders; 1,555 VCs in 8.665 unique portfolio
companies located in 37 countries - 22 developed and 15 emerging economies
- carry out these cross-border deals.
To get a first impression on global VC investment activity, table D.8 in the
appendix provides further information on domestic venture capital invest-
ments, cross-border inflows, and outflows per country for the top quantile
(in terms of investment activity) of countries. For the development of VC
activity over time, consider table D.9. Finally, D.11 sets out a matrix of ven-
ture capital investments between country pairs, where we show the activity
between the in terms of VC activity.
Dependent Variables
In most related studies, venture capital flows between country dyads and is
measured by either counting the number of investments or their monetary
value, which is strongly influenced by the size of the countries under study.
All else being equal, this amount is obviously expected to be higher between
large economies, and vice versa. To take the gravity effect of economic size
into account ( c.f. e.g. Feenstra et al., 2005; Krugman, 1980; Pöyhönen, 1963;
Tinbergen, 1962), we construct our dependent variable as a measure of ven-
ture capital flow propensity.
VC propti→j =
VC f lowti→j/VCinvest
t
i
GDPti /GDP
t
j
(D.1)
1For a detailed description of the Zephyr database and its positive value for cross-border
venture capital research, see Schertler and Tykvová (2009, 2010)
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The numerator represents the share of dyadic investments from the source
country for all the venture capital investments in the destination country; the
denominator represents the ratio between the source and destination coun-
try’s GDP. For the sake of comparison and robustness, we also used the
number of annual deal counts (VC invti→j) as a dependent variable for an
alternative model.
Independent Variables
Geographic Distance We follow Mayer and Zignago (2011) by measuring
geographicaldistance as the population density adjusted for distance in kilo-
meters between a country dyad, where we generally expect a negative effect
on venture capital investment activity. However, with increasing geograph-
ical distance, investors are able to substitute means of transportation (e.g.,
car, train, airplane) and communication, leading to a non-linear increase of
investment obstacles in geographical space (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). To
account for this, we use the logarithmic transformation of geographical dis-
tance.
Cultural Distance To measure cultural distance, we calculate the distance
between countries over Hofstede’s (2010) four cultural dimensions (power
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance), following the
approach of Kogut and Singh (1988):
dist culti,j =
4
∑
u=1
Iuj − Iui
var(Iu)
2
4
(D.2)
Lingual Distance In addition, we include a dummy variable provided by
Melitz and Toubal (2012) indicating that the countries share a common lan-
guage (same langi,j) spoken by at least 10% of the population in both coun-
tries. The lack of a common language might very well represent an obstacle
in both the communication of both codified and tacit information between
VCs and investee firms and between entrepreneurs and other officials in the
destination country.
Institutional Distance and Quality of Institutions Venture capitalists in-
vesting in countries with different institutional settings are confronted with
unfamiliar explicit and implicit “rules of the game” (North, 1990), codes of
conduct, and general business practices and ethics. Institutional distance is,
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thus, commonly regarded as a major obstacle for cross-border venture capi-
tal investments (Guler and Guillén, 2010; Megginson, 2004). To analyze the
effect of institutionaldistance, we employ a set of different measures.
First, a dummy variable is implemented indicating the country’s legal sys-
tem, based on different law traditions (same legali,j), as classified by La Porta
et al. (1998). Legal differences are associated with increased ex-ante informa-
tion costs and decreased ex-post capabilities of adding value and are, thus,
expected to negatively affect investment activities between country dyads.
The level of corruption in the destination country represents another insti-
tutional facet likely to affect cross-border venture capital flows, particularly
in developing economies which tend to have less-developed, formal institu-
tional structures (Peng, 2000). We, therefore, include the Corruption Percep-
tion Index (cpitj) provided by Transparency International in our set of inde-
pendent variables. The CPI reflects the view of a panel of country experts on
how corrupt the public sector of the corresponding country is perceived. The
CPI is considered one of the most reliable measures of corruption around
the world (Wilhelm, 2002). Generally, we expect corruption to negatively
affect the amount of cross-border venture capital inflows. However, in coun-
tries with rigid and ineffective formal institutions, market-driven corruption
can also be a means to grease the wheel and get business done (Hunting-
ton and Fukuyama, 2006; Leff, 1964; Levy, 2007; Nielsen, 2003). Learning to
deal with corruption might turn out to be a key capability in such settings.
Therefore, we also include the differential between the destination and source
country’s CPI (∆cpitj−i) in our empirical tests. To account for the effects of po-
litical instability and the associated increase of uncertainty in countries with
highly unstable political regimes, we also employ the measure provided by
Kaufmann et al. (2010), which captures perceptions of the likelihood that the
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means (inst stabtj).
Institutional Trust Institutional trust is the perception that other people
can generally be considered as trustworthy. Institutional trust represents a
commonly used measurement for social capital and relational embeddedness,
and it is said to strongly impact economic activity in (e.g. Dovey, 2009; Guiso
et al., 2008; Knack and Keefer, 1997) , as well as between, countries (Guiso
et al., 2008), particularly in transactions characterized by high uncertainty
(Nooteboom, 2006). To analyze the impact of this institutional facet on cross-
border venture capital flows, we employ a common measure for institutional
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trust (trustj) in economic analysis (e.g. Beugelsdijk, 2006; Knack and Keefer,
1997) provided by the Survey (2009).2
We expect high-trust destination countries to receive a higher share of
cross-border venture capital investments. Comparing the WWS in-country
measure with the measure of bilateral trust provided by the Eurobarometer
(2011)3 reveals a high correlation between a country’s internal generalized
trust and the trust received by other countries. Therefore, we also interpret
a country’s generalized trust as an approximation for the level of trust re-
ceived by the source country. Trust in the society as a whole is also cause
and consequence of trust in the quality of political and economic institutions.
Hence, it is not surprising that the WWS measure of generalized trust, in our
sample as well as other studies, strongly correlates with measures of institu-
tional quality, such as indices for political stability, property right protection,
freedom of press and speech, and quality of the legal system.
Relational Trust In order to analyze the possible effect on syndication that
domestic venture capitalists might play in bridging geographical, institu-
tional, and cultural distance (Dai and Nahata, 2013; Tykvová and Schertler,
2013), harnessing synergies of complementary resource bases (Chemmanur
et al., 2011), and providing credible signals on the portfolio company’s qual-
ity (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008), we also include a variable (VC syndti→j) rep-
resenting the share of investments carried out in syndication with domestic
investors to all investments of the source i in the destination country j. While
cross-border investments of foreign VCs directly into domestic investee com-
panies may not necessarily necessitate a former relationship between them,
for syndicated investments between domestic and foreign VCs, it is very
well likely that not only will the participants already know each other, ei-
ther through prior joint investments, shared contacts, or reputation, but that
there sufficient, open, and persistent lines of communication exist. Thus, for
our analysis, we interpret (VC syndti→j) as a first approximation of potential
relational trust between country dyads.
Trade Flow To account for the intensity of economic relationships between
countries we use a standard measures from the trade literature: The product
2Since the different waves of the survey do not always cover all countries, in some cases,
survey results were used from older waves between 1995 and 2000. The correlation coefficient
across the different waves always sits above 90 percent, which indicates that the phenomenon of
trust is somewhat persistent over time.
3Unfortunately, this measure is only available for a subset of European countries and, there-
fore, could not be used against the background of our analysis.
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of last year’s export from country i to j and j to i, divided by the products of
their GDP:
tradet−1i→j =
exportt−1i→j ∗ exportt−1j→i
gdpt−1i ∗ gdpt−1j
(D.3)
Control Variables Furthermore, we control for the following country and
country-dyad specific characteristics. The growth-rate of the destination coun-
try’s GDP (growtht−1j ) reflects the tendency to invest in countries with high
economic growth and the differential between the growth of destination and
source country. A vivid stock market represents a profitable exit option for
venture capital investment and is said to have a positive effect on venture
capital activity (Black and Gilson, 1998; Gompers et al., 2008), which we take
into account by incorporating control variables for the destination country’s
ratio of market capitalization (capitalizationt−1j ) and stocks traded capitaliza-
tion (stockst−1j ) to its GDP. Additional to the characteristics of the destination
country, we also include directional controls for the differences between the
destination and source country (∆growtht−1j−i , ∆capitalization
t−1
j−i , ∆stocks
t−1
j−i ).
For the sake of clarity, and to avoid very high differences in the order of mag-
nitude of the coefficients, we have rescaled all control variables in the country
dyad by dividing by their maximum, resulting in a range [0,1].
Foreign VC Characteristics For an additional model analyzing the constel-
lation of cross-border venture capital deals, we also include a set of variables
indicating the highest prior investment experience of the foreign VCs in the
same sector (expsectortmax(k)), the destination country (expcountry
t
max(k)), and
prior investments in the current portfolio company itself (exp targettmax(k)).
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table D.1 provides general descriptive statistics on country dyad, and table
D.2 on deal level.
The correlation matrix of our macro-level analysis provided in table D.3
shows that, generally, venture capital, in absolute (VCti→j) as well as in rela-
tive (VC propti→j) terms, tends to flow towards destination countries with low
cultural and geographical distance and low corruption and high trust, as one
might expect. These variables are also associated with a higher share of syn-
dicated investments between source and destination country (VC syndti→j),
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Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics, Country Dyad Level
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min max
Dependent
VC countti→j 70,571 0.151 1.943 0.000 104.000
VC propti→j 70,571 0.006 0.158 0.000 29.920
Distance
dist geoi,j 68,597 8.586 0.918 3.835 9.886
dist culti,j 36,414 0.060 0.023 0.006 0.150
same legali,j 70,571 0.225 0.418 0.000 1.000
same langi,j 68,597 0.146 0.353 0.000 1.000
Trust & Relationship
trustj 63,711 0.063 0.314 -0.427 1.000
VC syndti→j 70,571 0.015 0.113 0.000 1.000
tradeti,j* 66,226 0.559 0.227 0.150 1.000
Institutions & Relational Trust
cpitj * 66,226 0.559 0.227 0.150 1.000
inst stabtj 68,605 0.260 0.921 -2.812 1.668
Controls
gdpt−1j * 68,586 0.045 0.118 0.000 1.000
gdp capt−1j * 68,587 0.178 0.180 0.002 1.000
gdp growtht−1j 68,516 0.893 0.103 0.000 1.000
capitalizationt−1j 66,570 0.110 0.115 0.000 1.000
stockst−1j 66,640 0.062 0.102 0.000 1.000
This table presents descriptive statistics of our main variables for the models on country dyad level.
The source country is denoted with subscript i, the destination country with j
* indicates the variable is normalized(divided by maximum, hence [0,1]).
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Table D.2: Descriptive Statistics – Cross-Border Venture Capital Deals
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min max
Dependent
deal_host 7,349 0.599 0.490 0.000 1.000
Destination Country
gdptj 7,346 0.438 0.400 0.000 1.000
gdp growthtj 7,346 2.491 2.757 -14.072 14.781
capitalizationtj 7,344 107.068 46.252 -19.815 549.423
cpitj 7,340 0.725 0.146 0.17 1.000
trustj 7331 0.885 0.821 -1.478 3.459
Dyad
dist geomean(i,j) 7,324 8.158 1.144 5.087 9.833
dist cultmean(i,j) 7,251 0.040 0.024 0.006 0.130
same legalmax(i,j) 7,325 0.541 0.498 0.000 1.000
same langmax(i,j) 7,324 0.540 0.498 0.000 1.000
Acquiring foreign VCs
exp sectortmax(k) 7,349 21.607 38.652 1.000 270.000
exp countrytmax(k) 7,349 9.106 14.435 1.000 111.000
exp targettmax(k) 7,349 1.262 0.545 1.000 5.000
This table presents descriptive statistics of our main variables for the models on country dyad level.
The source country is denoted with subscript i, the destination country with j
* indicates the variable is normalized(divided by maximum, hence [0,1]).
contrary to the idea that VCs use syndication with domestic partners partic-
ularly as a means of dealing with high distance and local uncertainty. Inter-
estingly, there is no strong correlation observable between the institutional
and geographical per se. The remaining correlations between variables are as
expected, overall, and in a reasonable scale. The only exceptions are the high
correlations between trustj, inst stabtj and cpi
t
j , and between capitalization
t−1
j
and stockst−1j . Since this set of variables measure different facets of the same
phenomenon, to some extent, high correlation can be expected.4
Table D.4 provides the correlation matrix for the set of regressions at the
deal level. Worth mentioning is that, in contrast to the macro level models,
the variables for institutional, cultural, and legal distance strongly correlate.
Again, by sequentially adding these variables in different combinations in
the model-building phase, we ensure the stability of our models and the
robustness of the results.
4Since the models provide stable results, and colinearity diagnostic statistics such as the
variance inflation factor indicate no worrisome instability, we decided to use these variables
jointly. However, we first ran a set of unreported regressions, in which we sequentially add
these variables in different combinations and observe changes in coefficient values and variance.
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Table D.3: Correlation Matrix – Country Dyad Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) VCtti→j 1.0000
(2) VC propti→j 0.2412∗ 1.0000
(3) dist culti,j -0.0878
∗ -0.0503∗ 1.0000
(4) dist geoi,j -0.0036 -0.0384
∗ 0.1871∗ 1.0000
(5) dist techi,j -0.0328
∗ 0.0094 0.0493∗ 0.0374∗ 1.0000
(6) tradeti,j 0.0283
∗ 0.0453∗ -0.0913∗ -0.1258∗ 0.0049 1.0000
(7) same legali,j 0.0612
∗ 0.0417∗ -0.2471∗ -0.0806∗ 0.0064 0.0418∗ 1.0000
(8) same langi,j 0.1058
∗ 0.0485∗ -0.1593∗ 0.0150 -0.0018 0.1569∗ 0.2385∗ 1.0000
(9) VC syndti→j 0.2059∗ 0.1641∗ -0.1005∗ -0.1581∗ -0.0613∗ 0.0477∗ 0.0574∗ 0.1452∗
(10) trustj 0.0283
∗ 0.0304∗ 0.1531∗ -0.0907∗ 0.0035 0.0115 -0.1168∗ 0.0008
(11) cpitj 0.0350
∗ 0.0012 0.0824∗ -0.1505∗ 0.0003 -0.0073 -0.0697∗ 0.0742∗
(12) gdp growthtj -0.0159 -0.0012 0.0165 0.1068
∗ -0.0010 0.0322∗ -0.0033 0.0234∗
(13) capitalizationtj 0.0321
∗ 0.0132 0.0308∗ 0.0456∗ -0.0059 0.0687∗ -0.0125 0.1422∗
(14) stockstj 0.0882
∗ 0.0581∗ 0.0377∗ 0.0219∗ -0.0020 0.0599∗ -0.0102 0.1308∗
(15) gdptj 0.2465
∗ 0.1402∗ -0.0012 0.0761∗ 0.0076 0.0192∗ 0.0224∗ 0.0848∗
(16) inst stabtj 0.0013 -0.0132 0.0369
∗ -0.1783∗ -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0673∗ -0.0468∗
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(9) VC syndti→j 1.0000
(10) trustj 0.1084
∗ 1.0000
(11) cpitj 0.1582
∗ 0.6501∗ 1.0000
(12) gdp growthtj -0.0751
∗ -0.0967∗ -0.2901∗ 1.0000
(13) capitalizationtj 0.0744
∗ 0.2278∗ 0.4028∗ 0.1375∗ 1.0000
(14) stockstj 0.1714
∗ 0.2981∗ 0.3481∗ 0.0237∗ 0.7248∗ 1.0000
(15) gdptj 0.3047
∗ 0.1052∗ 0.0700∗ -0.0786∗ 0.0641∗ 0.3500∗ 1.0000
(16) inst stabtj 0.0519
∗ 0.5465∗ 0.7755∗ -0.2734∗ 0.2430∗ 0.1850∗ -0.0280∗ 1.0000
∗ indicates p < 0.001, two-tailed Pearson correlation
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Table D.4: Correlation Matrix – Deal Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) deal host
(2) gdptj 0.3144
∗
(3) gdp captj 0.2667
∗ 0.4751∗
(4) gdp growthtj -0.1386
∗ -0.1139∗ -0.4336∗
(5) capitalizationtj 0.1715
∗ 0.3327∗ 0.3288∗ 0.0980∗
(6) cpitj 0.2441
∗ 0.0760∗ 0.6577∗ -0.4051∗ 0.3978∗
(7) trustj 0.0397
∗ 0.1050∗ 0.2448∗ 0.1830∗ 0.1511∗ 0.2586∗
(8) dist geomean(i,j) -0.0002 0.4607
∗ -0.0465∗ 0.1908∗ 0.1384∗ -0.3004∗ -0.0316∗
(9) dist cultmean(i,j) -0.1749
∗ -0.1897∗ -0.3067∗ 0.1823∗ -0.1970∗ -0.3176∗ -0.0017 0.1571∗
(10) same legalmax(i,j) 0.0931
∗ 0.0681∗ 0.1173∗ -0.0443∗ 0.1248∗ 0.1113∗ -0.0865∗ 0.0151
(11) same langmax(i,j) 0.0699
∗ 0.1082∗ 0.0995∗ -0.003 0.1715∗ 0.0494∗ -0.1603∗ 0.0991∗
(12) exp sectortmax(k) -0.0418
∗ -0.1119∗ -0.1242∗ 0.0096 -0.0970∗ -0.0959∗ -0.0524∗ 0.0337∗
(13) exp countrytmax(k) 0.1768
∗ 0.3096∗ 0.0886∗ -0.0612∗ 0.0459∗ -0.0093 -0.011 0.0913∗
(14) exp targettmax(k) 0.1577
∗ 0.0512∗ 0.0838∗ -0.0509∗ 0.0302∗ 0.0618∗ -0.0036 -0.0514∗
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(10) same legalmax(i,j) -0.5308
∗
(11) same langmax(i,j) -0.4955
∗ 0.8125∗
(12) exp sectortmax(k) -0.0324
∗ 0.0295 0.0550∗
(13) exp countrytmax(k) -0.1990
∗ 0.0792∗ 0.0849∗ 0.4169∗
(14) exp targettmax(k) -0.1093
∗ 0.0747∗ 0.0722∗ 0.0942∗ 0.1871∗
∗ indicates p < 0.001, two-tailed Pearson correlation
3.3 Model Specification
Even though the global venture capital investment network has sharply in-
creased during the last decade, compared with international trade flows,
which are still rather sparse, only around a quarter of all country dyads
show cross-border venture capital investment activity during the observation
period. When explanations for these country dyads without investment ac-
tivity diverge from the model estimating their absolute or relative amount
of investment activity, issues of structural zeroes and endogenous selection
arise. To deal with potential biases, we apply two-stage estimation techniques
in both cases. For the set of GLS regressions, we first fit a probit model, esti-
mating the probability that a country dyad accounts for any investment activ-
ity from 1998 until 2013. Following Heckman (1979), we calculate the inverse
Mills ratio, and insert it into the GLS model.5 Since many of our independent
variables are time-invariant and our dependent variable construction makes
it unlikely to face omitted variable problems (since it already accounts for
differences in domestic VC and general economic activity), we deploy a ran-
5The results of the first stage of the model accounting for endogeneous selection can be found
in table D.12 in the appendix. For robustness check, we also run a random as well as source and
destination country fixed effects logit model, where the results all point in the same direction.
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dom effect model. Standard procedures such as the Hausman test confirm
this choice.
In another model, we are interested in contrasting entry-mode decisions
of VCs in foreign-developed and emerging economies. In particular, we are
interested in determining which conditions local investors have included in
the otherwise foreign investment syndicate. Therefore, with single cross-
border venture capital deals as units of observation, we run a simple logit
model on the dependent variable, which - if the deal includes not only the
foreign VC but also at least one investor with residence in the same country
as the investee firm - takes the value of one. To contrast investments in
developed economies with the ones in emerging economies, we additionally
run this model using only the corresponding sub-sample. To avoid sampling
issues, we here calculate the standard errors with the bootstrapping method.
3.4 Results and Discussion
Table D.12 reports the results of this set of GLS random-effect regressions
again at the country dyad level where we are aim to contrast the effects
of distance and trust on VC investment propensity in deals only consist-
ing of foreign investors vis-à-vis deals also including a domestic investor
located in the destination country. We therefore in models 1 and 2 only
include foreign-only cross-border investments when constructing our depen-
dent variable (VC propti→j), whereas in models 3 and 4, we only include
foreign-domestic syndicates.
At first glance, the results lend support to hypothesis 4.a and hypothesis
4.b indicating that VC investment activity is negatively affected by geograph-
ical and cultural distance, where the results are less pronounced in the sub
sample, including investments only including a domestic syndication part-
ner. Both the magnitude and significance are lower in this sub-sample. To
allow for path dependencies in the VC investment pattern, we control for the
lagged dependent variable (VC propt−1i→j), which is significant in all settings.
Tradeti→j shows no statistical significance in all settings.
6
In Models 2 and 4, we introduce the measure for institutional trust in the
destination country. As expected by 5.a, institutional trust positively impacts
6Alternative measures for bilateral trade, such as unidirectional trade from SC to DC or DC
to SC, sum of trade between SC and DC, trade only of goods or services et cetera also remain
insignificant.
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Table D.5: Regression table – Random Effects GLS. Country Dyad Level. Dependent Variable:
VC Propensity
all foreign–domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Path dependencies
VC propt−1i→j 0.300∗ 0.299∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.0599) (0.0598)
Distance
dist geoi,j −0.00686∗∗ −0.00722∗∗ −0.00164∗ −0.00167∗
(0.00255) (0.00261) (0.000729) (0.000726)
dist culti,j −0.288∗∗ −0.318∗∗ −0.0717∗ −0.0747∗
(0.0958) (0.0993) (0.0300) (0.0303)
same legali,j 0.0123
∗ 0.0130∗∗ 0.00517∗∗ 0.00523∗∗
(0.00480) (0.00481) (0.00188) (0.00189)
same langi,j 0.0127 0.0131 0.00498 0.00503
(0.00765) (0.00766) (0.00282) (0.00280)
Trust & Relationship
trustj 0.0172
∗∗∗ 0.00173
(0.00002) (0.00187)
tradet−1i→j 0.154 0.148 0.0230 0.0223
(0.191) (0.185) (0.0305) (0.0299)
Institutions
cpitj 0.0177 0.0108 0.00947 0.00878
(0.0364) (0.0371) (0.0159) (0.0163)
inst. stabtj −0.00250 −0.00371∗ −0.000779 −0.000900
(0.00157) (0.00147) (0.000842) (0.000837)
∆cpitj−i −0.0191 −0.0217 −0.00303 −0.00330
(0.0272) (0.0274) (0.0103) (0.0102)
Controls
gdpt−1j 0.157∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗
(0.0480) (0.0482) (0.0161) (0.0159)
gdp capt−1j 0.146∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.0517∗ 0.0510∗
(0.0537) (0.0527) (0.0244) (0.0242)
gdp growtht−1j 0.0420∗ 0.0383∗ 0.0132 0.0128
(0.0184) (0.0174) (0.00983) (0.00964)
capitalizationtj 0.0391 0.0454 0.00199 0.00262
(0.0303) (0.0301) (0.00819) (0.00838)
∆gdpt−1j−i −0.00700 −0.00847 −0.00135 −0.00150
(0.00863) (0.00854) (0.00346) (0.00341)
∆gdp capt−1j−i −0.126∗∗ −0.127∗∗ −0.0454∗ −0.0455∗
(0.0465) (0.0467) (0.0222) (0.0222)
∆gdp growtht−1j−i −0.0282∗ −0.0289∗ −0.00800 −0.00808
(0.0136) (0.0137) (0.00608) (0.00611)
∆capitalizationtj−i 0.0639∗ 0.0571∗ 0.0139∗∗ 0.0132∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.00495) (0.00501)
λti,j (imr) 0.00457 0.00591
∗ 0.00185∗ 0.00198∗
(0.00281) (0.00272) (0.000819) (0.000810)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 20, 053 20, 053 20, 053 20, 053
R2 0.1278 0.1281 0.4232 0.4232
Subscript i indicates the source country, j the destination country
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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cross-border VC inflows. However, consistent with 5.c, institutional trust
loses its significance when only looking for deals syndicated domestic VCs.7
As discussed earlier, we expect the rationales of cross-border venture capi-
tal investments to substantially differ when targeting an emerging destination
country. Therefore, the next set of regressions, reported in table D.6 contrasts
dyadic VC flows with developed (Models 1-4) or emerging destination coun-
tries (Models 5-8).
The first striking insight is that both samples differ substantially in terms
of coefficient magnitude, direction, significance, and overall model fit. The
results for the sub-sample of developed destination countries shows prop-
erties similar to the ones reported in table D.12. Again, with a significant
VC propt−1i→j, investment activities show path dependencies, and geographical
as well as cultural distance have a negative impact on cross-border VC invest-
ment activities, lending support to hypothesis 4.a. A negative and significant
indicates venture capital to flow from countries with higher growth to those
with lower growth, which on first glance appears counter-intuitive. In this
sub-sample, the negative effects of corruption on VC activity are particularly
strong. When we introduce our measure for relational trust (VCsyndti→j)
in Model 2, representing the share of foreign-domestic syndications in the
whole cross-border investment activity, we observe a positive and signifi-
cant effect. While adding this variable leaves most other coefficients and
their corresponding p-values unchanged, it draws a substantial part of the
significance of geographical and cultural distance, lending again support to
hypothesis 5.a. When investing in developed economies, syndication with
domestic partners, which can be interpreted as a result of relational trust,
indeed seems to be common practice in mitigating the effects of high ge-
ographical, cultural, and institutional distance, a finding that supports hy-
pothesis 5.a. This also holds true when testing for the effect of relational
and institutional trust together in Model 4. Surprisingly, institutional trust
appears to have no significant effect when only considering investments in
developed economies. In line with hypothesis 5.b, our findings suggest that
institutional trust is ex-ante sufficiently established for developed economies
to estimate the viability of investing in a developed jurisdiction.
For the sub-sample of emerging destination countries, the picture changes
substantially. The R2 drops to single-digit values, and most coefficients com-
7We additionally ran an unreported (but available on request) model on the whole sample
(foreign-only as well as foreign-domestic investments), where we introduced an interaction term
between trustj and VC syndti→j, which turns out to be negative and significant on a 5% level. We
interpret this result as further evidence for the suggested mitigating effect of teaming up with a
local VC on institutional trust.
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Table D.6: Regression table – Random Effects GLS. Country Dyad Level. Dependent Variable:
VC Propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
developed emerging developed emerging developed emerging
Path dependencies
VC propt−1i→j 0.463∗∗∗ 0.162 0.456∗∗∗ 0.149 0.463∗∗∗ 0.162
(0.0914) (0.154) (0.0894) (0.140) (0.0914) (0.154)
Distance
dist geoi,j −0.00843∗∗ −0.00621 −0.00554∗ −0.00525 −0.00846∗∗ −0.00621
(0.00278) (0.00478) (0.00263) (0.00474) (0.00287) (0.00490)
dist culti,j −0.360∗∗ 0.0681 −0.317∗ 0.157 −0.361∗ 0.0684
(0.136) (0.122) (0.138) (0.147) (0.145) (0.141)
same legali,j 0.0146
∗ 0.00149 0.0143∗ 0.000377 0.0147∗ 0.00148
(0.00651) (0.00770) (0.00641) (0.00713) (0.00659) (0.00757)
same langi,j 0.0151 −0.00142 0.0118 −0.0103 0.0151 −0.00142
(0.00781) (0.00799) (0.00788) (0.0104) (0.00782) (0.00788)
Trust & Relationship
trustj 0.00134 0.00180
∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0002)
VC syndti→j 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.351
(0.0126) (0.186)
tradet−1i→j 0.199 0.230 −0.0174 0.212 0.199 0.230
(0.366) (0.221) (0.357) (0.207) (0.366) (0.221)
∆trustj−i 0.0103∗ 0.0239∗ 0.0117∗ 0.0201∗ 0.00970 0.0239
(0.00482) (0.0106) (0.00493) (0.00893) (0.00709) (0.0148)
Institutions
cpitj 0.0497 −0.124 0.0105 −0.177 0.0484 −0.124
(0.0264) (0.101) (0.0298) (0.121) (0.0277) (0.103)
inst. stabtj −0.0103 0.00202 −0.00532 0.0111 −0.0104 0.00204
(0.00555) (0.00211) (0.00519) (0.00566) (0.00546) (0.00287)
∆cpitj−i −0.0172 −0.00390 −0.00535 0.00886 −0.0168 −0.00392
(0.0188) (0.0448) (0.0195) (0.0478) (0.0190) (0.0445)
Controls
gdpt−1j 0.149∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.0991∗ 0.0604 0.150∗∗ 0.161∗
(0.0455) (0.0783) (0.0467) (0.105) (0.0473) (0.0741)
gdp capt−1j 0.105∗ 0.298 0.107∗ 0.234 0.104∗ 0.299
(0.0477) (0.197) (0.0473) (0.165) (0.0469) (0.209)
gdp growtht−1j 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0438 0.0507∗∗∗ 0.0461 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0438
(0.0138) (0.0360) (0.0137) (0.0357) (0.0138) (0.0373)
capitaliationtj 0.120 0.153
∗ 0.108 0.176∗ 0.122 0.153∗
(0.0817) (0.0643) (0.0809) (0.0714) (0.0877) (0.0614)
stockstj −0.107 −0.142 −0.123 −0.148 −0.109 −0.142
(0.0781) (0.0802) (0.0792) (0.0812) (0.0834) (0.0747)
∆gdpt−1j−i −0.0214 −0.00143 0.00233 0.0245 −0.0216 −0.00140
(0.0189) (0.0102) (0.0197) (0.0223) (0.0197) (0.0106)
∆gdp capt−1j−i −0.101∗ −0.0646 −0.102∗ −0.0559 −0.101∗ −0.0646
(0.0467) (0.0917) (0.0462) (0.0843) (0.0463) (0.0927)
∆gdp growtht−1j−i −0.0442∗∗∗ −0.0268 −0.0463∗∗∗ −0.0281 −0.0441∗∗∗ −0.0268
(0.0113) (0.0296) (0.0112) (0.0290) (0.0113) (0.0303)
∆capitalizationtj−i −0.156 −0.101∗ −0.148 −0.0986∗ −0.157 −0.100∗
(0.0937) (0.0428) (0.0929) (0.0410) (0.0958) (0.0411)
∆stockstj−i 0.134 0.0944 0.134 0.105 0.134 0.0943
(0.0818) (0.0525) (0.0817) (0.0553) (0.0834) (0.0494)
λ (imr) 0.0109∗ −0.00134 0.0106∗ −0.00325 0.0110∗ −0.00135
(0.00427) (0.00238) (0.00427) (0.00285) (0.00452) (0.00284)
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 11080 8973 11080 8973 11080 8973
R2 0.2830 0.0399 0.2893 0.0551 0.2830 0.0399
Subscript i indicates the source country, j the destination country
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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pletely lose their significance. Neither geographical and cultural distance nor
commonly used macro variables such as GDP growth or corruption in the
destination country seem to have any explanatory power at all, with desti-
nation country market capitalization as the only exception. In Model 6, we
also introduce relational trust (VCsyndti→j), which was highly significant in
the sub-sample of developed economies. As expected in hypothesis 5.4, in
the context of emerging economies, it again loses its explanatory power. Fi-
nally, Model 7 includes the measure for institutional trust in the destination
country, which, in contrast to the developed economies sub-sample, appears
to have a positive coefficient significant at the one-percent level. When jointly
testing for the effects of institutional and relational trust in Model 8, the re-
sults remain mostly unchanged. However, in this model we find a positive
impact of institutional stability, at least at the 10% level.
These results indicate that the utilization of relational trust via the syn-
dication with domestic VCs helps to overcome market entry barriers and
transaction costs associated with cross-border investments in a geographi-
cal, cultural, or institutional distant country. This finding is, at first glance,
in line with recent research on cross-border VC investments (e.g. Dai et al.,
2012; Dai and Nahata, 2013; Tykvová and Schertler, 2013), but also highlights
that its validity is restricted to practices in developed economies. At least
on the aggregated macro level, no evidence for such practices can be found
when targeting emerging economies. We find weak evidence for hypothe-
sis 5.b, which suggests that institutional trust has an effect on investments
in emerging compared with developed economies. Our results highlight the
need to further analyze the drivers of venture capital investment in emerging
economies. It also suggests that at least a minimum level of institutional trust
seems to be a necessary condition to attract foreign venture capital.
The results thus far suggest substantial qualitative differences between
stand-alone investments of foreign VCs and the ones including local co-
investors. We also find cross-border investments in developed destination
countries to be guided by quite different rationales than the ones targeting
emerging economies. Recent research (eg. Dai et al., 2012; Dai and Nahata,
2013)suggests foreign VCs underutilize the potential of joint investments with
domestic partners, which our results confirm. To further investigate this
issue, we raise the question, in an additional model, how experience and
other characteristics of the foreign investors, within and between country, in-
fluences the decision to include domestic partners. Thus, in table D.7, we
present the results of a logit model with cross-border VC deals as unit of
analysis. Our dichotomous dependent variable takes the value of one where
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the cross-border deal also includes a local VC. Hence, we not aim to ana-
lyze the amount, but rather the composition of deals targeting developed
vis-à-vis emerging economies. We run the models on the whole population
(Models 1 - 2) as well as the subpopulation only consisting of deals in de-
veloped (Models 3-4) and emerging (Models 5-6) destination countries. In
the first set of models (Models 1, 3, and 5) we test only for the effects of
different forms of distance, where we take the mean of all involved foreign
VCs to construct our variables for geographical (dist geomean(i,j)) and cul-
tural distance (dist cultmean(i,j)). For legal (legalmax(i,j)) and lingual similarity
(lanmax(i,j)) we maintain the dichotomous nature of the original variable, and
let them take the value of one in the event at least one of the foreign VCs
is located in a country with the same language or legal system as the desti-
nation country. Since our unit of analysis is now the cross-border VC deal,
we are able to also test for experience effects in the portfolio company itself
(exp targettmax(k)), its sector (exp sector
t
max(k)) and finally the destination coun-
try (exp countrytmax(k)) of the most experienced foreign VCs in a second set
of models (Models 2, 4, and 6).
The results for the whole sample (Models 1-2) again indicate with a neg-
ative and significant coefficient for emerging destination countries, that VCs
indeed appear to be reluctant to create syndicates with partners from emerg-
ing economies. In addition, the comparison between developed (Models 3-4)
and emerging (Models 5-6) destination countries reveals some interesting dif-
ferences.
While corruption (cpitj) negatively affects the tendency for foreign VCs to
syndicate with a local VC in developed economies, in emerging economies, it
appears to be arguably encourage syndication. Institutional trust (trusttj),
however, has a positive impact in the tendency to form foreign-domestic
syndicates in emerging economies. Finally, in contrast to deals in devel-
oped economies, in emerging economies geographical distance positively,
and cultural distance negatively affects the willingness to syndicate. Over-
all, foreign-domestic syndicates, particularly in emerging economies, seem to
help mitigate the effects of geographical distance, but not necessarily cultural
difference. However, while foreign VCs are amendable to syndicating with
partners from corrupt destination countries, foreign VCs will still require a
minimum level of comfort or trust in a country’s institutions.
When introducing experience effects (Models 2, 4, and 6) the maximum
investment experience of foreign VCs in the same sector as the investee
firm (exp sectortmax(k)) negatively influences the need to integrate domestic
investors, indicating cross-border investments to be even more complicated
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Table D.7: Regression table – Logit. Deal Level. Dependent Variable: Domestic participation in
cross-border VC deals
all developed DC emerging DC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Destination Country
gdptj 3.710
∗∗∗ 3.184∗∗∗ 2.736∗∗∗ 2.232∗∗∗ 3.584∗∗ 3.338∗
(0.502) (0.480) (0.700) (0.645) (1.344) (1.433)
gdp growthtj -0.0396
∗ -0.0268 -0.0643∗ -0.0698∗ -0.103∗∗ -0.0984∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0380) (0.0375)
capitalizationtj 0.00250
∗∗ 0.00205∗∗ 0.00566∗∗∗ 0.00470∗∗∗ -0.00664∗∗∗ -0.00673∗∗∗
(0.000792) (0.000769) (0.00110) (0.00104) (0.00143) (0.00145)
Dyad
cpitj -1.801
∗∗∗ -0.923∗ -2.826∗∗∗ -1.369∗ 1.138 1.332
(0.375) (0.378) (0.602) (0.582) (1.142) (1.196)
trustj -0.0694 -0.0710 -0.0552 -0.0766 0.486
∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(0.0414) (0.0410) (0.0684) (0.0658) (0.115) (0.114)
dist geomean(i,j) 0.0812
∗∗ 0.0787∗∗ 0.0429 0.0379 0.418∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0272) (0.0297) (0.0291) (0.111) (0.115)
dist cultmean(i,j) -3.707
∗∗ -1.308 -3.460∗ -0.891 -2.08∗∗∗ -2.39∗∗∗
(1.384) (1.422) (1.478) (1.526) (5.539) (5.660)
same legalmax(i,j) 0.273
∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.327∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.633∗∗ 0.587∗
(0.0985) (0.0988) (0.118) (0.116) (0.230) (0.232)
same langmax(i,j) -0.206
∗ -0.175 -0.310∗∗ -0.269∗ -0.224 -0.206
(0.0991) (0.0994) (0.116) (0.114) (0.244) (0.246)
emergingj -0.783
∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.143)
Acquiring foreign VCs
exp sectortmax(k) -0.00533
∗∗∗ -0.00704∗∗∗ -0.000729
(0.000870) (0.00103) (0.00187)
exp countrytmax(k) 0.0281
∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗ -0.00661
(0.00321) (0.00396) (0.0124)
exp targettmax(k) 0.525
∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0652) (0.151)
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 7251 7251 6056 6056 1195 1195
Pseudo R2 0.1029 0.1271 0.0395 0.0711 0.1131 0.1186
log Pseudoliklihood -4375.305 -4257.428 -3704.637 -3582.7357 -618.504 -614.615
Subscript i indicates the source country, j the destination country, and k the acquiring VC
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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when carried out in an unfamiliar sector. Put differently, foreign VCs are less
likely to seek local syndicated expertise if they feel they have sufficient sector
experience. The experience in the destination country (exp countrytmax(k)), in
turn, has a positive effect, indicating that domestic partners are found after all
in existing networks in the destination country. Both, however, are only true
for the sub sample of developed economies. A possible explanation is that
VCs indeed struggle to identify, generally avoid, or prematurely terminate
relationships with domestic partners in emerging economies due to friction,
prejudices, or dissatisfaction.
3.5 Robustness tests
To ensure that our results are not solely driven by our choice of how to con-
struct the dependent variable, we also ran a set of alternative models. In
the reported models, we not only construct the dependent variable in a way
where every deal adds one count to all participating source countries, but we
also run models where deals either count once per investor for every desti-
nation country, or only for the destination country with the largest number
of investors. We also replace the number of deals by their value in US dol-
lars. Zephyr unfortunately has no information on the amount invested by
individual investors, so we have to assume that all investors participate in
the deal with equal investments.8Furthermore, we run the same variable set
up in a zero-inflated negative binomial model with the VC deal count be-
tween a country dyad as a dependent variable.9Overall, these measures lead
to quite comparable, but less pronounced, results and a lower but accept-
able significance and goodness-of-fit of the models. We also tried alternative
measures for our institutional trust variable, such as the indices for the qual-
ity of law, the government, investor protection, and accountability provided
by the World Bank. While less pronounced, these results point in the same
direction.
8Unfortunately, In Zephyr the deal value is missing in about 30 percent of the cases, hence
decreases our number of available observations
9The test for over-dispersion (likelihood ratio test of α=0) confirms our choice of a negative
binomial over a possion model. To evaluate the benefits of the applied two-stage zero inflation
procedure, we carry out the likelihood ratio test for model selection suggested by Vuong (1989),
where the results speak in favor of our choice.
196
4. Conclusion
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effects of geographical, cultural, and institu-
tional proximity as well as institutional and relational trust on cross-border
VC flows between country dyads. We contrast cross-border investments
made by only foreign VCs with investments made by both foreign and local
VCs in syndicate. We further analyze cross-border venture capital investment
between developed and emerging economies, as many emerging economies
have been actively supporting their own venture capital markets pursuant to
the perceived success of VC contribution to innovation in more developed
jurisdictions (Bruton et al., 2008, 2005). These same economies are seeking
not only to attract foreign funds but more specifically foreign expertise as
it is thought that not only would local entrepreneurs benefit from specialist
VC skills, but also that local VCs would benefit from the transfer of knowl-
edge from the more sophisticated foreign VCs. However, underdeveloped
investor and property protection, high cultural distance, diverging business
ethics and practices, and the perception of corruption in certain jurisdictions
are obstacles to the development of these markets. An example of a jurisdic-
tion that has faced such challenge is China, and it is this jurisdiction that we
have looked to for the motivation of this research. Despite the institutional
obstacles, China has been able to not only build a venture capital market
from scratch since 1984 (Xiao, 2002) but has been able to develop it to the
success it is today, and this has been attributed to guanxi, or network-based
strategies, utilized by market participants (Peng, 2003; Pukthuanthong and
Walker, 2007; Su et al., 2007). By taking into account more jurisdictions, we
believe our research provides a more thorough understanding of the balance
between institutional factors and network effects from a pattern of interna-
tional alliances and syndicates in the venture capital industry. In line with
prior research, we find evidence that foreign venture capital flow into de-
veloped economies is facilitated by the building of relational trust among
foreign VCs investing as a syndicate comprising local VCs. However, we
find the driving forces of cross-border VC investment activities in emerging
economies to be substantially different and widely unexplained by traditional
mechanisms used to analyze venture capital flows in the context of developed
economies. Consistent with Rousseau et al. (1998), our results suggest insti-
tutional trust to be a necessary precondition for foreign VC inflow as well
as the formation of foreign-domestic syndicates. Institutional trust thus pro-
vides the foundation for building up a critical mass of initial trust to enter a
relationship involving proximity.
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Our findings highlight not only the need for further analysis of the driv-
ing forces of cross-border venture capital flows, but more specifically the
need for analysis to explicitly consider investments in emerging economies.
We believe our paper sheds light on a yet under-explored facet driving cross-
border venture capital investments and thereby provides guidance for aca-
demics on how to integrate more socio-economic determinants in macroe-
conomic venture capital investment analyses. Future research for example
could shed even more light by looking at the effect of changes in the percep-
tions of trust or changes in political stability (instability) on venture capital
fund flows. An analysis of the effect of having a VC partner from the host
country on profitability and other performance metrics could also further
extend this research. For policy makers, we believe our findings may shed
light on the determinants of not only venture capital inflow but also the in-
flow of VC expertise. As our findings suggest, sophisticated VCs are not
necessarily transferring valuable knowledge, such as sector expertise, to local
syndicate members but are more likely to extract such knowledge. To tap
foreign sources of knowledge and capital, more needs to be done by policy
makers in emerging economies to instill institutional trust which appears to
be a necessary precondition for foreign venture capital inflow. For example,
in China, policies to attract foreign venture capital emphasize strengthening
the legal environment. Guanxi can only get you so far.
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Appendix
Table D.8: Venture Capital Flows on Country Level
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT JP NL NO PT SE US
Domestic investments
Volume 400 669 748 6,014 799 1,420 697 0 11,823 15 582 690 352 1,205 292 43 1,498 126,961
Number 80 155 136 1145 166 309.0 167 0 2,433 4.00 201 86 151 224 57 12 362 11,794
Gross cross-border inflow (from all sample countries)
Volume 105 363 647 1,444 344 232 241 0 3,593 0 356 226 18 625 166 16 556 10,020
Number 26 98 175 427 105 47 81 0 763 0 137 34 14 117 33 8 182 2,402
Gross cross-border outflow (to all sample countries)
Volume 22 576 1,905 2,198 465 104 170 1,270 4,878 0 151 143 1,616 870 229 12 538 3,801
Number 9 185 487 552 138 26 62 367 1,152 0 51 54 367 286 91 6 163 653
Note: This table reports the aggregated venture capital investments, in- and outflows in the period between 2000 to 2013 on country level, measured in
million EURO and alternatively in the number of investments. For the sake of brevity, only the top quantile of countries in terms of VC activity are
reported
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Table D.10: Variable Description
Variable Description Source
Macro Models
Dependent Variables
VCti→j Number of venture capital deals in destination country j with participating venture
capitalists from source country i
Zephyr (2012)
VC propti→j Venture capital propensity between source country i and destination country j, as
in equation ??
Zephyr (2012)
Distance
dist geoi,j Natural logarithm of the distance in kilometers between the source country j and
the destination country i, adjusted to population density
CEPII (2011)
dist culti,j Cultural distance between source country j, as in equation ?? Own construction from Hofst-
ede et al. (2010)
same legali,j Dummy variable, indicating the same origin of the legal system in source i and
destination country j (categorized in french, german, english, scandinavian)
La Porta et al. (1998)
same langi,j Dummy, indicating a shared language spoken by at least ten percent of population
in source j and destination country i
CEPII (2011)
Trust & Relationships
trustj Percentage of citizens of the destination country i who replied to the question:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?” with “Yes”
World Value Survey
VC syndti→j Share of deals carried out in syndication between foreign venture capitalists from
source country i with domestic ones in destination country j to all investments from
source country i in destination country j
Zephyr (2012)
tradeti→j Trade flow relative to GDP between Source country i and destination country j,
normalized, as in equation ??
OECD STAN database
Institutions
cpitj Corruption Perception Index of destination country j, adjusted to 0-1 scale, where
high values indicate low levels of corruption
Transparency International
inst stabtj Institutional stability of destination country j, standardized on -2.5 - 2.5 scale, where
high values indicate high instability
Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Controls
gdptj GDP of destination country j, constant 2005 USD Worldbank Development Indi-
cators
gdp growthtj GDP growth of destination country j in percentage Worldbank Development Indi-
cators
capitalizationtj Ratio of market capitalization of listed companies to GDP in destination country j Worldbank Development Indi-
cators
stockstj Ratio of stocks traded to GDP in destination country j Worldbank Development Indi-
cators
Micro Models
Dependent Variables
VC host Dummy variable, indicating whether or not the cross-border VC deal also includes
a domestic VC
Zephyr (2012)
Dyad
dist geomean(i,j) Mean of geographical distance between destination country and country of resi-
dence of the foreign VCs
CEPII (2011)
dist cultmean(i,j) Mean of cultural distance between destination country and country of residence of
the foreign VCs
Hofstede et al. (2010)
legalmax(i,j) Dummy variable, indicating whether or not at least one of the foreign VCs comes
from a country with the same legal tradition
La Porta et al. (1998)
langmax(i,j) Dummy variable, indicating whether or not at least one of the foreign VCs comes
from a country with the same language
CEPII (2011)
Acquiring foreign VCs
exp sectortmax(k) Maximum of the participating foreign VCs experience in the PC sector Zephyr (2012)
exp countrytmax(k) Maximum of the participating foreign VCs experience in the DC Zephyr (2012)
exp targettmax(k) Maximum of the participating foreign VCs experience with the same PC Zephyr (2012)
Overview and definition of variables and data-sources
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Table D.12: Regression Table – Random Effect Probit. Dependent Variable: VC activity between
country dyad in at least one year 2000–2012
Coef. Sdt. Err. z P > z 95% Conf. Interval
Distance
dist culti,j -5.5647 0.5765 -9.6500 0.0000 -6.6947 -4.4347
dist geoi,j -0.4513 0.0149 -30.2000 0.0000 -0.4806 -0.4220
same legali,j 0.0814 0.0305 2.6700 0.0080 0.0217 0.1411
same borderi,j 0.2643 0.0695 3.8000 0.0000 0.1281 0.4005
same langi,j 0.0926 0.0427 2.1700 0.0300 0.0089 0.1763
Trust & Relationship
trustmean(j) -0.3633 0.0877 -4.1400 0.0000 -0.5352 -0.1913
trademean(i→j) -1.1429 0.3350 -3.4100 0.0010 -1.7995 -0.4862
∆trustmean(j−i) 0.3950 0.0588 6.7200 0.0000 0.2798 0.5102
Institutions
cpij,mean 6.1197 0.2229 27.4600 0.0000 5.6828 6.5565
cpi lowestj 0.5211 0.0619 8.4200 0.0000 0.3998 0.6424
cpi lowestj -0.2149 0.0717 -3.0000 0.0030 -0.3555 -0.0743
inst. stabmean(j) -0.6133 0.0279 -21.9700 0.0000 -0.6680 -0.5586
∆cpimean(j−i -2.4122 0.1494 -16.1400 0.0000 -2.7051 -2.1193
Controls
gdpmean(j) 7.6400 0.2418 31.5900 0.0000 7.1660 8.1139
gdp capmean(j -4.5785 0.2931 -15.6200 0.0000 -5.1530 -4.0041
gdp growthmean(j 3.1562 0.2471 12.7700 0.0000 2.6719 3.6405
capitaliationmean(j 5.0114 0.5268 9.5100 0.0000 3.9789 6.0438
stocksmean(j -0.0874 0.5809 -0.1500 0.8800 -1.2259 1.0511
emergingj -0.7343 0.0562 -13.0600 0.0000 -0.8445 -0.6241
emergingi -1.2545 0.0619 -20.2700 0.0000 -1.3758 -1.1331
∆gdpmean(j−i) -4.3361 0.1570 -27.6100 0.0000 -4.6439 -4.0283
∆gdp capmean(j−i) 3.5252 0.2047 17.2200 0.0000 3.1240 3.9264
∆gdp growthmean(j−i) -1.2368 0.1742 -7.1000 0.0000 -1.5783 -0.8953
∆capitalizationmean(j−i) -4.9170 0.4028 -12.2100 0.0000 -5.7064 -4.1275
∆stocksmean(j−i) 2.0402 0.4378 4.6600 0.0000 1.1821 2.8983
N 26,292
R2 0.4642
Log pseudolikelihood -6604.48
Subscript i indicates the source country, j the destination country
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Abstract
The aim of this paper was to provide a framework and novel methodology geared
towards mapping technological change in complex interdependent systems by us-
ing large amounts of unstructured data from various recent on- and offline sources.
Combining techniques from the fields of natural language processing and network
analysis, we are able to identify technological fields as overlapping communities of
knowledge fragments. Over time persistence of these fragments allows to observe how
these fields evolve into trajectories, which may change, split, merge and finally dis-
appear. As empirical example we use the broad area of Technological Singularity,
an umbrella term for different technologies ranging from neuroscience to machine
learning and bioengineering, which are seen as main contributors to the development
of artificial intelligence and human enhancement technologies. Using a socially en-
hanced search routine, we extract 1,398 documents for the years 2011-2013. Our
analysis highlights the importance of generic interface that allow ease the recombi-
nation of technology to increase the pace of technological progress. While we can
identify consistent technology fields in static document collections, more advanced
ontology reconciliation is needed to be able to track a larger number of communities
over time.
Keywords: Technological change, transition, technology forecasting, natural lan-
guage processing, network analysis, overlapping community detection, dynamic com-
munity detection
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Preface
Conceptual frameworks, as the one I sketch in this thesis, help us under-
standing complex systems by identifying overall commonalities, rules, and
relationships. However, to make them useful beyond scholarly discussions
and support evidence based decision making, such a framework’s determi-
nants (elements, relations, input and output) have to be quantifiable. While
in the first papers of this thesis I provide ample own examples and discuss
related work on how to measure elements and their characteristics, their
network and interaction pattern within and between finance and research
sphere, mapping and measuring elements within the technology sphere rep-
resents a more challenging task. In chapter A, I identify a set of interrelated
challenges for empirical research in the energy sector representative for a
large and complex technological system, where the delimitation of sectors
and technologies represents the first necessary condition for empirical work.
Indeed, the energy area is vast and diverse, including a multitude technolo-
gies from different technological fields and deployed in various industries.
Many of those technologies can in a specific configuration be used for the
production, distribution, storage and efficient consumption of energy, but
originate from and are still deployed for the same or different tasks in other
sectors. This prevalent technological diversity represents a major challenge
for a delimitation of the energy sector and it’s subsystems. Yet, such a delin-
eation of technological systems, subsystems, their components and interac-
tions is fundamental for any descriptive or predictive analysis of technolog-
ical change and its drivers, including finance. This challenge, even though
quite distinct, is not unique to the energy sector but nowadays can be found
in many large technological systems. Contemporary trends of modularisa-
tion and the emergence of “interface technologies” ease the combination and
re-combination of components from different technological trajectories, sec-
tors and paradigms, making the line between different sectors increasingly
blurry. Among others, the rapid progress of ICT technology led to its pen-
etration of virtually all areas of social and commercial activity, and the de-
velopment of common data transfer protocols and interfaces is said to make
technologies from different trajectory more compatible with each other.
Obviously, static classifications such as industry IPC codes or patent classes
are of very limited use to delimit and map such interconnected and rapidly
evolving technological systems. Common approaches to do so are mostly
limited to qualitative in-depth case studies (Davies, 1996), quantitative meth-
ods based on patents (Verspagen, 2007) or scientific publication (Wagner and
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Leydesdorff, 2005) data, and more generic simulation models (Dawid, 2006;
Lopolito et al., 2013). While undeniably useful, they either require massive
effort to qualitatively analyze complex interaction patterns in technological
space, or rely on quantitative data only available with non-negligible time de-
lay, and only relevant for certain technology domains, often underestimating
the context in which technology is used.
During the last decade we have witnessed tremendous growth of freely
available digital information, often in the form of unstructured text data from
sources such as web-sites and blogs, written communication of communities
in forums or via e-mail, and knowledge repositories (e.g. SSRN, Research-
gate). The topicality and sheer amount of such data bear great opportunities
for social science research in general, and particularly to timely analyze com-
plex technological change. Most recently, social scientists have also started to
deploy methods from the fields of computational linguistic and natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) to advance empirical research on the development of
science and technology (DiMaggio et al., 2013; McFarland et al., 2013; Mohr
and Bogdanov, 2013; Ramage et al., 2009). In their essence, such linguistically
informed methods are capable of identifying patterns of language usage in
large bodies of text and communication.
Taping in this new source and utilizing newest advances in NLP and net-
work analysis, my co-author Roman Jurowetzki and I in this chapter develop
a framework and suggest a set of methods geared towards mapping techno-
logical change in complex interdependent systems by using large amounts
of unstructured text data from various on- and offline sources. Such an ap-
proach integrates the broad multidimensional perspective of qualitative re-
searchers with quantitative objectivity given by the machine learning based
methodology. To do so, I extract a large number of text documents all over
the internet, using a social search routine that we built around the follow-
ship structure within the microblogging service twitter. Deploying entity
recognition tools from the semantic web area and community detection tech-
niques from modern network analysis, I am able to represent technological
systems as a network of functionally related technologies, and identify fields
of densely related technologies. By doing so, I am able to observe the evolu-
tion of such fields over time, and identify the technological trajectories they
follow. I believe this to be a crucial step towards a dynamic and adaptable
real-time mapping of technological evolution. I further suggest feasible meth-
ods such as entity identification techniques to link these technologies again
to actors in the research and finance sphere. Having such tools at hand, in
further steps a more nuanced discourse on the interplay of finance and tech-
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nology beyond the aggregation of investments fitting in certain static clas-
sifications is possible. Instead, a dynamic mapping of technological change
as the reconfiguration of relationships of technologies enables us to analyze
the impact of investments in terms of its contribution to the technological
system’s evolution in a certain direction.
Fig. E.1: Positioning the paper in the theoretical framework
Investor Space
Technology Space
Research Space
Institutional Environment
Part I
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Part II Part III
Chapter 2 Chapter 3
This chapter mainly attempts to explore the internal dynamics of the tech-
nology space in isolation. The main focus lays on developing a method to
provide data suitable for mapping , analyzing and predicting technological
change, as I do in the following chapter F. Yet, it also offers first insights,
particularly on the role densely connected “interface technologies” play in
the evolution of technological fields and systems by easing the burden to
combine formerly separated technologies. These findings appear suitable for
future research that aims to develop predictive models to forecast the emer-
gence of such interface technologies, or even technological revolutions. In
addition, I illustrate how entity recognition techniques can be used to easily
identify associations between technologies, investors and researchers/firms
to establish links between technology, research and finance space
This paper was developed during my visiting researcher period at Stan-
ford University, and simultaneously Roman’s research stay at RAND Europe,
Cambridge. Exposed to new state-of-the-art methods as well as latest con-
ceptual developments, we combined our insights to develop a new method
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to tackle important issues in our field of research. It was firstly presented
at the Stanford Network Forum 2014, afterwards the ISS 2014 in Jena, and
finally at the SocInfo 2014 in Barcelona. It is published in the Social Infor-
matics Conference Proceedings, as part of the Springer Lecture Notes in Computer
Science.
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1. Introduction
1 Introduction
Understanding the pattern of technological change is a crucial precondition
to formulate meaningful long-term research and industry policy. Technologi-
cal change usually happens along technological trajectories Dosi (1982) focusing
its pathway within a scientific paradigm Kuhn (1962). Apart from defining the
boundaries, a paradigm often provides a set of generic technology artifacts
which can be deployed along multiple trajectories Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995). Furthermore, recent trends towards modularization and the develop-
ment of common interfaces have led to an increasing compatibility of tech-
nologies within and between paradigms. We argue that today we face an ac-
celerating deterioration of burdens for technology (re-)combination through
growing complementary of components Baldwin and Clark (2000); Schilling
(2000). In order to understand innovation activity in many modern techno-
logical fields, it therefore becomes pivotal to deploy conceptual frameworks,
methods, and data geared towards the analysis of such dynamic and highly
interdependent systems.
Common approaches to analyze technological change are yet limited to
qualitative in-depth case studies Davies (1996); Hekkert and Negro (2009),
quantitative methods depending on data such as patents Verspagen (2007)
or scientific publications Wagner and Leydesdorff (2005), and more generic
simulation models Dawid (2006); Lopolito et al. (2013). While undeniably
useful, they either require massive effort to qualitatively analyze complex in-
teraction patterns in technological space, or rely on quantitative data only
available with non-negligible time delay, and only relevant for certain tech-
nology domains, often underestimating the context in which technology is
used. During the last decade we have witnessed tremendous growth of freely
available digital information, often in the form of unstructured text data from
sources such as web-sites and blogs, written communication of communities
in forums or via e-mail, and knowledge repositories (e.g. SSRN, Research-
gate). The topicality and sheer amount of such data bear great opportunities
for social science research in general, and particularly to timely analyze com-
plex technological change, as we attempt to demonstrate in the following.
In this paper we present a framework and suggest a set of methods to map
technological change by using large amounts of unstructured text data from
various on- and offline sources. We conceptualize technological change as the
reconfiguration of interaction patterns between technology fragments, and their
clustering in space to technological fields, and in time to technological trajectories.
To analyze such change, we propose the combination of techniques from the
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fields of natural language processing (NLP) and network analysis. We use
the case of technological singularity to illustrate our approach graphically as
well as with key measures derived from network analysis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section ?? reviews
and discusses literature and concepts of technological change, and provides
a theoretical framework for our approach. In section 4 we suggest a set of
methods suitable to analyze such a framework, and illustrate it in section 5 at
the case of singularity technologies. Finally, section 6 concludes, provides im-
plications for theory, empirical research, and suggests applications for science
and industry policy.
2 Conceptualization and Analysis of Technologi-
cal Change
2.1 Conceptualization of technological change
The conceptualization of technological change has a long tradition in differ-
ent academic communities. Generally, technology exists to fulfill or support
some societal functions through direct application or indirectly through de-
rived products. It is thus always embedded in and framed by a societal, polit-
ical and organizational context, which co-evolves with it Kaplan and Tripsas
(2008). It is also understood as happening within broader scientific paradigms
Kuhn (1962).
Scholars studying industrial dynamics further describe the development
of technology as contextual to the evolution of industrial structures Dosi
(1982); Hain and Jurowetzki (ming). Technology is envisioned as a mean to
problem solving in a particular context, which could usually be solved in var-
ious other ways using other technologies. Technological trajectories represent
pathways spanning across the technological space delimited by the paradigm
Dosi (1982), focusing the problem solving process over time around one pos-
sible configuration of technologies. While this process usually unfolds grad-
ually, sometimes significant technological discontinuities punctuate a trajec-
tory Perez (2010). Such disruptive change radically alters a trajectory’s or
even paradigm’s internal logic, or completely replaces it in an act of Schum-
peterian creative destruction Schumpeter (1942). Overall that suggests com-
petition between substitutional trajectories. Yet, they can also be compatible
and complementary to each other, since generic technological artifacts may
feed the progress of multiple trajectories.
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Drawing on work in theoretical biology Kauffman (1993), technological
evolution can be conceived as a recombinatory process of novel and exist-
ing component technologies within complex adaptive systems Fleming and
Sorenson (2001). Innovative recombinations can address fundamentally dif-
ferent problems from the ones that were initially targeted within the com-
ponents’ paradigms. This comes close to a Schumpeterian understanding,
where the innovation process is envisioned as the recombination of existing
resources in a novel way Schumpeter (1942). The result of such a develop-
ment can also be envisioned as a complex system with a number of elements
that collectively fulfill a single or various goals Simon (1969). A main charac-
teristic of such complex systems is a high degree of interdependence (or epis-
tasis), meaning a functional sensitivity of a system to changes in constituent
elements Fleming and Sorenson (2001). Thus, a change in one element will
affect not only affect its own but also the functioning of epistatically related
ones Frenken (2006). Since the complexity of the system increases with the
number of elements and their degree of interdependence, in large epistatic
systems one faces a complexity catastrophe, making it increasingly hard to find
useful combinations Fleming and Sorenson (2001).
A possible solution suggested to avoid the complexity catastrophe is to in-
crease the systems modularity Baldwin and Clark (2000); Ethiraj and Levinthal
(2004); Schilling (2000). This approach aims at the development of standard-
ized interfaces between more discrete elements to mediate interdependence
Langlois (2002), thus allowing to decrease the overall complexity while main-
taining the number of possible recombinations. Modularity and common
interfaces further ease the way to combine and recombine components stem-
ming from different trajectories, perhaps even different paradigms. On a
higher level, technological revolutions disrupting current techno-economic
paradigms are usually accompanied by the emergence of such modules, which
can be deployed in various contexts Perez (2010). A recent and very obvious
example for this development, the smartphone, is illustrated in figure ??. The
combination of voice and data communication with GPS, camera, compass
and accelerometer technologies, bound together by a miniature touchscreen-
computer, opened up for a uncountable number of not anticipated applica-
tions. Various standardized wireless connection technologies like bluetooth
or WiFi allow for compatibility with many other external devises, thus in-
creasing the functionality and re-purposing the phone.1
1The continuation of these dynamics on a higher level of aggregation can be seen in the cur-
rently evolving Internet of Things (IoT), where the pairing of everyday objects with sensors and
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Fig. E.2: Illustrative combination of technology components from different trajectories
We argue that today we are witnessing a rapid decline of the burdens
to technology-combination through efficient modularization between compo-
nents within artifacts such as the smartphone. Embracing this line of thought,
we aim to develop a framework and methodology geared towards the analy-
sis of evolving interdependent technology systems. Such a framework has to
be able to capture the ongoing incremental adjustment of interaction pattern
between its components (technological evolution) as well as disruptive changes
fundamentally altering the systems logic (technological revolution).
2.2 Measurement and analysis of technological change
Existing empirical research on technological change can broadly be divided
in three fields. Work from scholars associated with the Science, Technology
and Society (STS) tradition mainly relies on detailed ethnographic studies
of the complex multidimensional setup around technological systems, and
sheds light on the variety of factors that influence and shape its development
(Bijker, 1997; Bijker et al., 2012; Hughes, 1987a).
A stream of more positivistic research in the fields of industrial economics
and sciencometrics is primarily based on patent and scientific publication
data as an approximation for technological development. Research so far
mostly incorporates patent data as aggregated numbers to explain differ-
ences in scale Pavitt (1982), or in a network representation to explain struc-
communication devises is supposed to enable many new applications in a variety of contexts,
and potentially triggering many disruptive innovations Trappeniers et al. (2013).
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tural differences Fontana et al. (2009); Verspagen (2007) in the development
of technologies across countries and industries. Patent data has also been
used to study invention as a recombination process Fleming and Sorenson
(2001, 2004); von Wartburg et al. (2005).2
Most recently, social scientists have also started to deploy methods from
the fields of computational linguistic and NLP to advance empirical research
on the development of science and technology DiMaggio et al. (2013); McFar-
land et al. (2013); Mohr and Bogdanov (2013); Ramage et al. (2009). In their
essence, such linguistically informed methods are capable of identifying pat-
terns of language usage in large bodies of text and communication. They
range from simple measures of word co-occurrence across documents, cor-
pora and over time ?, to complex linguistically informed probability model
Hall et al. (2008); Nallapati et al. (2011); Ramage et al. (2010).
We perceive the latter as a fruitful way to analyze technological change,
implicitly accounting for the socio-economic context in which it is embed-
ded. Such an approach integrates the broad multidimensional perspective
of qualitative researchers, that very importantly emphasizes the role of tech-
nology users, organizations and governments in innovation processes, with
quantitative objectivity given by the machine learning based methodology.
2.3 Technology evolution as structural network change
We conceptualize technology as a system of interdependent components Hughes
(1987b) within their respective trajectories of development Dosi (1982). Rep-
resenting such systems of interacting elements as networks has brought fresh
perspectives and insights to the analysis of complex phenomena from the bio-
logical to the social sciences Newman et al. (2006). Embracing this approach,
we attempt to analyze technological change as the ongoing structural recon-
figuration of interaction between elements in a technology network, which
allows us to deploy the rich set of network analysis.
On the lowest level of aggregation in a network representing a techno-
logical system, one finds what we call technology fragments. They repre-
sent atomic, non-reducible repositories of scientific/technological knowledge
needed to fulfill certain narrow tasks. Scientific, technological and industrial
applications such as machines, software and other devices (which we call
2However, besides its merits and easy accessibility, there are widely recognized limits in
the use of patent data Griliches (1998); Pavitt (1985) such as the high variation of importance
across industries and countries, and over time and the long delay between the time research is
conducted and the corresponding patent publication.
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technological artifacts) combine technology fragments in a functional relation-
ship to produce some output. In our previous example, GPS devices, touch-
screens and WiFi receivers represent technology fragments, which combined in
a functional relationship can resemble the smartphone, a technological artifact.
On a higher level, sets of complementary and substitutional artifacts form
atechnological field (which could be, let’s say mobile applications and devices).
Over time, such fields develop along technological trajectories, where accumu-
lated sets of common configuration patterns reproduce over time and set the
foundation for further combinations. Again, fragments and artifacts origi-
nating from one field might be reconfigured and redeployed in a different
field to fulfill the same or even a different purpose. Furthermore, fragments
as well as artifacts might not even mainly belong to one field, but be equally
employable across multiple fields.
In summary, our conceptualization of technological change, and the sug-
gested methods to analyze it, is based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Knowledge fragments are atomic, non-reducible repositories of
scientific/technological knowledge
Assumption 2: Technology fragments can be arbitrary combined and recombined
to resemble functional technological artifacts of varying quality
Having clarified the elements (or edges) in such a network, one has to
decide how to measure the functional relationships between them. In our
case, identifying technology fragments in unstructured text data, we have to
add the following assumption:
Assumption 3: Co-location of technology fragments in documents imply a func-
tional relationship between them
3 Measurement of Technological Change – State of
the Art
Empirical research on technological change has a long tradition in differ-
ent academic communities. Generally technology exists to fulfill or support
some societal functions through direct application or indirectly through de-
rived products, is thus always embedded in and framed by a societal, politi-
cal and organizational context, which co-evolves with it Kaplan and Tripsas
(2008). Work by sociologists of science within the STS (Science, Technology
and Society) tradition, has produced many concepts and valuable insights
into processes of systemic technological change Bijker et al. (2012). The work
often relies on detailed description of the complex multidimensional setup
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around the studied technology and sheds light on the variety of factors that
(can) influence and shape its development Bijker (1997).
A substantial stream of more positivistic research in the fields of industrial
economics and sciencometrics is based on patent data as an approximation
for technological development. Research so far mostly incorporates patent
data as aggregated numbers to explain differences in scale Pavitt (1982), or
in a network representation to explain structural differences Fontana et al.
(2009); Verspagen (2007) in the development of technologies across coun-
tries and industries. Patent data has also been used to study invention as
a recombination process Fleming and Sorenson (2001, 2004); von Wartburg
et al. (2005).3 Alternatively, similar research also utilizes the assessment by
industry experts to delimit and quantify development within and across tech-
nologies Pavitt (1984). Carlsson et al. (2002), suggest for instance the use of
industry experts to delineate technological systems.
Most recently, social scientists have also started to deploy methods from
the fields of computational linguistic and natural language processing to ad-
vance empirical research on the development of science, technology and other
bodies of knowledge In their essence, such linguistically informed methods
are capable of identifying patterns of language usage in large bodies of text
and communication. They range from simple measures of (raw or somewhat
weighted) word co-occurrence across documents, corpora and over time ?,
to complex probabilistic language and topic identification models Hall et al.
(2008), which lately started to gain traction in the social science DiMaggio
et al. (2013); McFarland et al. (2013); Mohr and Bogdanov (2013); Ramage
et al. (2009). Such models basically identify larger topics by fitting a linguis-
tically informed probability model which tries to predict them using text and
meta information of the corpus under investigation. Such topics by nature
are rather descriptive and aims to understand how language is used by a
certain set of actors to describe and differentiate real-life phenomena. For in-
stance, the interesting variety of lead-lag models which groups of actors, such
as universities Ramage et al. (2010) or outlets Nallapati et al. (2011) influence
the formation of topics, and which adapt instead.
3However, besides its merits and easy accessibility, there are widely recognized limits in
the use of patent data Griliches (1998); Pavitt (1985) such as the high variation of importance
across industries and countries, and over time and the long delay between the time research is
conducted and the corresponding patent publication.
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4 Analyzing Technology Evolution: Dynamic Se-
mantic Network Approach
After providing a conceptual framework to analyze technological change, in
this section we suggest a set of methods to empirically study such changes.
A illustration of the method pipeline is provided in figure ??.
User account network 
extraction and 
centrality filtering 
Tweet-Extraction for 
selected accounts
Selection of relevant 
tweets with linked text
Text data extraction
Identification of seed 
Twitter account
Entity identification
Construction of time-
slice 
word-doc  
2-mode network
Projection on to the 
word-mode
Community detection
Dynamic Community 
Tracking
Corpus mining Text to 
Semantic 
network
Network to 
Trajectory
1 2 3
Figure 4: Illustration of significant events in the evolution of communities
C13 C14
C23 C34
C11 C12
• Split: In the same manner, technological fields can also separate into independent dis-
ciplines. Technically a split occurs when one community Ci matches with two or more
dynamic communities in the previous period.
Technically, we do so by applying a simple but eﬀective heuristic threshold-based method
allowing for many-to-many mappings between communities across diﬀerent time steps proposed
by Greene et al. (2010). Here we compare an identified community Cti in observation period t
with the set of dynamic communities in the previous period {Ct 11 , . . . , Ct 1J } by employing the
widely adapted Jac-card coeﬃcient J tij , calculated as follows:
J tij = sim(C
t
i , C
t 1
j ) =
|Cti \ Ct 1j k
|Cti [ Ct 1j k
(2)
If the similarity exceeds the defined matching threshold ✓ 2 [0, 1], both communities are
added to the dynamic community Di. Using this simple but eﬃcient method has the advantage
that is independent of (static) community detection in the observation periods, hence represents
a somewhat modular approach. It can also handle overlapping as well as (with some minor
adjustments) weighted communities.
4.5 Summary
In this section, we provide a conceptual model to how to map the evolution of techno-logical
fields embedded in a larger technological system based on large amounts of text data.
15
Fig. E.3: Illustration of the method pipeline
4.1 From unstructured text to technology fragments: Entity
extraction
First obvious choice to be mad is w ich corpus of technology related text
documents one wants to analyze. Such a corpus shou d optimally (i.) consist
of technology related writings (ii.) ranging equally distributed over a tim
sufficient to observe technological change, and (iii.) not be biased towards
particular technologies within the system. Examples for such data are scien-
tific publications, patent descriptions, articles in industry journals, but also
online sources such as collections of tech-blogs. In figure ?? we illustrate
how to generate an online data corpus with socially enhanced web scraping
techniques.
In a next step, it is necessary to convert the unstructured text documents
to a machine readable representation.4 For our means, the goal is to reduce
4Typically, this takes the format of a bag of words (BOW), a line-up of thematically relevant
keywords, usually nouns and bi-gram noun phrases. The key assumption of this type of NLP
applications is that statistically significant co-occurrence patterns of concepts across the corpus
is indicative for actual association between them.
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each document to the contained technological concepts. Instead of using
a probabilistic approach that stepwise excludes text-elements that are defi-
nitely not a technology, we try to detect mentioned technologies in the data.
This task falls into the category of named entity extraction, which typically re-
lies on tagged dictionaries and string-matching rules to identify the required
concepts.
Fig. E.4: Example of pairwise semantic similarity between terms and documents
car, road, garage
park, tree, playground
truck, road, cargo
Truckcos (θ) = 0.001
doc 1
doc 2
doc 3
ti
cos (θ) = 0.2
cos (θ) = 0.8
A number of applications related to this development target the identifi-
cation of different concepts in unstructured text, among others technological
and industrial terms. The advantage of these semantic web tools is that they
are supported by large, centralized, constantly updated and optimized dic-
tionaries and intelligent disambiguation functions. The result of a success-
ful entity extraction returns a collection of documents that only contain the
mentioned technology terms and their document appearance frequency. Re-
ferring to our conceptual framework in section ??, the extracted technology
term resemble the elements (nodes) in our technological system, which we
label as technology fragments.
4.2 From technology fragments to a network: Vector space
modelling
In a first step, one could create a network with the corpus documents as
nodes, then vector space modeling and represent them as vectors defined by
the respective combination of contained concepts. This representation allows
to calculate pairwise similarities between the documents. The result is a fully
connected weighed network with documents as nodes and corresponding
similarities as edges. Now clustering or community detection algorithms can
be used to identify technological fields, represented by document communi-
ties discussing them, as suggested by Jurowetzki (2014). Yet this approach
has two disadvantage: First, technology fragments are only indirectly repre-
sented in networks as node characteristics, what means that many powerful
measures in network analysis (such as centrality, betweenness, etc.) are not
directly available to describe them, but only the documents containing them.
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Second and related, nodes representing documents are not suitable for a dy-
namic analysis, since they are only associated with one observation period.
Thus, one can either construct a cumulative network that only grows, or a net-
work with a complete node turnover every period. For that reasons we have
chosen to liberate the terms from their document boundaries while maintaining
the latent semantic similarity structure that is defined by their co-occurrence
in documents.
After having defined the nodeset in our network of technology fragments,
we have to create weighted edges between them, representing their techno-
logical relatedness and interaction. In a first step we construct a (hierarchical)
2-mode network between technology fragments and the corresponding docu-
ments they occur in. We weight the edges by the pairwise cosine similarity
between the vectors of the technology fragment and document within a vec-
tor space, which we define by by training a Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI)
model Deerwester (1988); Deerwester et al. (1990) on the full corpus of docu-
ments.5 Thus, our measure of edge weight indicates to which extent the term
representing the technology fragment is semantically close to the entirety of
other terms contained by the document (see figure ??). To map technological
change over time, we do this separated for every observation period.
While the entirety of technology fragments is stable over time, documents
obviously experience a 100% turnover in population every observation pe-
riod. To coerce a stable nodeset, we project the 2-mode to a weighted 1-mode
network in technology space. Again, the underlying rationale is based on the
assumption that co-occurrence in documents - at least on an aggregated level
- also corresponds to a functional relationship between technology fragments.
However, on a document level that will not always be true. While some doc-
uments may discuss technology in the realm of one particular technological
fields, others might serve more as an overview on industry or research of
a broader context, hence contain a collection of technological fragments from
many otherwise distinct fields. Thus, we penalize documents containing
more technology fragments in a similar spirit as the method used by New-
man (2001), represented by the following equation Opsahl (2013). Here wij
represents the edge-weight between node i and j, and p the corresponding
documents.
5Before training the model, we apply TF-IDF weights to all terms within the documents. This
appreciates the value of particularly important terms for the single document, while depreci-
ating the value of generic terms that often occur across the corpus. Here we have chosen the
established LSI algorithm for training the vector space model but other algorithms e.g. Latent
Dirichlet allocation (LDA) or Random Projections would also be feasible to calculate pairwise
cosines.
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wij =∑
p
wi,p
Np − 1 (E.1)
We end up with a one-mode network of technology fragments connected by
the pairwise projected semantic similarity values, associated with the corre-
sponding period. Figure E.5 illustrates these nodeset properties in dynamic
networks.
t1
t2
t3
Fig. E.5: Illustration of the development of a nodeset over time
Identifying technological fields: Overlapping community detection
We depict technological change as the structural reconfiguration of micro
level interactions between technology fragments. When analyzing the struc-
ture, function, and dynamics of networks, it is extremely useful to identify
sets of related nodes, known as communities, clusters, or partitions Radicchi
et al. (2004). Such communities of closely connected technologies resemble
what we call a technological field, a set of complementary or substitutional
technologies following one technological trajectory, and clustering over time
around a common objective. Therefore, we attempt to identify technological
fields using a community detection algorithm of choice.6
6An alternative approach would be to use to identify technological fields by the using topic
modeling, an approach that lately started to gain traction in social science DiMaggio et al. (2013);
Hall et al. (2008); McFarland et al. (2013), create a two-mode network of terms and topics, and
project it to an one-mode network of terms. However, for reasons described we here want to offer
an alternative, where the topics are already identified using the powerful community detection
methods offered by network analysis.
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Early clustering and community detection algorithms, in network analy-
sis and elsewhere, usually assumed that the membership of entities to one
distinct group. However, depending on the meaning of edges and nodes,
many real life networks show a high overlap of communities, where nodes at
the overlap are associated with multiple communities. This especially tends
to happen when relationship of different quality are projected in a one-mode
network Kivelä et al. (2013). Ones’ social interaction network for instance may
consist of family members, work colleagues, members of the same karate club
or other associations. The more diverse interests such a person has, the more
different communities this person will be assigned into. In the same way, the
more generic the nature of a technology fragment or artifact, the more tech-
nological fields will it have functional relationships with. Some technological
artifacts (and the technology fragments resembling them) are that pervasive,
they facilitate almost all other technologies in the way they work, such as
by its time steam-power or nowadays semiconductors Perez (2010). Embrac-
ing that line of thought, researchers recently stated to develop community
detection algorithms able to cope with overlapping and nested community
structures Ahn et al. (2010); Mucha et al. (2010), which can be deployed to
properly delimit interdependent technological fields.
Identifying technological trajectories: dynamic community detection
Technological fields do not spontaneously appear and reassemble in a vacuum.
They gradually change, grow or decline in an cumulative manner, following
a historical technological trajectory which connects them over time. However,
in times of disruptive technological change, former technology interaction
pattern might completely reconfigure, particular new configurations might
spin-off a main trajectory and so forth. Owing respect to the evolutionary
nature of technology, we want to identify communities which are somewhat
stable and thus to be found in multiple observation periods, but also allow
technological fields to experience disruptive key-events in their life-cycle. Be-
sides helping us linking changing communities over time, the identification
of such effects in itself represents an interesting information. We consider the
following significant events a community might experience during its evolu-
tion, also illustrated in figure ??:
• Birth & Death: The first time a community Cti (which are the repre-
sentation of a technological field) is observed and not matched with an
already existing community Ct−1j . This community, however, does not
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have to be stable over time. We in fact expect a substantial share of
communities to only appear in on period but not sustain.
• Pause: Communities might be more stable than the reporting on them
in the corpus.Thus, allowing them to pause for a period might smoothen
birth & death dynamics.
• Merge: In case two communities develop substantial functional interde-
pendence, the main interaction with the rest of the system only happens
between them. Thus they merge and form a new community consisting
of both sets. Technically that happens when two or more different com-
munities are matched with one dynamic community Dj in the previous
period.
• Split: In the same manner, communities can also separate into inde-
pendent disciplines. Technically a split occurs when one community
Ci matches with two or more dynamic communities in the previous
period.
C11
t1
C21
C12 C13 C14
t2 t3 t4
Merge
C13 C14
Split
C23 C34
C11 C12
C11
C21
X2 C13 C14
Pause
C22 X3 C24
C21
C12 C13 C14D1
D2
Birth & Death
C22 C23
D1
D2
D1
D2
D1
D2
Fig. E.6: Illustration of significant events in the evolution of communities, adopted from Greene
et al. (2010)
We do so by applying a simple but effective heuristic threshold-based
method allowing for many-to-many mappings between communities across
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different observation periods proposed by Greene et al. (2010). Here we com-
pare an identified community Cti in observation period t with the set of dy-
namic communities in the previous period {Ct−11 , . . . , Ct−1J } by employing the
widely adapted Jaccard coefficient Jtij, calculated as follows:
Jtij = sim(C
t
i , C
t−1
j ) =
|Cti ∩ Ct−1j |
|Cti ∪ Ct−1j |
(E.2)
If the similarity exceeds the defined matching threshold θ ∈ [0, 1], both
communities are added to the dynamic community Di. Using this has the
advantage that is independent of the (static) community detection method
of choice in the observation periods, hence represents a somewhat modular
approach. It can also handle overlapping as well as (with some minor ad-
justments) weighted communities. A major advantage of this approach is the
separation of static and dynamic community detection is the high flexibility
in the choice of suitable algorithms.
5 Demonstration Case
In the following section we demonstrate the capabilities of our approach to
deliver insightful results, and provide some illustrative examples of measures
and graphical representations that can be used to gain further insights. We
intended to find an empirical case of technological development that would
combine a large number of components from traditionally disconnected tech-
nological fields. Additionally, the technology field in focus should be yet in
a formative stage and have a potentially strong and broad social impact to
generate enough attention and thus reporting texts online. We decided to
explore the field of singularity. Rather then a clearly delineated technologi-
cal field, singularity represents a future scenario and an umbrella term that
summarizes a number of developments in areas as diverse as neuroscience
and 3D printing. Based on the context of the technology under study and
the characteristics of the corpus, we provide examples how to calibrate the
techniques used in the different stages of or method pipeline.
5.1 Empirical setting: The singularity case
Technological Singularity as a term has gained momentum since the publica-
tion of Ray Kurzweil’s book in 2005 Kurzweil (2005). Observing various mea-
sures of technological progress over time, he argues that most technologies
improved their performance exponentially and therefore it is only a matter
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of a few decades until we will have reached a point in history when ar-
tificial intelligence will supersede human intelligence. The most powerful
technological advancement of the 21th century will happen when robotics,
nanotechnology, genetic engineering and artificial intelligence reach a cer-
tain level of development and can be combined, what will have disruptive
consequences for society, culture and the human nature. Overall, the litera-
ture describes two possible (perhaps even simultaneously possible) scenarios:
The first scenario is the rise of engineered super-intelligent agents that might
even become a threat to humanity Joy (2000). A more cheerful scenario is
advocated by the transhumanists. Here the focus is more on the evolution
of human enhancement technologies that will improve human physical an
cognitive abilities and in the long run might contribute to the rise of a post-
human society Eden et al. (2013). While many of the forecasts sound like
science fiction, others seem plausible.
Recently, singularity entered the European technology policy context, as
a technological field within the Horizon 2020 programming. Since 2012, the
Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technol-
ogy (DG CONNECT) is undertaking a foresight process to inform the ICT
related programming of research to be financed under Horizon 2020, where
singularity was identified as one of the 10 central technological fields. It is cur-
rently being examined closer to capture early signals and anticipate beneficial
trends that should be supported within public research funding schemes.
5.2 Data mining & corpus generation
Researchers, organizations and science journalists are increasingly using so-
cial media and the blogosphere to communicate findings and developments,
far ahead of journal publication or conference proceedings. This makes mi-
croblogging platforms and in particular Twitter with over 200 million monthly
active users (Feb. 2014) a valuable source of data. We now describe our
data mining approach aiming at selecting relevant twitter updates by rele-
vant users. Instead of using already available corpora to study technolog-
ical change in singularity, such as patent description, scientific publications
and industry journals, we choose to create an own out of a variety of online
available technology relevant text documents, including publications, tech-
blogs et cetera. Since singularity is a recent and very heterogeneous movement
spanning various scientific, industries and tech-communities with distinct
routines for communicating and publishing findings and progress, our final
corpus therefore is supposed to be unbiassed towards a particular discipline.
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To identify relevant documents, we employ a socially-enhanced search
routine based on twitter tweets. 7 Twitter’s graph structure, built on fol-
lowship links, is similar to citation networks in academic publications. This
enables the construction of large directed graphs and allows applying net-
work analysis methods, to identify central actors for a particular field or
topic. For this study we constructed a large followship graph around the -
somewhat arbitrarily selected - account Singularity Hub, which is an online
news platform that actively reports on the topic. The initial snowballed net-
work has 49,574 accounts. Using eigenvector centrality, we identify the most
influential users and then manually reduce the number of nodes down to 34
twitter accounts that indicate an interest for the area in their profile.8 Figure
?? shows a central fragment of the network. Coloring represents commu-
nities, detected by the Louvain algorithm Blondel et al. (2008), merely for
illustration. We can see that the red cluster seems to contain all the central
organisations that are present on twitter and focused on singularity and tran-
shumanism like the H+ movement, KurzweilAI, David Orban and more. The
green cluster is mostly populated with users that are related to robotics and
the violet to software architecture. An overview of the selected user accounts
can be found in figure ??.
Micro-blogged tweets (status updates) by these actors often contain links
to research papers, popular media articles or blog entries that the selected
user considers as worth communicating. For each of these accounts we ex-
tract up to 3,200 status updates starting with the most recent, 63,000 in total.
We discard all updates that do not carry a link. Relevant tweets were then
identified using a vector space model powered semantic search. The data
search thus becomes to a certain degree socially enhanced as opposed to the
results of search engines, which are more likely to return most popular or
sponsored rather than relevant results. The text content behind the embed-
ded links - outside of Twitter – is then extracted and processed, and finally
represents our document corpus for further analysis.
An often used methodology for BOW transformation combines part of
speech tagging (POS), n-gram detection, stopword elimination, various types
of term frequency filtering and language normalisation such as stemming or
lemmatisation. Such an approach is very fruitful for the detection of multidi-
mensional themes in unstructured data, for instance in news-summarization
7However, our socially-enhanced approach only illustrates possibilities of corpus generation.
Our general methodology is, mutatis mutandis, able to handle various sources of input of tech-
nology relevant text documents.
8This selection is very restrictive but is likely to make the final corpus less noisy. Alternatively
the manual reduction can be skipped and a corpus filtering built in, at a later stage.
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tasks. Here, various types of interacting objects (e.g. locations, persons, or-
ganizations etc.) contribute to the construction of events and background-
stories. The selection of the keywords does not rely on predefined dictio-
naries and can therefore be very permissive, meaning that novel concepts
would rather be included if they fulfill certain linguistic criteria. Initially, we
tried to apply this approach for out means, but decided to discard it, as the
generated BOW representations were to noisy. While many of the included
concepts could be associated with technologies, there were too many other
unrelated terms that would distort the analysis.
5.3 Identification of technology fragments: Entity extraction
The documents in our corpus discuss technology from very different angles.
Some talk about state-of-the art research in certain university labs, while oth-
ers review the allocation of public research grants or venture capital invest-
ment strategies. When attempting to uncover functional relationships be-
tween technology fragments, it is crucial to avoid false positives caused by
relationships that are non-technical in nature, such as being funded by the same
investor, or developed in the same country. More traditional statistical NLP ap-
proaches to BOW generation, including Part of speech tagging and n-gram
detection are useful when large pieces of text data have to be reduced to rel-
evant keywords that summarize the essence of the particular document. Yet,
when using network analysis to investigate relationship structures between
terms, one has to make sure only including relationships of interest. In this
case, restricting the nodeset carefully to identified technology terms is one
attempt to do so. We rely on entity extraction when condensing documents
to BOW representations. In the particular case we use OpenCalais, a free
web service that performs entity identification across 39 different concepts
within submitted text data. The great advantage of cloudsourcing in this case
is given by the fact that the centralized machine learning algorithms of Open-
Calais are trained on a very large amount of natural text and its dictionaries
are constantly updated and optimized. An offline solution would hardly be
able to compete in terms of performance and topicality.9 When inspecting
the results we find clear technology terms such as dna profiling, robotic surgi-
cal systems, clinical genomics or regenerative stem cell technologies, which come
9For an overview and performance evaluation of available systems see Rizzo and Troncy
(2011). In addition, OpenCalais provides ontology reconciliation and disambiguation. Identified
entities are in many cases enriched with metadata (e.g. profession for persons, ticker symbols
for companies and geospatial coordinates for locations). Other detected entity types are not used
in this analysis.
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fairly close to how we understand technology fragments. These terms nar-
rowly describe technology deployed for a fairly delimited task. However,
we also find boarder technology terms such as stem cells genomics, which
span across a somewhat larger field of applications and are likely to include
some of the aforementioned terms, and on an even more generic level terms
such as biotechnology or robot.10 While this clearly diverts from our theoretical
framework, where we find on node level only functional interaction of atomic
technology fragments, we do not consider that as worrisome for the analysis to
come.
5.4 Network generation, technological field & trajectory iden-
tification
For a very first inspection and illustration of the nodeset we create a sim-
ple static network of all documents connected by their similarity in terms of
containing technology fragments, cluster them by applying the common Lou-
vain algorithm Blondel et al. (2008), and plot them in figure ??. For the three
main communities detected we provide a tag-cloud, weighted by the frag-
ments’ TF-IDF scores. One can see at first glance that our singularity corpus
very broadly consists of three fields, where the biggest is centered around
robotics, and the two others around (stem) cell and brain research, or to be
more interpretative: Robotics, biotechnology and neuroscience. Figure ??
provides some key statistics on the networks, communities, and their de-
velopment. While subject to some fluctuation, the networks seem to develop
from many to less nodes and edges, and to less but denser communities. This
might indicate singularity after an initial phase of experimentation to mature
and establish more delimited fields and sub-disciplines, as life-cycle theories
might suggest.
We now construct a set of two-mode networks between this nodes and
the documents in our corpus,11 containing only documents published in the
corresponding observation period, which we choose to be half a year.12 Fi-
10In future iteration of this approach, a more conservative filtering of high-frequency contex-
tual stopwords might decrease the presence of too general terms.
11Vector space modeling is performed with the gensim package Rˇehu˚rˇek and Sojka (2011)
within IPython, using LSI and a 400 dimensional model as suggested by Bradford (2008)
12This choice has to be made according to the properties of the data to be analyzed, since best
results can be achieved when the network structure shows some gradual change between the ob-
servation periods, but no radical turnover suggestion complete discontinuity. This corresponds
roughly to a Jaccard index of the two networks between 0.2 and 0.8.
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nally, we project this structures on one-mode networks between technology
fragments.
Now we identify technological fields with the link community detection al-
gorithm proposed by Ahn et al. (2010), which is able to detect communities
with highly pervasive overlap by clustering links between the nodes rather
than the nodes themselves.13 Each node here inherits all memberships of its
links and can thus belong to multiple, overlapping communities (technological
fields). By doing so, we owe respect to the overlapping and nested structure
of technology, and are able to identify key technological fragments interacting
with multiple distinct fields.14 We first run the community detection sepa-
rated for every time step independently. We do not a-priori define a fixed
amount of communities, but rather set the cutoff at the point where the aver-
age community density is optimized in every observation period.
Figure ?? plots the network of knowledge fragments and their membership
to technological fields for every timestep. Again, what can be seen is that sin-
gularity appears to develop from a broad area without clear boundaries and
high interconnectedness towards clearly delimited technological fields. How-
ever, we also find first hints that over time some very generic technologies
such as smartphones and artificial intelligence appear to develop towards a very
central position, where they serve as common interface between most other
fields. While it seems unlikely that smartphones (as we understand them to-
day) will be around for much longer then a decade, their centrality in the
singularity discussion can be understood as the importance of mobile devices
that enhance our by nature limited interaction range. In fact, smartphones be-
came a rapidly adopted human enhancement device and currently a number
of different wearable technologies are entering the mainstream markets. We
also see the generic artificial intelligence, which is at the very core of the sin-
gularity debate, in a very central position as interface or generic technology
between technological.
We now perform a threshold-based dynamic community detection15, where
we besides an immense turnover of briefly appearing and disseminating
short-term trends indeed find identify a set of persistent technological tra-
jectories. Figure ?? illustrates the composition of some selected communities
13We use the implementation of the link-community approach provided by Kalinka and
Tomancak (2011) as package for the statistical environment R.
14Most traditional community detection algorithms would in the above described case of high
overlap detect communities somewhat resembling a core-periphery structure, with a central
highly interconnected community surrounded by sparsely interconnected ones, where link com-
munities allow for the multi-group membership of nodes.
15We use a C++ implementation provided by Greene et al. (2010)
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Table E.1: Network of Knowledge Fragments per Period after Overlapping Community Detec-
tion
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5. Demonstration Case
Table E.2: Exemplary identified technological fields and their knowledge fragments
Biometrics & Law Enforcement Ubiquity & Social Networks
Genomics 3D Printing
Nodes term representing the name of the technology fragment represented as tag-cloud. Size
weighted by the nodes within community degree centrality.
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which proves to be somewhat stable over time.16 The tag-cluster are a good
way to visualize the interaction between the actual technologies, principal
applications and challenges. The first cluster suggests for instance that an
important area of application for biometric technologies in conjuncture with
machine learning will be found within law enforcement. The second cluster
addresses advancements in the area of augmented reality and connections to
existent social network structures using primarily mobile devices.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide a framework and novel methodology
geared towards mapping technological change in complex interdependent
systems by using large amounts of unstructured data from various recent
on- and offline sources. We combine techniques from the fields of NLP and
network analysis. Our approach is based on the following steps:
• Using entity recognition techniques we identify technology related terms
in the text document of our corpus, which resemble technology frag-
ments.
• In a first step, using vector space modeling, we construct an undirected
two-mode network between technology fragments and corpus docu-
ments for every observation period, where the edges are weighted by
the pairwise cosine similarities between documents and terms.
• After projecting this network in technology space, we end up with an
undirected one-mode network of technology fragments connected by
their weighted co-occurrence in documents of the corresponding obser-
vation period.
• To delimit technological fields in every observation period, we use over-
lapping community detection techniques, owing respect to the interde-
pendent and nested nature of technology.
• To identify technological trajectories, we link technological fields between
observation periods over time using
As empirical example we use the broad area of Technological Singularity,
a umbrella term for different technologies ranging from neuroscience to ma-
chine learning and bioengineering which are seen as main contributors to
16For the sake of clarity, the technology fragments are weighted by their within-cluster cen-
trality.
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the development of artificial intelligence and human enhancement technolo-
gies. We extract 1,398 relevant text documents all over the internet, using
a social search routine that we built around the followship structure within
the microblogging service twitter. Using entity recognition tools from the se-
mantic web area, we reduce documents to technology-term representations
and finally generate a semantic timestep network of technology fragments.
Our community detection exercise identified many coherent technological
fields within each community. Already the static clustering provides valu-
able insights in the emergence of new technological fields and applications
for existing technologies. Overlapping community detection, allowed us also
to identify certain general technologies that work as hubs between other tech-
nologies, stemming from a large number of different domains.
Yet, we find the results of the community-tracking over time unsatisfac-
tory. The obstacle are false negatives that obstruct the identification of simi-
lar communities over time. While we, as humans, can see that very similar
communities are present in successive timesteps, even though the contained
terms are slightly different, the algorithm is unable to identify this because
the terms are not identical. Our language is full of synonyms, metaphors and
unregulated terminology. The reader of this article has no difficulty compre-
hending that we use the terms clusters and communities interchangeably, a
computer would not. While we are (yet) unable to teach the algorithm a deep
understanding of ontology, we can try to normalize the terminology as far
as possible. This future measure should increase the number of identical
terms over time. Furthermore, there seem to be a trade-off between the the-
matic scope of a given corpus and the resolution of the analysis. Therefore,
a broader corpus is most suitable for creating a broad-brush picture of tech-
nological change. Another measure to normalize the language would be to
chose a less noisy corpus. Single scientific and technological fields tend to
have a relatively homogeneous terminology. Therefore we believe that the
proposed method combination will perform better on the atomic level if the
corpus is more focused on a particular technology or scientific field.
We believe a major advantage of our approach is that it conveys text data
into a network representation suitable for a dynamic analysis of technology.
It proves to be more flexible with respect to the corpus than other semantic
or n-gram based methods in natural language processing. Furthermore, for
subsequent quantitative analysis and graphical representation one can now
draw from the large toolkit of powerful methods available for network anal-
ysis. The here performed dynamic community detection is one example, but
other methods such as blockmodeling appear to be promising to gain further
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insights into the evolution of technology. Finally, networks are well estab-
lished in many areas of social science and thus a representation of semantic
features as networks is likely to help bridging the gap between scholars in
computer and social science.
244
References
References
Ahn, Y.-Y., Bagrow, J. P., and Lehmann, S. (2010). Link communities reveal
multiscale complexity in networks. Nature, 466(7307):761–764.
Baldwin, C. Y. and Clark, K. B. (2000). Design Rules: The power of modularity.
MIT Press.
Bijker, W. E. (1997). Of Bicycles, Bakelites and Bulbs. Toward a Theory of
Sociotechnical Change. The MIT Press.
Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P., Pinch, T., and Douglas, D. G. (2012). The Social
Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and
History of Technology. MIT Press.
Blondel, V. D., Guillaume, J.-L., Lambiotte, R., and Lefebvre, E. (2008). Fast
unfolding of communities in large networks. Journal of Statistical Mechanics:
Theory and Experiment, 2008(10):P10008.
Bradford, R. B. (2008). An empirical study of required dimensionality for
large-scale latent semantic indexing applications. In Proceeding of the 17th
ACM conference, page 153, New York, New York, USA. ACM Press.
Bresnahan, T. F. and Trajtenberg, M. (1995). General purpose technologies
‘engines of growth’? Journal of econometrics, 65(1):83–108.
Carlsson, B., Jacobsson, S., Holmén, M., and Rickne, A. (2002). Innovation
systems: analytical and methodological issues. Research Policy, 31(2):233–
245.
Davies, A. (1996). Innovation in large technical systems: the case of telecom-
munications. Industrial and Corporate Change, 5(4):1143–1180.
Dawid, H. (2006). Agent-based models of innovation and technological change,
volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1235–1272. Elsevier.
Deerwester, S. (1988). Improving information retrieval with latent semantic
indexing. In Proceedings of the 51st ASIS Annual Meeting (ASIS 8´8), Vol. 25
(October 1988), 25.
Deerwester, S. C., Dumais, S. T., Landauer, T. K., Furnas, G. W., and Harsh-
man, R. A. (1990). Indexing by latent semantic analysis. JASIS, 41(6):391–
407.
245
References
DiMaggio, P., Nag, M., and Blei, D. (2013). Exploiting affinities between
topic modeling and the sociological perspective on culture: Application to
newspaper coverage of us government arts funding. Poetics, 41(6):570–606.
Dosi, G. (1982). Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: a
suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical
change. Research Policy, 11(3):147–162.
Eden, A. H., Moor, J. H., Soraker, J. H., and Steinhart, E. (2013). Singularity
Hypotheses. A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment. Springer.
Ethiraj, S. K. and Levinthal, D. (2004). Modularity and innovation in complex
systems. Management Science.
Fleming, L. and Sorenson, O. (2001). Technology as a complex adaptive sys-
tem: evidence from patent data. Research Policy, 30(7):1019–1039.
Fleming, L. and Sorenson, O. (2004). Science as a map in technological search.
Strategic Management Journal, 25(89):909–928.
Fontana, R., Nuvolari, A., and Verspagen, B. (2009). Mapping technological
trajectories as patent citation networks. an application to data communica-
tion standards. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 18(4):311–336.
Frenken, K. (2006). A fitness landscape approach to technological complex-
ity, modularity, and vertical disintegration. Structural Change and Economic
Dynamics, 17(3):288–305.
Greene, D., Doyle, D., and Cunningham, P. (2010). Tracking the evolution of
communities in dynamic social networks. In Proc. International Conference
on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM’10).
Griliches, Z. (1998). Patent statistics as economic indicators: a survey. In
R&D and productivity: the econometric evidence, pages 287–343. University of
Chicago Press.
Hain, D. S. and Jurowetzki, R. (forthcoming). Incremental by design? on the
role of incumbents in technology niches - an evolutionary network analysis.
Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
Hall, D., Jurafsky, D., and Manning, C. D. (2008). Studying the history of
ideas using topic models. In Proceedings of the conference on empirical meth-
ods in natural language processing, pages 363–371. Association for Computa-
tional Linguistics.
246
References
Hekkert, M. P. and Negro, S. O. (2009). Technological forecasting & social
change. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 76(4):584–594.
Hughes, T. P. (1987a). The Evolution of Large Technological Systems, pages 51–82.
The MIT Press.
Hughes, T. P. (1987b). The evolution of large technological systems. The social
construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history
of technology, pages 51–82.
Joy, B. (2000). Nanoethics: The ethical and social implications of nanotech-
nology - google books. Nanoethics–the ethical and social implicatons of . . . .
Jurowetzki, R. (2014). Exploring technology evolution in danish smart grid
development - an nlp approach. In DRUID Academy Conderence, pages 1–25.
Kalinka, A. T. and Tomancak, P. (2011). linkcomm: an r package for the
generation, visualization, and analysis of link communities in networks of
arbitrary size and type. Bioinformatics, 27(14).
Kaplan, S. and Tripsas, M. (2008). Thinking about technology: Applying a
cognitive lens to technical change. Research Policy, 37(5):790–805.
Kauffman, S. A. (1993). The Origins of Order. Self-Organization and Selection
in Evolution. Oxford University Press.
Kivelä, M., Arenas, A., Barthelemy, M., Gleeson, J. P., Moreno, Y., and Porter,
M. A. (2013). Multilayer networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1309.7233.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago
Press.
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The Singularity Is Near. When Humans Transcend Biology.
Penguin.
Langlois, R. N. (2002). Modularity in technology and organization. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization.
Lopolito, A., Morone, P., and Taylor, R. (2013). Emerging innovation niches:
An agent based model. Research Policy, 42(6):1225–1238.
McFarland, D. A., Ramage, D., Chuang, J., Heer, J., Manning, C. D., and
Jurafsky, D. (2013). Differentiating language usage through topic models.
Poetics, 41(6):607–625.
247
References
Mohr, J. W. and Bogdanov, P. (2013). Introduction - topic models: What they
are and why they matter. Poetics, 41(6):545–569.
Mucha, P. J., Richardson, T., Macon, K., Porter, M. A., and Onnela, J.-P. (2010).
Community structure in time-dependent, multiscale, and multiplex net-
works. Science, 328(5980):876–878.
Nallapati, R., Shi, X., McFarland, D. A., Leskovec, J., and Jurafsky, D. (2011).
Leadlag LDA: Estimating topic specific leads and lags of information out-
lets. In ICWSM.
Newman, M. (2001). Scientific collaboration networks. ii. shortest paths,
weighted networks, and centrality. Physical review, 64(1):016132.
Newman, M., Barabási, A.-L., and Watts, D. J. (2006). The Structure and Dy-
namics of Networks:. Princeton University Press.
Opsahl, T. (2013). Triadic closure in two-mode networks: Redefining the
global and local clustering coefficients. Social Networks, 35(2):159–167.
Pavitt, K. (1982). R&d, patenting and innovative activities: a statistical explo-
ration. Research Policy, 11(1):33–51.
Pavitt, K. (1984). Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy
and a theory. Research policy, 13(6):343–373.
Pavitt, K. (1985). Patent statistics as indicators of innovative activities: possi-
bilities and problems. Scientometrics, 7(1):77–99.
Perez, C. (2010). Technological revolutions and techno-economic paradigms.
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34:185–202.
Radicchi, F., Castellano, C., Cecconi, F., Loreto, V., and Parisi, D. (2004). Defin-
ing and identifying communities in networks. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 101(9):2658–2663.
Ramage, D., Manning, C. D., and McFarland, D. A. (2010). Which universities
lead and lag? toward university rankings based on scholarly output. In
Proc. of NIPS Workshop on Computational Social Science and the Wisdom of the
Crowds. Citeseer.
Ramage, D., Rosen, E., Chuang, J., Manning, C. D., and McFarland, D. A.
(2009). Topic modeling for the social sciences. In NIPS 2009 Workshop on
Applications for Topic Models: Text and Beyond, volume 5.
248
References
Rˇehu˚rˇek, R. and Sojka, P. (2011). Gensim—statistical semantics in python.
Rizzo, G. and Troncy, R. (2011). Nerd: evaluating named entity recognition
tools in the web of data. In Workshop on Web Scale Knowledge Extraction
(WEKEX’11).
Schilling, M. A. (2000). Toward a general modular systems theory and its ap-
plication to interfirm product modularity. Academy of Management Review.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper, New
York.
Simon, H. A. (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. MIT Press.
Trappeniers, L., Feki, M. A., Kawsar, F., Boussard, M., and Trappeniers, L.
(2013). The internet of things: The next technological revolution. Computer,
46(2):0024–25.
Verspagen, B. (2007). Mapping technological trajectories as patent citation
networks: A study on the history of fuel cell research. Advances in Complex
Systems, 10(01):93–115.
von Wartburg, I., Teichert, T., and Rost, K. (2005). Inventive progress mea-
sured by multi-stage patent citation analysis. Research Policy, 34(10):1591–
1607.
Wagner, C. and Leydesdorff, L. (2005). Network structure, self-organization,
and the growth of international collaboration in science. Research policy,
34(10):1608–1618.
249
References
Appendix
250
References
Ta
bl
e
E.
3:
O
ve
rv
ie
w
ov
er
th
e
"e
xp
er
t"
Tw
it
te
r-
ac
co
un
ts
th
at
w
er
e
us
ed
fo
r
th
e
te
xt
ex
tr
ac
ti
on
Tw
it
te
r-
id
N
am
e
Lo
ca
ti
on
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
12
16
84
99
2
C
A
TH
ER
IN
E
C
O
ST
E
G
en
om
ic
En
te
rt
ai
nm
en
t
M
IT
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
in
G
en
om
ic
s.
G
en
om
ic
&
Pr
ec
is
io
n
M
ed
ic
in
e
U
C
SF
.B
lo
g:
Et
hi
cs
,H
ea
lt
h
&
D
ea
th
2.
0
-
D
TC
G
en
om
ic
s
16
87
04
21
Si
ng
ul
ar
it
yU
N
A
SA
M
of
fe
tt
Fi
el
d,
C
A
Si
lic
on
V
al
le
y’
s
le
ad
in
g
ex
pe
rt
s
on
ex
po
ne
nt
ia
lt
ec
hn
ol
og
y.
Fo
llo
w
@
si
ng
ul
ar
it
yh
ub
@
si
ng
ul
ar
it
yl
ab
s
@
su
gl
ob
al
@
ex
po
ne
nt
ia
lm
ed
60
44
27
2
R
am
ez
N
aa
m
Se
at
tl
e
A
ut
ho
r:
N
ex
us
/
C
ru
x
/
M
or
e
Th
an
H
um
an
/
Th
e
In
fin
it
e
R
es
ou
rc
e.
Fo
rm
er
ly
a
co
m
pu
te
r
sc
ie
nt
is
t
at
M
ic
ro
so
ft
.I
nt
er
es
te
d
in
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
.
18
70
50
65
H
um
an
it
y+
G
lo
ba
l
H
um
an
it
y+
is
de
di
ca
te
d
to
pr
om
ot
in
g
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g,
in
te
re
st
an
d
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
in
fie
ld
s
of
em
er
gi
ng
in
no
va
ti
on
th
at
ca
n
ra
di
ca
lly
be
ne
fit
th
e
hu
m
an
co
nd
it
io
n.
95
66
10
07
K
yl
e
M
un
ki
tt
ri
ck
D
en
ve
r,
N
Y
C
,S
an
Fr
an
Bi
oe
th
ic
s:
th
e
un
ho
ly
un
io
n
of
sc
ie
nc
e,
m
ed
ic
in
e,
an
d
ph
ilo
so
ph
y.
Bl
am
e
no
on
e
bu
t
m
ys
el
f
fo
r
w
ha
t
yo
u
fin
d
he
re
.
16
35
29
93
H
ea
th
er
K
ni
gh
t
C
M
U
R
ob
ot
ic
is
t
w
it
h
a
so
ft
sp
ot
fo
r
in
te
ra
ct
iv
e
ar
t
&
liv
e
ro
bo
t
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
:F
ou
nd
er
@
M
ar
ily
nM
on
ro
bo
t,
D
ir
ec
to
r
@
ro
bo
tfi
lm
fe
st
,R
ob
o-
Te
ch
@
R
ob
ot
C
om
ba
tS
yF
y!
28
13
25
85
A
ar
on
Sa
en
z
W
ri
te
r
fo
r
Si
ng
ul
ar
it
y
H
ub
,f
or
m
er
Ph
ys
ic
s
du
de
,I
m
pr
ov
C
om
ed
ia
n,
N
om
ad
24
43
05
1
at
ti
la
cs
or
da
s
C
am
br
id
ge
,U
K
bi
oi
nf
or
m
at
ic
ia
n,
EB
I,
re
gu
la
r
H
ad
oo
p
&
R
ti
nk
er
er
,p
er
so
na
lp
ro
te
om
ic
s
in
st
ig
at
or
,e
x
m
it
oc
ho
nd
ri
al
-s
te
m
ce
ll
bi
ol
og
is
t
dr
iv
en
by
he
al
th
y
lif
es
pa
n
ex
te
ns
io
n
15
24
91
66
Si
ng
ul
ar
it
y
H
ub
N
A
SA
M
of
fe
tt
Fi
el
d,
C
A
N
ew
s
ne
tw
or
k
co
ve
ri
ng
sc
ie
nc
e,
te
ch
no
lo
gy
&
th
e
fu
tu
re
of
hu
m
an
it
y.
Fo
llo
w
@
si
ng
ul
ar
it
yu
|
Be
co
m
e
H
U
B
M
em
be
r:
ht
tp
:/
/t
.c
o/
w
X
G
C
jv
IC
bk
16
83
84
43
K
ur
zw
ei
lA
IN
ew
s
C
al
if
or
ni
a/
M
as
s
K
ur
zw
ei
lA
I
(h
tt
p:
//
t.c
o/
K
D
0H
q6
D
66
p)
is
a
ne
w
sl
et
te
r/
bl
og
co
ve
ri
ng
na
no
-b
io
-i
nf
o-
co
gn
o-
co
sm
ic
br
ea
kt
hr
ou
gh
s
in
ac
ce
le
ra
ti
ng
in
te
lli
ge
nc
e
74
45
64
2
C
hr
is
G
ra
ys
on
N
ew
Yo
rk
C
it
y
/
Sa
n
Fr
an
ci
sc
o
#W
ea
ra
bl
es
/
A
dv
is
or
:h
tt
p:
//
t.c
o/
ks
23
gJ
j3
0J
/
Pr
io
r
EC
D
:h
tt
p:
//
t.c
o/
Q
4p
Su
Eb
Fs
4
/
Ev
en
ts
:h
tt
p:
//
t.c
o/
bq
Lt
G
O
3G
5o
&
ht
tp
:/
/t
.c
o/
G
rm
H
eG
38
Ir
16
93
47
72
tr
is
ta
nh
am
bl
in
g
N
ew
Z
ea
la
nd
Tr
ac
ki
ng
fu
tu
re
,t
ec
h,
na
no
,b
io
,n
eu
ro
,i
nf
o
st
uf
f,
an
d
an
yt
hi
ng
ne
w
th
at
sc
an
s
pa
st
m
y
ev
en
t
ho
ri
zo
n.
ht
tp
:/
/t
.c
o/
7a
JF
w
A
jk
v7
al
so
@
fu
tu
re
se
ek
19
00
47
91
D
av
id
W
oo
d
C
ha
ir
of
Lo
nd
on
Fu
tu
ri
st
s.
W
ri
te
r
&
co
ns
ul
ta
nt
.P
D
A
/s
m
ar
tp
ho
ne
pi
on
ee
r.
Sy
m
bi
an
co
-f
ou
nd
er
.F
or
m
er
ly
at
Ps
io
n
an
d
A
cc
en
tu
re
.C
ol
la
bo
ra
ti
ve
Tr
an
sh
um
an
is
t
15
41
05
87
R
od
Fu
rl
an
V
an
co
uv
er
,B
C
A
rt
ifi
ci
al
in
te
lli
ge
nc
e
re
se
ar
ch
er
,q
ua
nt
,S
in
gu
la
ri
ty
U
ni
ve
rs
it
y
al
um
,G
oo
gl
e
G
la
ss
Ex
pl
or
er
,s
er
ia
la
ut
od
id
ac
t,
sc
ie
nc
e
lo
ve
r
&
so
on
-t
o-
be
-r
ob
ot
23
11
57
43
h+
M
ag
az
in
e
U
SA
h+
M
ag
az
in
e
co
ve
rs
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l,
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c,
an
d
cu
lt
ur
al
tr
en
ds
th
at
ar
e
ch
an
gi
ng
hu
m
an
be
in
gs
in
fu
nd
am
en
ta
lw
ay
s.
74
39
13
D
av
id
O
rb
an
N
ew
Yo
rk
,N
Y
C
EO
,D
ot
su
b
/
A
dv
is
or
&
Fa
cu
lt
y,
Si
ng
ul
ar
it
y
U
ni
ve
rs
it
y
–
A
na
ly
zi
ng
an
d
ap
pl
yi
ng
cy
cl
es
of
ac
ce
le
ra
ti
ng
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
lc
ha
ng
e.
Fl
ow
in
g
in
w
on
de
rm
en
t.
19
74
82
00
G
iz
m
ag
I
am
a
w
eb
si
te
ab
ou
t
em
er
gi
ng
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
.
19
72
26
99
Po
pu
la
r
Sc
ie
nc
e
N
ew
Yo
rk
Sc
ie
nc
e
an
d
te
ch
no
lo
gy
ne
w
s
fr
om
th
e
fu
tu
re
!
Tw
ee
ts
fr
om
@
R
os
eP
as
to
re
13
82
22
77
6
N
eu
ro
te
ch
fu
tu
re
Bo
st
on
,M
A
,U
SA
Th
e
fu
tu
re
of
lif
e,
hu
m
an
it
y,
an
d
in
te
lli
ge
nc
e
re
st
s
in
th
e
m
in
ds
an
d
ha
nd
s
of
th
e
in
no
va
to
rs
w
ho
en
vi
si
on
,g
ui
de
,a
nd
bu
ild
it
.
59
47
18
36
7
G
ri
sh
in
R
ob
ot
ic
s
N
ew
Yo
rk
Ev
er
yt
hi
ng
ab
ou
t
co
ns
um
er
ro
bo
ti
cs
,c
on
ne
ct
ed
de
vi
ce
s
&
Io
T.
Pu
bl
is
he
d
by
th
e
fir
st
ro
bo
ti
cs
in
ve
st
m
en
t
co
m
pa
ny
.F
ou
nd
er
-
@
dg
ri
sh
in
,f
ee
d
ed
it
or
-
@
V
al
er
y_
K
a.
86
62
68
45
Er
ic
To
po
l
La
Jo
lla
,C
A
C
ar
di
ol
og
is
t,
ge
ne
ti
ci
st
,d
ig
it
al
m
ed
ic
in
e
afi
ci
on
ad
o,
Ed
it
or
-i
n-
C
hi
ef
,M
ed
sc
ap
e,
au
th
or
of
Th
e
C
re
at
iv
e
D
es
tr
uc
ti
on
of
M
ed
ic
in
e
15
80
86
47
M
IT
Te
ch
R
ev
ie
w
C
am
br
id
ge
,M
A
W
e
id
en
ti
fy
im
po
rt
an
t
ne
w
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
—
de
ci
ph
er
in
g
th
ei
r
pr
ac
ti
ca
li
m
pa
ct
an
d
re
ve
al
in
g
ho
w
th
ey
w
ill
ch
an
ge
ou
r
liv
es
.
10
17
75
75
9
H
iz
oo
k.
co
m
Sa
n
Jo
se
,U
SA
R
ob
ot
ic
s
N
ew
s
fo
r
A
ca
de
m
ic
s
&
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
s
by
Tr
av
is
D
ey
le
44
91
06
88
R
ob
ot
M
ag
az
in
e
R
id
ge
fie
ld
,C
T
U
SA
Th
e
la
te
st
in
ho
bb
y,
sc
ie
nc
e
an
d
co
ns
um
er
ro
bo
ti
cs
.
16
69
52
66
C
hi
ef
R
ob
ot
Bo
st
on
Yo
ur
da
ily
do
se
of
ro
bo
ts
.
15
16
48
74
1
R
ob
ot
oW
ea
r
C
lo
th
in
g
fo
r
hu
m
an
s,
in
sp
ir
ed
by
ro
bo
ts
.R
ob
ot
t-
sh
ir
ts
,h
at
s,
po
lo
s
an
d
ho
od
ie
s.
87
46
87
36
Er
ic
Ta
tr
o
C
hi
ca
go
,I
L
Tw
ee
ts
ab
ou
t
tr
an
sh
um
an
is
m
,t
he
si
ng
ul
ar
it
y,
A
I,
na
no
te
ch
,b
io
te
ch
,r
ob
ot
ic
s,
lif
e
ex
te
ns
io
n
an
d
hu
m
an
en
ha
nc
em
en
t.
A
ll
tw
ee
ts
an
d
op
in
io
ns
ar
e
m
y
ow
n.
10
35
16
87
3
W
ill
ow
G
ar
ag
e
M
en
lo
Pa
rk
,C
A
H
el
pi
ng
to
re
vo
lu
ti
on
iz
e
th
e
w
or
ld
of
pe
rs
on
al
ro
bo
ti
cs
67
78
03
2
R
ob
er
t
O
sc
hl
er
Id
ah
o
A
rt
ifi
ci
al
In
te
lli
ge
nc
e
an
d
sm
ar
t
ph
on
e
de
ve
lo
pe
r,
cu
rr
en
tl
y
fo
cu
si
ng
on
sp
ee
ch
re
co
gn
it
io
n
an
d
na
tu
ra
ll
an
gu
ag
e
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
an
d
ro
bo
ti
cs
.
18
06
67
13
ro
bo
ts
_f
or
ev
er
To
ky
o,
Ja
pa
n
R
ob
ot
ne
w
s,
ro
bo
ti
cs
re
se
ar
ch
,c
om
ba
t
an
d
hu
m
an
oi
d
ro
bo
t
ev
en
ts
,a
nd
ot
he
r
ro
bo
t
co
ve
ra
ge
fr
om
Ja
pa
n.
81
25
92
2
A
le
xa
nd
er
K
ru
el
G
er
m
an
y
Tr
an
sh
um
an
is
t,
at
he
is
t,
ve
ge
ta
ri
an
in
te
re
st
ed
in
m
at
h,
pr
og
ra
m
m
in
g,
sc
ie
nc
e
fic
ti
on
,s
ci
en
ce
,l
an
gu
ag
e,
ph
ilo
so
ph
y,
co
ns
ci
ou
sn
es
s,
th
e
na
tu
re
of
re
al
it
y.
..
22
91
00
80
R
ob
Sp
en
ce
Ey
eb
or
g
To
ro
nt
o,
C
an
ad
a
W
e’
ve
bu
ilt
a
w
ir
el
es
s
vi
de
o
ca
m
er
a
ey
e.
Tw
ee
ts
ab
ou
t
pr
iv
ac
y,
cy
bo
rg
s,
pr
os
th
et
ic
s,
ey
ep
at
ch
es
,S
ta
r
Tr
ek
,T
he
Bi
on
ic
M
an
,a
nd
A
ug
m
en
te
d
R
ea
lit
y.
77
96
91
2
Tr
an
sh
um
an
is
ts
N
ew
Yo
rk
,N
Y
Si
ng
ul
ar
it
y,
Tr
an
sh
um
an
is
m
,A
rt
ifi
ci
al
In
te
lli
ge
nc
e,
H
um
an
En
ha
nc
em
en
t,
St
em
C
el
ls
,N
an
ot
ec
hn
ol
og
y,
R
en
ew
ab
le
En
er
gy
15
78
43
53
Se
ns
iu
m
R
ev
ol
ut
io
na
ry
bo
dy
m
on
it
or
in
g
fo
r
he
al
th
ca
re
:w
ir
el
es
s,
in
te
lli
ge
nt
,c
on
ti
nu
ou
s,
lo
w
-c
os
t.
23
11
62
80
Po
pu
la
r
M
ec
ha
ni
cs
N
ew
Yo
rk
C
it
y
Th
e
be
st
in
te
ch
,s
ci
en
ce
,a
er
os
pa
ce
,D
IY
an
d
au
to
ne
w
s.
C
us
to
m
er
Se
rv
ic
e:
ht
tp
:/
/t
.c
o/
rY
W
TF
W
zg
2R
N
ot
es
:D
at
a
ex
tr
ac
te
d
us
in
g
th
e
Tw
it
te
r
A
PI
in
M
ay
20
14
.A
cc
ou
nt
s
ca
n
be
fr
ee
ly
ac
ce
ss
ed
us
in
g
ht
tp
s:
//
tw
it
te
r.c
om
/i
nt
en
t/
us
er
?u
se
r_
id
=[
in
se
rt
he
re
th
e
tw
it
te
r
id
]
251
References






































































































































 







































































































 



  















 





























































































































































































































































































































 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































 


















































































































































































 




























































































































 

























































Fig.E.7:Static
C
om
m
unity
D
etection:D
ocum
ent
sim
ilarity
netw
ork
of
the
w
hole
corpus
252
References
Table E.4: Network and community statistics over time
2011, 2nd 2012, 1st 2012, 2nd 2013, 1st 2013, 2nd
N nodes 320 293 341 163 233
N edges 3,979 2,579 3,445 1,105 1,752
N communities 74 49 66 30 36
Max. community density 0.58 0.77 0.63 0.75 0.71
Max. nodes community 54 34 28 21 26
Table E.5: Overview over top 10 Persons in the corpus
Person Frequency Description
Ray Kurzweil 133 Raymond "Ray" Kurzweil (born February 12, 1948) is an American author, scientist, inventor, futurist, and is a director of
engineering at Google. Aside from futurology, he is involved in fields such as optical character recognition (OCR), text-to-speech
synthesis, speech recognition technology, and electronic keyboard instruments.
Peter Diamandis 53 Peter H. Diamandis (born May 20, 1961) is a Greek-American engineer, physician, and entrepreneur best known for being the
founder and chairman of the X PRIZE Foundation, the co-founder and chairman of Singularity University and the co-author of
the New York Times bestseller Abundance: The Future Is Better Than You Think.
Peter Thiel 18 Peter Andreas Thiel (born October 11, 1967) is an American entrepreneur, venture capitalist, and hedge fund manager. Thiel
cofounded PayPal with Max Levchin and served as its CEO.
Daniel Kraft 15 Daniel Kraft, M.D. is an NIH funded faculty member affiliated with Stanford.
Peter Norvig 15 Peter Norvig (born 1956) is an American computer scientist. He is a Director of Research (formerly Director of Search Quality)
at Google Inc.
Jason Silva 14 Jason Silva (born February 6, 1982) is a Venezuelan-American television personality, filmmaker, and performance philosopher.
He resides in Los Angeles, California and New York City.
Larry Page 13 Lawrence "Larry" Page (born March 26, 1973) is an American business magnate and computer scientist who is the co-founder of
Google, alongside Sergey Brin. On April 4, 2011, Page succeeded Eric Schmidt as the chief executive officer of Google.
Steve Jobs 12 Steven Paul “Steve” Jobs (born February 24, 1955 – October 5, 2011) was an American entrepreneur, marketer, and inventor,
who was the co-founder, chairman, and CEO of Apple Inc. Through Apple, he is widely recognized as a charismatic pioneer of
the personal computer revolution and for his influential career in the computer and consumer electronics fields, transforming
“one industry after another, from computers and smartphones to music and movies.” Jobs also co-founded and served as chief
executive of Pixar Animation Studios; he became a member of the board of directors of The Walt Disney Company in 2006, when
Disney acquired Pixar.
Elon Musk 8 Elon R. Musk (born June 28, 1971) is a South African-born Canadian-American business magnate, inventor and investor.
Notes: Descriptions extracted form Wikipedia
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Table E.6: Overview over top 20 research facilities in the extracted corpus
Item Frequency
singularity university 157
singularity institute 18
willow garage 14
computer history museum 13
foresight institute 12
stanford university 12
university of california 12
international space station 10
university of illinois 9
university of washington 9
washington university 8
carnegie mellon university 7
university of texas 7
duke university 6
nasa ames campus 6
national cancer institute 6
tel aviv university 6
university of michigan 6
university of pittsburgh 6
university of tokyo 6
254
References
Table E.7: Overview over top 20 companies in the extracted corpus
Firm Frequency
google 280
singularity university 164
youtube 129
facebook 97
ibm 64
amazon 55
twitter 50
the new york times 44
microsoft 39
apple 27
irobot 25
intel 23
autodesk 22
paypal 22
wall street journal 21
bbc 19
singularity institute 19
nokia 18
techcrunch 17
cisco 16
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Paper F.
Abstract
In this paper, we present an agent-based simulation model of technology invest-
ment by heterogeneous and interacting financial agents. Investment decisions are
explained by the topology of the technology landscape, the agents’ capability to re-
ceive and interpret incomplete landscape information, and their investment capac-
ity. We are particularly interested in the effects of different information-sharing an
co-investment network structures among agents on the rate and direction of tech-
nological change. We model these agents as to observe emerging technologies on a
technology “fitness landscape”, and select potential investment targets according to
their perceived risk-adjusted returns, where risks are a function of the technology’s
maturity and the returns of the achieved technology performance. Subject to imper-
fect information and bounded rationality, financial agents are heterogeneous in their
view of the landscape determining the potential investment targets they are able to
spot, as well as in their forecasting ability determining the accuracy of their predic-
tion of achievable technological fitness. Assuming a trade-off between search radius
and forecasting ability, the population of financial agents will consist of more spe-
cialized investors with a narrow view on the landscape but high forecasting ability
within this area, and more generalized ones who can search a large area but have a
low forecasting ability. We observe which configuration of financial agents lead to
high rates of technological change and diversity. In a next step, we introduce investor
networks and allow agents to co-invest together in order to pool financial resources
and get access to their forecasting capability in a specific technological domain. We
compare which investor network structures and compositions lead to the high rates of
technological change and diversity on a given technology landscape. Results from a
Monte Carlo simulation indeed indicate networked investor population to outperform
isolated investor performance, an effect that tends to increase with complexity of the
technology landscape.
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Preface
After the theoretical, as well as empirical groundwork, in this chapter my
co-author Elena Mas Tur and I make a first attempt towards more predic-
tive models by developing a mathematical formalization of the interaction
between finance, research and technological change. In detail, I develop a
model of heterogeneous and interacting financial agents, making investment
allocation decisions in research projects resulting in technological change.
Investment decisions are explained by the topology of the technology land-
scape, the technological maturity of potential investment targets, the agents’
capability to receive and interpret incomplete landscape information, and
their investment capacity. Thereby, I incorporate the central insights from
the theoretical theoretical building elaborated in other chapters of this Ph.D.
thesis. Subject to incomplete information and bounded rationality, finan-
cial agents are heterogeneous in their knowledge and information at hand
to identify and assess the outcome of investments in certain technologies.
To mitigate incomplete and asymmetric information, with increasing tech-
nological complexity, investors might decide to focus on a narrow techno-
logical field to accumulate relevant experience within that area. This trend
of specialization on modern capital markets (Amit et al., 1998; Black and
Gilson, 1998; Cressy et al., 2007)1 leads to asymmetric information in the
market for technology finance – meaning an uneven distribution of existing
information and capabilities among heterogeneous investors and other rel-
evant agents. This simple fact has two immediate theoretical implications
which I stress throughout this thesis. First, it calls for explicitly consider-
ing the micro-foundation of innovation and technology investments – since
investors will asses certain investments differently with respect to their per-
ceived risks and returns. Second, it offers an explanation for the emergence of
investor networks to leverage synergies among those heterogeneous agents.
Yet, asymmetric information among investors also creates tensions manifest-
ing in agency and governance issues, which I also discuss in this chapter.
Complex systems theory also enters the chapter by modeling financial agents
to observe emerging technologies on a technology “fitness landscape”. Fi-
nally, it is well established that during the technology life cycle, some charac-
teristics of technologies and associated industry alter tremendously (Klepper,
1997), particularly the capital intensity, risks, and returns. With considering
these insights, I apply a dynamic perspective on technological change.
1Which among others manifests in the emergence of new forms of financial intermediaries
such as venture capitalists with in depth knowledge on technologies as well as their markets.
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Fig. F.1: Positioning the paper in the theoretical framework
Investor Space
Technology Space
Research Space
Institutional Environment
Part I
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Part II Part III
Chapter 2 Chapter 3
While my main focus here lies on the effect of finance on technological
change – the guiding topic of this PhD thesis, I exhaustively discuss possi-
bilities to model interactions within and between all three considered dimen-
sions (research, technology, and investment space). I carefully elaborate on
the endogeneity between characteristics of all three dimensions, yet demon-
strate that - for the sake of analytic orthogonality - they can be studied in
isolation, at least in the short run. Thus, this chapter aims to link all three
dimensions of technological change, but emphasizes the up to now under-
researched and -conceptualized finance space.
Combining most collected insights gathered during my Ph.D. fellowship,
this is the latest chapter written. It was firstly presented at the “DRUID
Winter Academy” 2015 in Aalborg, and afterwards at the “DRUID Summer
conference” 2015 in Rome. It is currently available as an IKE working paper.
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1 Introduction
The duality between finance and technological change has long been rec-
ognized as a main driving forces behind capitalist dynamics and economic
progress (Perez, 2004, 2010; Schumpeter, 1934, 1942). The search for new
technologies is a risky and uncertain endeavor, especially for the ones leav-
ing established technological trajectories and engaging in more radical forms
of innovation (Dosi, 1988). Yet, in modern capitalistic economies, not only
researchers, inventors and entrepreneurs, but also their providers of capital
share this risk. Without an investor able and willing to financially back such
endeavors, ideas remain ideas and will not enter the commercial landscape as
new products, services, or processes. Consequently, understanding investors
decision processes under uncertainty becomes integral to explain technolog-
ical change.
A long tradition of research dating back to the seminal contributions by
Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959)indicates investments in innovation to be par-
ticularly difficult for investors to handle. One of the main arguments put
forward lies in the nature of information required to assess their profitabil-
ity. For mature technologies embedded in a likewise stable and well un-
derstood technological system one can apply traditional risk-adjusted return
projection techniques. Here, the expected profitability of an investment is
quantified by summing over a set of possible outcome-scenarios weighted by
their probability. In case of emerging technologies diverting from established
trajectories, the still unfolding set of information on single technologies as
well as their interaction in a technological system leads to “true uncertainty”
(Knight, 1921), preventing accurate predictions of timing, technological fea-
tures, and economic consequences of innovations along these lines. This
prediction problem tends to amplify with increasing interdependence and
associated complexity of modern technological systems, where the perfor-
mance of any single component is highly sensitive on changes in other parts
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Kauffman and Macready, 1995).
Confronted with incomplete information and limited capabilities to pro-
cess them, investors acting under “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1955) to a
large extent rely on simple heuristics, rules-of-thumb and intuition when as-
sessing potential investments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). To mitigate
information deficits and improve applied heuristics, investors can focus on
a narrow set of investments to accumulate relevant experience within that
area. This trend of specialization in modern capital markets (Amit et al.,
1998; Black and Gilson, 1998; Cressy et al., 2007) causes asymmetric informa-
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tion in the market for technology finance, meaning an uneven distribution
of existing information and capabilities among investors and other relevant
agents.
A way to mitigate information deficits outside one’s own area of exper-
tise is to mobilize knowledge and capabilities of partners within an investor’s
network of informants (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Fiet, 1995). In ad-
dition, for equity based technology investments, it is also common practice to
team up with other investors and co-invest together (also referred to as “syn-
diation”) in the same target. In such co-investment networks, investors can
pool capabilities and financial resources (Ferrary, 2010) in order to achieve
superior investment performance (Hochberg et al., 2007). A long tradition of
social science research ranging from seminal work by Simmel (1955) to Mer-
ton (1957), Granovetter (1973), Burt (1992) to recent work, provides sound
evidence as to how the behavior of individuals and organizations is strongly
affected by the way they relate to and interact with larger collectives. Conse-
quently, the topology of such investor networks is also said to strongly affect
the amount of investments, their pattern and performance on the investor –
as well s system-level (Baum et al., 2003).
Indeed, we can draw from a large body of literature providing theoreti-
cal frameworks as well as empirical evidence, as to how certain designs of
financial systems (Beck and Levine, 2002; Dosi, 1990; Rajan and Zingales,
2001), types of investors (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, 2000), and their network
structure (Baum et al., 2003; Hochberg et al., 2007) impact the amount and
performance of investments in emerging technologies. Yet, from a static per-
spective it is not obvious how conducive such investments are for technolog-
ical change. To reach the market and have meaningful economic and social
impact, technologies have to attract investors in every development stage,
from the lab to the scaling up for mass market production. Mismatches be-
tween technology characteristics with the capabilities and rationales of the
investor population can cause investment bottlenecks (commonly refereed
to as financial “valleys of death”, where technologies “die” due to under-
investment) and seriously jeopardize further progress. During the develop-
ment of a technology along its’ life-cycle, many of its’ characteristics rele-
vant for investors tend to alter substantially (Klepper, 1997; Nelson, 1994;
Utterback, 1994). Most relevant, the accumulation of available knowledge
regarding the general feasibility and interaction with other components of
the system de-risks technology, decreasing the chance of failure and making
further progress more predictable (Dosi, 1988). At the same time, technol-
ogy development tends to become more capital intense in later stages close
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to commercialization. While maturing, technologies may also gradually alter
their own logic in terms of how they function and on what kind of problem of
which they can be applied. Consequently, the same technology will appeal to
a different set of specialized investors in different stages of its life-cycle, thus
without the right mix of such investors present, this technology will be un-
likely to reach the market. Information sharing and co-investment networks
here have the potential to mitigate the negative effects of lacking capabilities
and resources of particular investors, depending on their structure.
In this paper, we present an agent-based simulation model of technology
investment by heterogeneous and interacting financial agents. Investment
decisions are explained by the topology of the technology landscape, the
agents’ capability to receive and interpret incomplete landscape information,
and their investment capacity. We are particularly interested in the effects
of different information-sharing an co-investment network structures among
financial agents on the rate and direction of technological change. We model
financial agents to observe emerging technologies on a technology “fitness
landscape”, and select potential investment targets according to their per-
ceived risk-adjusted returns, where risks are a function of the technology’s
maturity and the returns of the achieved technological performance.
Subject to imperfect information and bounded rationality, financial agents
are heterogeneous in their view of the landscape determining the potential
investment targets they are able to spot as well as in their forecasting abil-
ity determining the accuracy of their prediction of achievable technological
fitness. Assuming a trade-off between search radius and forecasting ability,
the population of financial agents will consist of more specialized investors
with a narrow view on the landscape but high forecasting ability within this
area, and more generalized ones who can search a large area but have a low
forecasting ability. We observe which configuration of financial agents lead to
high rates of technological change and diversity, and in which technologies
get stuck in the “valley of death”. In a next step, we introduce investor net-
works and allow financial agents to co-invest together with their connected
peers in order to pool financial resources and get access to their forecasting
capability in a specific technological domain. While we expect such net-
works per se to be conductive, we are interested which network structures
and compositions lead to the high rates of technological change and diver-
sity. Therefore, we compare the results of more homogeneous or heteroge-
neous networks in term of the agents technological knowledge and degree of
specialization.
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Results from a Monte Carlo simulation on different investor network
structures and technology landscape complexity indeed indicate networked
investor population to outperform isolated investor performance, a effect that
tends to increase with complexity of the technology landscape.
Our general attempt is to provide a more nuanced understanding of the
interplay between technology characteristics and decision making processes
of bounded rational investors and emerging characteristics of a technological
system. We thereby contribute to literature on technological change as well
as financial and investment theory by establishing an analytical link between
them. We are also convinced that this model provides a solid basis for simu-
lations to be done, enabling them to derive important implications for theory
and practice. For policy making, it provides the potential to analyze real
life investor populations and, based on the results facilitating technological
change, by policies aiming to reconfigure investor network structures or by
targeted public funding in problem areas.
The remainder of the paper is structured as followed. Grounded on prior
work which we review briefly, in section 2 we present a conceptual model of
investments on a technology landscape by connected heterogeneous financial
agents, and in section ?? its mathematical formalization. Section ?? summa-
rizes preliminary results from a Monte Carlo simulation on different investor
network structures and technology landscape complexity. Finally, in section
5 we conclude, provide implications for theory and practice, and fruitful av-
enues for further research.
2 Conceptual Framework
In neoclassical economic theory, technological change is commonly envi-
sioned as an equilibrium shifting exogenous shock, or as something subject
to a production function with a determined relationship between inputs such
as R&D spending, and outputs such as patents or sales with new products.
A more modern understanding depicts technological change inherently as
happening endogenously to the system it is embedded in, where the sys-
tem’s components are interdependent among each other as well as with ele-
ments outside the system’s boundaries (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nel-
son, 1993). In the same vein, innovation which is believed to be a driving force
of technological change, is above all a social process not happening in isola-
tion but nurtured by the collective interaction of various directly involved
agents, as well as supporting ones (Powell et al., 1996).
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Investors and other provides of external finance are among those crucial
supporting agents. Indeed, without the commitment of financial resources,
ideas remain ideas, independent of their potential. Depending on the capi-
tal intensity of the technology, one can develop ideas and invention with a
minimum commitment, as is the case with classical garage inventions. How-
ever, this can only go so far, since a fair share of progress is usually achieved
by the testing of such inventions in real life situations, where technological
and economic properties can be gradually improved. Through their decision
of whom to provide capital and to whom not, financial institutions such as
banks and stock markets nowadays represent the major ex-ante selection de-
vice every innovating firm and project has to face. Thus, with their allocation
of resources, they play a major role in determining the amount of innovative
effort, as well as its trajectory (Dosi, 1990).
This pivotal role of finance in facilitating innovation and propelling tech-
nological change is already emphasized in the work of Schumpeter (1934,
1942), who claims innovations by a creative entrepreneur based on credit cre-
ation by a risk-taking banker as the force behind capitalist dynamics. The
entrepreneur-banker duality here has to be considered as a symbiotic rela-
tionship: the entrepreneur creates potential high-return investment oppor-
tunities for the banker, who in turn enables venturing possibilities for the
entrepreneur by providing external finance.
However, it is well understood that this powerful, yet simple, relationship
does not capture the full complexity of the financial system and the multi-
tude of heterogeneous involved actors influencing the allocation of resources
towards innovative activity. Research during the last decades has provided
a more nuanced understanding as to how the design of financial systems
(Beck and Levine, 2002; Dosi, 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 2001), the behavior
of investors on financial markets (Perez, 2002, 2004, 2010), public funding
(Mazzucato, 2011), and firm level resource allocation (Tylecote, 2007) influ-
ence the rate and direction of technological change.
In the following, we will elaborate on what we believe to be a crucial yet
underexplored determinant of technological change: How the composition
of investors with heterogeneous resource endowments impacts investment
patterns in technologies with certain characteristics, and how this is mediated
by information-sharing and co-investment networks. Before clarifying the
mechanics and other mathematical details of the simulation model, we will
proceed with placing this link between investor characteristics, networks, and
resulting investments in technological change in a bigger context. We do
so by first elaborating on the dynamics between three main dimensions of
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technological change, namely (i.) the research space where technology is
developed by research agents, (ii.) the financial space where financial agents
allocate investments among the innovation projects developed in the research
space, and an intermediate (iii.) technology space in which research operates
and investors evaluate.
2.1 The Dimensions of Technological Change
Following Schumpeter’s conceptualization of the entrepreneur-banker (and
broader, finance and economic progress) duality, we envision technological
change primarily as the outcome of micro-level activities between (i.) agents
developing invention by conducting research and development, and finan-
cial agents providing the capital to do so (ii.). Yet, in line with his neo-
schumpeterian heritage (eg. Hanusch and Pyka, 2007a; Winter, 2006) we see
this relationship to be embedded in a more complex context, and the result-
ing innovation as the outcome of interactions between various subsystems
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Lundvall, 1992; Malerba, 2002; Nelson, 1993)
and embedded heterogeneous economic agents (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007b;
Pyka, 2002).
As a basic framework for our model explaining technology investments
and their impact, we consider three dimensions of technological change2: (i.)
the research space where technology is developed by research agents, (ii.)
the intermediate technology space which takes the form of a fitness land-
scape representing potential performance of certain technology configura-
tions, and (iii.) the financial space where financial agents search for possible
investment opportunities in technology space. In detail, we aim to explain
investment decisions of heterogeneous financial agents with incomplete in-
formation regarding investment opportunities as well as their technological
potential. Further, we elaborate on possible mediating effects of information-
sharing and co-investment networks among financial agents. The outcome of
such search and investment processes - technological change - manifests in
a realized reconfiguration of components in a complex technological system
consisting of interrelated components. We know that technological systems
are always embedded in - and co-evolve with - a social and institutional con-
text (Bijker et al., 1987; Hughes, 1987). This is illustrated in figure ??. Here we
see research, as well as financial space, to be populated by respective agents
2For a more exhaustive discussion on these dimensions, their theoretical foundation and
interplay, consider Hain (imeo)
266
2. Conceptual Framework
- investors and researchers - which are connected by certain cooperation pat-
tern.
Fig. F.2: Linking Investment and Research on the Technology Landscape
Investor Space
Technology Space
Research Space
Institutional Environment
In brief, research agents generate potential innovation projects that trigger
technological change if they attract investments by financial agents, while
both research and investment activities are constrained by the corresponding
agents insight in the landscape. In the following, we shall elaborate in detail
about the intuition, theory, and mechanisms behind this processes. In the
model to be presented in this paper, we are interested in the effects of investor
characteristics and networks on investment pattern resulting in technological
change. We here assume the technology landscape, as well as investment
opportunities to be given exogeneous. While in reality for sure multiple
feedback between finance and research activities, for the sake of simplicity
we here assume them to be analytically orthogonal at least in the short-term.3
2.2 The Agents involved in Technological Change
As outlined before, both research as well as financial space are populated by
heterogeneous agents. Our main interest, financial agents, are to be under-
stood as various kinds of entities who actively invest in technological change,
3However, in later sections we discuss possible extensions, including feedback loops between
investor and research activities and networks.
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meaning they are willing to financially back firms and products or projects
aiming to alter or improve a certain technology. This can be classical insti-
tutional investors such as pension funds, private equity (PE), venture capital
(VC) investors, and other financial institutions such as banks which operate
under the following assumptions. (i.) Their main rationale is to optimize the
perceived risk-adjusted returns of their investments. (ii.) Their returns de-
pend on and scale with the performance of the technology under investment.
This is usually the case in equity based investments.4
Research agents can be all kinds of actors actively participating in the
search for technological advancements, inventors, and entrepreneurs so to
say. The main assumption here is that they are in need of external finance to
do so. This holds true for most private and academic inventors, other non-
public and also public research institutions, private sector SMEs as well as
larger companies. Nevertheless, we obviously exclude a fair share of tech-
nological progress happening in large firms that are able to fully finance
their research endeavors internally with means of accumulated profit. In this
model, we treat activity in research space as a black-box and assume the
behavior of research agents as given, where only their output in terms of
exogenous proposed innovation projects searching for finance enters.
2.3 Investments and the Technology Life-Cycle
It is well established that during the technology life cycle, some characteristics
of technologies and associated industry alter tremendously (Klepper, 1997).
Particularly, two of those characteristics are said to alter how it might appeal
to certain types of financial agents. First, technologies in early stages of the
life cycle, without established technological trajectories to guide the direction
of search, are commonly associated with higher risks, and innovation projects
in such technologies show a higher probability of failure (Dosi, 1982, 1988;
Freeman et al., 1983). Second, capital requirements for further technology de-
velopment and deployment tend to increase while a technology moves from
the lab to the market. To gain legitimacy and ease the way to commercial-
ization, it often is necessary to demonstrate the feasibility and functionality
of the invention in a real-life setting of appropriate scale. Finally, to become
an innovation, an invention has to be introduced to the commercial market,
with all the costs associated.
4Later, we discuss how to relax this assumptions, and allow for diverging rationales (eg.
governments who might aim to increase technological progress rather the return of their invest-
ments) and pay-offs (eg. dept based finance, which always offers a ex-ante fixed percentage of
the investment as return in case of success, and default in case of failure).
268
2. Conceptual Framework
This perspective on technology development – including different types
of agents, investments, and investors – offers valuable insights. Mismatches
between innovation projects proposed by research agents, technology char-
acteristics, and financial agents capabilities can cause financial bottlenecks at
any of these stages and seriously jeopardize the further technology develop-
ment. Such bottlenecks are commonly referred to as “valleys of death” in
which technologies “die” due to underinvestment. Such valleys of death are
particularly likely to occur in the post-lab but pre-market stages. Moving
them from the lab to a full scale demonstration project can get very capital
intense technologies, and public funding – which often funds early research
gets scarcer at this stage. When this challenge is managed, scaling up for
full commercialization becomes the next challenge – when they get capital
requirements get to high for early stage investors but the technology risk is
still unacceptably high for most institutional investors with suitable capacity.
2.4 Search on the Technology Landscape
Before being able to discuss investment decisions in the development of novel
technologies, we are in need of a framework which defines the mechanisms
on how the search for technology development is conducted, and provides
metrics for the rate and direction of technological progress and its profitabil-
ity for investors.
The concept of “fitness landscapes” has proven useful to map and analyze
selection processes as stochastic combinatory optimization in complex sys-
tems; in this case, how technological change by the way technologies within
a larger technological systems are related to each others. In its core, such
a landscape represents a multidimensional mapping of components with at-
tributed states of solution parameters to some measure of performance rep-
resenting an elements fitness (Kauffman, 1993). In this fitness dimension,
the landscape shows high performance “peaks” as well as low performance
“valleys”, where the peaks can be understood as the “evolutionary frontier” –
the highest reachable level of a certain evolutionary path with respect to rele-
vant environmental conditions. In the classical model proposed by Kauffman
(1993), biological evolution of complex organisms, in which the functioning
of genes is interdependent, has been analyzed as “hill-climbing” activity on
NK fitness landscapes through random mutation and natural selection. Since
the components are epistatically related, their fitness depends not only on
their own states but also the “interaction” with their neighbors. The systems
complexity is determined by the number of its components and their degree
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of epistasis, and manifests in the “ruggedness” of the landscape (Levinthal,
1997). Simple systems, with a small set of components and/or low epistatic
relations among them, correspond to smooth landscapes with a few evenly
distributed peaks, whereas a complex ones corresponds to a landscape with
many unevenly distributed peaks of varying height. A main insight de-
rived from such models is the efficiency of different evolutionary processes.
With increasing complexity and associated ruggedness of the landscape, it
becomes more and more unlikely that pure local selection will lead to glob-
ally optimal outcomes, but rather to a lock-in into locally optimal evolutionary
pockets.
This evolutionary metaphor has also been adopted to mimic research
strategies of firms, concluding that with increasing complexity of the tech-
nological/scientific paradigm one is operating in, the more important be-
come exploration oriented research strategies in contrast to local incremental
exploitation of already existing solutions (March, 1991). It is further high-
lighted that increasing interdependence between technologies makes it very
hard to integrate them in existing systems (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). In-
deed, modern technological systems appear to develop towards increasing
epistasis, making outcomes of re-combinatory processes such as R&D activ-
ities harder to predict. In order to understand innovation activity in many
technological fields, it thus becomes important to understand the dynam-
ics of these recombination which happen on large scale and with increasing
pace. In the current energy system, for instance, the successful development
of potential new energy sources is highly dependent on how their charac-
teristics such as their load fluctuation profiles interact with existing energy
production, transmission, and storage infrastructure. Consequently, the ex-
ante prediction of research outcome in this area appears to be impossible
without immense technological knowledge, a fact that daunts many financial
agents to invest in emerging renewable energy technologies (Kenney, 2011).
2.5 Investments in Technological Change
In line with Schumpeter’s entrepreneur-banker duality, attempts to search
for technological improvement conducted by research agents can only be
realized if able to attract an investment by a financial agent (ii.). In other
words, one can envision financial agents to “unlock” potential inventions to
be transformed to innovations in technology space. To make such an invest-
ment happen, three necessary conditions have to be fulfilled.
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First, the financial agent has to be aware of the investment opportunity of-
fered by the innovation project. Assuming the market for technology invest-
ments to be imperfect and necessary information often private and opaque,
this will not always be the case but rather depend on the outcome of active
search of financing agents for investment opportunities, or by researching
agents for investors. The radius of this search will obviously face some con-
straints, which could be geographical, cultural, institutional, or technological,
where we in the ongoing focus on the latter. We assume investors depend-
ing on their competence profile and investment history to be closer related
to particular (more or less narrow) technologies, where insider knowledge
and contacts eases the search for investment opportunities. In the same way,
financial agents operating in a certain area of the technology space enjoying
higher visibility and probably status among research agents, are thus more
likely to be approached by them for funding. As illustration, one can imagine
investors to observe the technology landscape with a birds-eye perspective as
in figure ??.
Second, the financial agent has to be sufficiently endowed with capital
required by the project. This investment capacity greatly varies among finan-
cial agents. While investors such as business angels, who fund their activity
with private wealth, tend to be rather constraint in the amount of capital they
can mobilize, large investments banks often easily stem multi-billion deals.
Third, the financial agent has to assess the investment as potentially prof-
itable. Generally, it is well understood in investment theory that the primary
rational of financial agents’ investment allocation is to maximize their risk
adjusted rate of return from their capital under management. This is tradi-
tionally done by summing the profits of possible outcome scenarios weighted
by their profitability, in the simplest form as stylized in equation F.1:
Πi(pii, ϕi) =
n
∑
i=1
piiϕi
N
(F.1)
where pii is the expected rate of return (which can be positive or negative)
achieved in scenario i, and ϕi its probability. In case of a symmetric unimodal
distribution of outcomes, the average rate of return is to be found at the prob-
ability density function’s maximum (ϕ′i(pii) = 0). Obviously, fat tails on the
left (loss) side of the distribution associated with higher risks of the invest-
ment also require equally high weights on the right (gain) side to maintain
a certain average rate of return.5 When assuming financial agents per se to
5This is true for equity based investments, where the investors equally participate in losses as
well as benefits. For debt based finance of innovation projects, only the left tail of the distribution
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be risk averse, for equal average rates of return they prefer investments with
lower variance in outcome (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964).6
Most of the discussion up to now conceptualizes modern financial inter-
mediaries as Schumpeter’s “reckless bankers”, willing to risk it all in prospect
of potential extraordinary gains. In contrast, traditional investors such as
commercial banks are said to be risk averse and thus more prone to invest
in mature technologies not subject to the “liability of newness”. With chang-
ing the typical firm populations characteristics during the technology and
industry life-cycle, this goes hand in hand with a natural separation of firms
that receive such investments; entrepreneurial start-ups, in the case of early
stage investors, and established SME’s and MNE’s in the case of late stage
investors. Again, the main mechanisms that create this separation are id-
iosyncratic risk preferences among financial agents. We, however, propose
a different mechanism attained by disentangling (systemic) risk and uncer-
tainty components of investments.
Πi(pii, ϕi) =
n
∑
i=1
piiϕi
N
(1− var(pii)αk) (F.2)
where αk would represent the risk preferences of financial agent k. The
heterogeneity of this parameter leads to a separation of investors in Schum-
peterian risk-takers such as business angels or venture capitalists investing in
emerging technologies, and traditional risk-avoiding investors such as banks
investing in mature technologies in late stages of their life-cycle. By disentan-
gling risk and uncertainty components of investments, we suggest a different
mechanism to be at work. While we assume the risk of an investment to be
objectively measurable by all financial agents, its uncertainty is based on a
subjective evaluation under bounded rationality, thus heterogeneous among
investors (Knight, 1921). In contrast to risk, uncertainty implies that nei-
ther the probability of different outcome states, nor the characteristics of this
states can be ex-ante quantified. For investments in emerging technologies,
we attribute this inability primarily to the financial agent’s incomplete infor-
mation regarding the technology’s characteristics and interaction with other
elements of the present technological system.
Financial agents involved in investment decisions under uncertainty basi-
cally can react in two ways. They might specialize on investments in a lim-
matters, since investors participate in partial or total default of the loan but the returns are
truncated by the ex-ante agreed interest rate in case of success. Therefore, the mostly fixed
interest rate has to capture all potential losses.
6Which holds on average in most settings, yet some situation and personal characteristics
might lead to an active “risk taking” behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
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ited set of well-understood technologies to accumulate specific information
improving their ability to forecast future developments and thereby identify
investments with possible abnormal profits. Consequently, an informed in-
vestor able to identify future profitable development scenarios will be more
likely to undertake objectively risky investments in emerging technologies
than others. As an alternative to decreasing the uncertainty of particular tech-
nologies, financial agents might also decrease the overall risk/uncertainty
of their investment portfolio by cross-sectional diversification across tech-
nologies (King and Levine, 1993). Obviously, broadly diversified financial
agents investing in various technologies have little opportunities to accu-
mulate technology-specific knowledge and thereby increase their forecasting
ability. Without an insight of the technology’s potential upsides, such in-
vestors’ risk-return evaluation will therefore naturally be more sensitive to
generic risks associated with emerging technologies “liability of newness”
and favor technologically mature alternatives. To sum up, we suggest the
decision to invest in more risky emerging technologies to be a function of the
investor specific forecasting ability rather than explicit or implicit risk pref-
erences. We here assume a trade-off between depth and breadth of search.
Agents able to invest in a broad set of different technologies will suffer from
limited forecasting capabilities, and vice versa.
In addition to internally accumulating technological knowledge, finan-
cial agents also use their network to access external information of their
cooperation partners. However, establishing and maintaining relationships
to other agents usually comes with a cost, so agents will not indefinitely ex-
pand their network beyond a certain beneficial size to get access to even more
information. Furthermore, when information is distributed asymmetrically
between agents, the less informed ones have to find ways to verify the credi-
bility of signals received from their supposedly better informed peers. When
discussing the assumed trade-off between broad access to external informa-
tion and its verification, arguments of particular network structures are often
brought forward – in particular the benefits of brokerage versus closure. In
essence, it is argued that brokering a relation between actors that would oth-
erwise be unconnected, also refereed to as structural holes, provides informa-
tion advantages in terms of access to a diverse set of novel information (Burt,
1992, 2001). In contrast, being embedded in closed – rather than brokered –
network structures facilitates the exchange of in-depth information through
frequent, trust-based interactions among interconnected actors (Uzzi, 1996,
1997). Another stream of research focuses on the characteristics agents in
a network rather than its structure, arguing that belonging to a network of
273
Paper F.
rather homogeneous agents provides access to in-depth, specialist informa-
tion, whereas being embedded in networks of rather heterogeneous agents is
a source to diverse information (Fleming et al., 2007; Reagans and McEvily,
2003). We aim to contribute to the latter discussion. While we generally ex-
pect a positive effect of networking vis-à-vis agents investing in isolation, we
investigate which distribution of actor characteristics within this networks -
more homogeneous or heterogeneous - is more conducive for technological
change.
We consider three relevant characteristics of financial agents, (i.) their
position in the technology landscape reflecting the core of their knowledge
base, (ii.) their degree of specialization and the resulting search radius and
forecasting ability, and (iii.) their capital endowment determining their in-
vestment capacity.
3 The Model
3.1 Landscape and initial conditions
First, we create a one-dimensional fitness landscape representing the space
of a technological system, where different technology configurations are or-
dered according to their relatedness on the x-axis, and the particular config-
uration’s fitness ( f (x), x ∈ R) on the y-axis. Due to this ordering of tech-
nologies, we assume the associated fitness to be a continuous function with
several local minima representing low performance valleys and maxima rep-
resenting high performance peaks. A fitness landscape is appropiately de-
scribed by a Gaussian mixture, that is to say, a density function of a random
variable obtained as a weighted sum of several Gaussian distributions with
different means and different standard deviations. The number of distribu-
tions in the mixture is not equivalent to the number of peaks, but a mixture
of a high number of distributions will result in a rugged landscape, while
a mixture of few distributions will give a flatter, less complex landscape, as
illustrated in figure F.3.
Technological progress here is associated with improving technology con-
figurations in order to increase a technology’s current fitness level. The
distance from a local minimum towards the closest local optimum can be
envisioned as a certain technological trajectory, and the process of gradual
improvement over time towards this optimum as a technology’s life-cycle.
Consequently, at a local optimum a technology has reached full maturity and
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(a) 10 Gaussian Mixtures (b) 25 Gaussian Mixtures
(c) 50 Gaussian Mixtures
Fig. F.3: Different technology landscapes with 10, 25, 50 Gaussian Mixtures
exhausted its trajectory, leaving no potential for further innovation.7 Note
that the same local peak can be discovered from two directions, where the
corresponding local valleys can have different heights in the landscape. This
is an intuitive feature, as two different trajectories can lead to the same final
technology configuration (peak), although one in a more efficient way from a
better starting point.
When research agents (which could be firms, research groups, or indi-
viduals) attempt to improve certain technologies, this attempt appears as a
potential innovation project k on the landscape. Its position xk represents the
7While a technology life-cycle is usually linked to an industry life-cycle, it is not necessarily
synchronized. Thus, even when a technological trajectory becomes exhausted, industries can
still progress by altering their logic in terms what and how they produce it. However, therefore
they have to enter new technological trajectories. Further, an exhaustive technology can still be
commercially viable and attract investments in its deployment. It, however, does not leave room
for further technological improvement.
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project’s initial technological configuration as basis for the further search for
improvement. Together, the potential innovation projects form the choiceset
χ which includes all possible technology investment in a certain technolog-
ical system. For the sake of simplicity, we assume analytic orthogonality of
agents’ behavior in research space, the amount and position of innovation
projects in χ is given exogenous.
The population of financial agents i are also positioned on the fitness
landscape. Here, pi, represents their locus of technological expertise. To cope
with various issues of incomplete and asymmetric information – as well as
limited forecasting capabilities – investors tend to specialize on investments
in certain technologies, industries, investment types or stages, geographical
regions et cetera. Consequently their own search strategy, visibility among
potential investment targets and their networks, tends to concentrate along
this specialization. The degree of specialization is determined by their search
radius ri. Low ri indicate a very narrow specialization on certain technology
investments, and high ri a more broad and diversified investment activity.
Related to this search radius, the forecasting ability hi determines the finan-
cial agent’s capabilities of predicting the further development of technologies.
A financial agent with a high forecasting ability will be able to see the local
peaks of a technology’s trajectory, while one with a low forecasting ability
will likely see only a small section of the technology’s way to the peak. We
assume a trade-off between forecasting ability and search radius in a way
that agents with high search radius act as generalists and can spot potential
investments in technologies in a broad area of the landscape, but have very
limited insight in its nature and thus future development. Technology spe-
cialists on the other hand, invest only in a small area of the landscape but
have a deeper understanding and more high quality information, hence can
accurately predict the technology’s future potential. Furthermore, a financial
agent will have a better understanding of technologies close to its own posi-
tion in the technology space, thus the forecasting ability decreases with the
distance to the potential investment.
Finally, financial agents differ in their capital endowment ei, which deter-
mines the amount they are able to invest per round in an innovation project.
This endowment, proportional to the degree of specialization – as generalist
financial agents tend to have – together with higher search radius and lower
forecasting abilities, gives a better access to capital than technology special-
ists.
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3.2 Investors landscape scanning
As a first necessary condition for an investment to take place, an investor
has to spot an investment opportunity represented by the innovation project
at all. To illustrate this process of scanning the market for potential invest-
ment targets, one can imagine investors to observe the technology landscape
with a birds-eye perspective. Assuming the market for information on new
technology investments to be imperfect, an investor’s choice-set χi of poten-
tial investment targets will be limited and not contain all possible options of
existing investment-ready solutions k in technology space χ. Investors may
gather information on potential investments via active own search, active
signals from the investment target, or referrals from their network. We here
focus on the former and introduce the latter at a later point. For the mo-
ment we shall just care if the investment opportunity falls into the investor’s
choice-set χi or not, which depends on the project’s position xk, the finan-
cial agents position xi and search radius ri, as illustrated in figure ?? and
formalized in equation F.3
χi ⊆ χ where : xi − ri ≤ xk ≤ xi + ri (F.3)
Fig. F.4: Investors view on the technology landscape
Investor space
Technology space
(fitness landscape)
Research space
i1 i2 … in
k1 k2 … km
r1 rn
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3.3 Investment Decision
After a financial agent’s choice set χi is defined, the agent evaluates the prof-
itability of potential investments and chooses the most attractive one. We
assume agents to primarily aim to maximize the risk-adjusted returns on in-
vestments (Πki ) by selecting among potential targets k, as stated in equation
F.4:
arg max
k∈χi
[Πki (pi
k
i , ρ
k
i , c
k
i ) =
piki (1− ρki )− cki
cki
where : cki ≤ ei] (F.4)
where piki represents the net gains of an investment in case of success, ρ
k
i
the probability of failure, and cki the investments costs. The gains of such an
investment (piki ) in reality are supposed to be a function of many variables
such as product and capital market condition, project/team/firm character-
istics, value added by the investor, and the technological potential of the in-
vention. In this model we focus solely on the latter and assume the others as
randomly distributed among available inventions. Hence, piki only depends
on the post-investment fitness of the innovation project, and the achieved
increase in fitness by the investment.
The costs of an investment (cki ) are here approximated with the maturity
of the technology, where early stage technologies are associated with low
and mature technologies with high capital intensity. The cost of moving a
technology from its original position xk to a new position yk in the technology
space depends on the relative height of those positions in the technology
landscape, specifically the height of the local maximum, xk, and the local
minimum, xk.
cki =
∫ yk
xk
(
x− xk
xk − xk )
2dx
=
f (yk)− f (xk))3 − ( f (xk)− f (xk))3
3 ∗ ( f (xk)− f (xk))2
(F.5)
The costs representing the amount a financial agent is capable and willing
to invest - and related, the gains depending on the size of the investment -
in an innovation project are limited by two factors. The maximum amount of
the investment cannot exceed the financial agents endowment (ei) per period.
Net gains (in case of success) increase non-linear with achieved fitness
level f xk2 and increase of fitness level ∆ f x
k
1→2
Net gains : piki = c
k
i ∗ (1+ f xk2) ∗ (1+ ∆ f xk1→2) (F.6)
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Further, the investment size is also limited by the financial agent’s capa-
bilities to forecast the technology’s further development. A long tradition of
research on behavioral finance tells us that such an assessment is less of an
objective optimization process by fully rational agents, but rather a heuristic
one by agents acting under “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1955). A major
argument rests on the lack of and unequal distribution of information. The
innovation process is inherently characterized by uncertainty Dosi and Ors-
enigo (1988), making proper predictions per se impossible. Private informa-
tion on the side of the developers of an innovation project further results in
asymmetric information, leading to the principal-agent problems (Myers and
Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As discussed exhaustively, one strat-
egy of financial agents to mitigate incomplete information issues is to spe-
cialize on a particular subset of investments. To capture such specialization
effects, we approximate the extent of a technology’s development assessable
by an financial agent as in Equation F.7.
hi = (ri ∗ |xi − xk|)−1 (F.7)
In addition to the potential gains, investors also care about the risk as-
sociated with potential investments, a fact that is well established in finance
(Hain and Christensen, 2014) literature, but somewhat neglected in literature
on technological change as well as policy making (Dinica, 2006). From a
financial agent’s perspective, investing in innovation is related with higher
risk and uncertainty (Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988) leading to a higher variance
of returns. The risks investors commonly consider are related to the (i.)
firm/project invested in, (ii.) policies that might influence it, (iii.) the market
it sells in, and (iv.) the technology deployed. Where the first is specific to
the investment, the latter are systemic. Again, we assume invention-specific
variables to be randomly distributed among investments and focus on the
investors evaluation of technology risk. As a simple rule, investors will re-
quire higher returns for riskier investments in order to maintain a certain
level of average returns.8 Consequently, the expected gains are weighted by
their probability of success (1− ρki ). This can be the result of a single gain
and its probability in case of “win all or loose all” situations, or the scalar
product over a variety of possible scenarios. For the sake of simplicity, we fo-
cus on the latter. We assume a technology’s risk and associated probability of
failure (ρk) to be very high for emerging technologies in early stages of their
8Which holds on average in most settings, yet some situation and personal characteristics
might lead to an active “risk taking” behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and other forms
of non-linear risk preferences.
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life-cycle, while gradually decreasing when a technology matures. Hence, in
the local minimum xk, ρk = 1; in the local maximum xk, ρk = 0; in between,
it increases exponentially, as illustrated in Equation F.8.
ρk = (
x− xk
xk − xk )
2 (F.8)
3.4 Investor Network effect
After developing a simple model of investments in developing technologies,
including investor heterogeneity, limited search radius for investments, and
limited technology forecasting capabilities, we now introduce network effects
and briefly discuss resulting changes in individual and aggregated invest-
ments with respect to their amount and the resulting technological change.
Such networks among financial agents can fulfill different purposes, reaching
from pure information sharing to cross/lending or co/investment networks,
where we shall focus on the latter one.9 Among professional financiers, the
joint investment in the same target, called “syndication”, is common practice.
Rationales to engage in syndicated rather that stand-alone investments are (i.)
increased deal-flow, (ii.) capital-pooling, (iii.) risk-sharing, (iv.) superior joint
selection of investments, (v.) reciprocity and social reasons pertaining to net-
work position,(vi.) portfolio diversification, and (vii.) synergies in investment
value-adding (Lerner, 1994). Again, we will focus on the first three rationales,
and discuss possible modifications to include the latter ones.
Therefore, we introduce an adjacency matrix Ω = (Ωij)i,j representing a
co-investment network among financial agents, where every agent has a set
of neighbors Ωi.
When selecting the most profitable investment k, the financial agents now
consider investments in their choice set χi carried out on their own or in a
syndicate together with a co-investor j in their ego-network Ωi. If a joint
investment, for reasons we discuss later, turns out to be the most profitable
one, agent i will invite j to join. In such co-investments, the joint capital
endowment (ei,j) and forecasting capability (hki,j) are calculated as follows:
ei,j = λ · ei + (1− λ) · ej (F.9)
hki,j = λ · hki + (1− λ) · hkj (F.10)
9However, an alternative model allowing for only information sharing regarding potential
investments could be easily done with some minor modifications
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cki = λ · cki,j; ckj = (1− λ) · cki,j (F.11)
piki = λ · piki,j; pikj = (1− λ) · piki,j (F.12)
However, in such syndicated investments, also asymmetric information
and moral hazard issues arise. In cases when hki > h
k
j , investor i has an
advantage in the evaluation of the technology’s potential compared to his
co-investor j, which only can trust i’s assessment. The trust the investor
with lesser information has in the evaluation of his better informed peer will
depend on the relationship between both, ranging in a continuum from no
(hki,j = arg max[h
k
i , h
k
j ]) to full trust (hi,j = arg min[h
k
i , h
k
j ]). The level of trust
here is represented by the parameter λ. In our simulations, λ takes the value
0.5, representing an average level of trust.
In this model, three rationales for syndication emerge. First, by capital
pooling, financial agents now are able to jointly carry out huge investments
which they otherwise could not stem on their own. Second, agents can ben-
efit from teaming up with partners with superior forecasting capabilities in
the particular technology to get financed. Third, they can also benefit from
increased deal-flows, since their network partners might invite them to oth-
erwise inaccessible investment opportunities.10
3.5 Timing: The Investment Process
The investment process is timed discretely. At the beginning of every round,
financial agents consider their choice sets χi of potential investment targets,
containing the technologies that they can spot depending on their position in
the technology space and their search radius. They estimate the risk-adjusted
returns on investments, both on their own (Πki ) or in a syndicate together with
a co-investor j in their ego-network Ωi (Πki,j). The investment that yields the
higher risk-adjusted return is the one that is made. If the technological devel-
opment fails, which happens with probability ρk, the technology remains at
its original position in the technology space. If it succeeds (with probability
1− ρk), the technology develops to its new position in the technology space,
climbing the fitness landscape towards the local maximum. This process is
repeated until no profitable investments remain available. A visualization of
an exemplary investment process to illustrate the logic can be found in figure
F.8 in the appendix.
10We assume a unilateral initiative by investor i, where co-investor j automatically joins all
invited investments which offer a positive risk adjusted rate of return.
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4 Results
To put our theoretical framework and its mathematical mechanisms to a test,
we ran a set of Monte Carlo simulations on different investor network struc-
tures and technology landscape complexity. Here, we ran 20 Monte Carlo
simulations for 50 different landscapes, which are constructed using from 1
to 50 Gaussian mixtures to test the effects of increasing technological com-
plexity (represented by an increasing ruggedness of the landscape by adding
more Gaussian Mixtures) in investment activity. We do that in four different
settings where financial agents are: (i.) unconnected who can only invest
on their own, (ii.) connected in a heterogeneous (random) network, (iii.)
connected with a tendency to be homogeneous in search radius, and (iv.)
connected with a tendency to be homogeneous in position. We therefore cre-
ate possible co-investment and information-sharing links between investors
with a certain probability, which is in case (ii.) equal for all other agents, in
cases (ii.) and (iv.) increasing in similarity of search radius or position in
the landscape. We thereby want to mimic the potential tendency of financial
agents to establish partnerships either with partners on a similar level of spe-
cialization (separation between generalists and specialists) or a similar locus
of competences (clustering of investors in technology space).
We construct the different networks in the following way. In the heteroge-
nous network all pairs of investors have an equal probability of being tied by
a collaboration, which is in our case 0.5, leading also to a network with the
density of 0.5. In the network homogeneous in position, this probability is
weighted by the distance between the investors in the technology space. In
the network homogeneous in searching radius, this probability is weighted
by the absolute difference between their searching radius. The networks are
computed in the following way: we start with a matrix of random numbers
from a U[0, 1] distribution. For the homogeneous in position (search radius)
network, we multiply every entry Ai,j of the matrix by the distance between
the positions (search radius) of the corresponding investors, |xi− xj| (|ri− rj|).
For the resulting matrix, the lowest half of the entries are transformed into
ones, and the highest half are turned into zeros. Thus, two investors with
similar positions in the landscape (search radius) are likely to be connected
in the homogeneous in positions (search radius) network, while the hetero-
geneous network is a poisson network.
For all four network constellations, we ran 50 Monte Carlo simulations
per technology landscape (of which we also have 25, constructed out of 1-25
Gaussian mixtures).
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In figure F.5 we plot the development of aggregated expected benefits
(sum of all investors’ expected profits during the investment process as an
average of all MC runs on one landscape) with increasing technological com-
plexity. The expected profits can be seen as a measure of performance of
financial agents, determining the survival and future investment capacity of
the population. As expected, all constellations of networked agents outper-
form the unconnected ones. In relative terms, this gap increases with techno-
logical complexity. Among the different network constellations, the investor
networks homogeneous in search radius in all cases perform worse, while the
ones homogeneous in position mostly outperform the rest. A direct impli-
cation thereof is that investors should not exclusively strive for establishing
networks among other investors of a similar type (bank with bank, VC with
VC), but rather aim for building a heterogeneous network. There, best re-
sults are achieved with co-investors with a close locus of their knowledge
base, where synergies of endowment and forecasting capabilities can be uti-
lized most effectively.
In the following figure F.6 we plot the number of technological peaks
discovered (meaning technologies brought to their full extent of maturity),
representing a measure of technological diversity created. There we again see
a tendency of networked agent populations to outperform isolated ones, even
though the results among the different constellations are more ambiguous.
Finally, in figure F.7 we plot the aggregated amount of technological fit-
ness improvements achieved by the investments, representing a measure of
the overall rate of technological change. Again, networked agents tend to
outperform isolated ones in financing technological change, where again the
constellations homogeneous in position do best in most cases. Interestingly,
networks homogeneous in search radius perform almost as weak as isolated
agents – in some cases even worse. This contrasts previous findings, where
all network constellations enjoyed some benefits: in terms of technological
change some networks might indeed cause more harm than good. These re-
sults resembled the empirical findings of Hain and Jurowetzki (ming), who
investigate the impact of different network constellations in public funded
R&D projects in danish smart-grid research and suggest networks strongly
controlled by incumbent actors to direct the research in more incremental
trajectories. In the same way, syndicated high endowment/low forecasting
investors enjoy little cooperation benefits from pooling their low forecast-
ing capability, but pooling their endowment leads to a large expansion of
investment capacity. Further, with their high joined search radius they are
jointly able to cover large parts of the landscape. Yet, their little depth of
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technological knowledge will make them even more likely to prefer capi-
tal intensive investments in mature technology at the end of their life-cycle.
Consequently, even with high overall investments, such networks will mainly
channel resources into incremental innovation and neglect promising early
stage technologies. This finding leads to immediate policy implications, sug-
gesting that large investor “cartels” of big players should be considered very
critically, while co-investments between high endowment investors, such as
large investment banks, and specialized technology investors, such as venture
capitalists, have the potential to accelerate technological change.
Our overall results indeed indicate networked investor population to out-
perform isolated investor performance, an effect that tends to increase with
complexity of the technology landscape. We also find heterogeneous net-
works to show a tendency to outperform other network configurations in
more complex settings. Both findings appear more pronounced for overall
investment activity than for the financial agents profits. In line with innova-
tion system literature, these results suggest that in modern complex techno-
logical system, heterogeneous networks, in this case among investors, appear
to be the most conductive environment for innovation to thrive. Yet, they
also suggest that heterogeneity not in all cases leads to benefits, and that
homogeneity sometimes even slows down technological change.
5 Conclusion & Avenues for Future Research
In this paper we presented an agent-based simulation model of technology
investment by heterogeneous and interacting financial agents. Investment
decisions are explained by the topology of the technology landscape, the
agents’ capability to receive and interpret incomplete landscape information,
and their investment capacity. We thereby aim to explain the complex rela-
tionship between investor behavior, technology characteristics, and techno-
logical change. We first focused on the general impact of different investor
populations and network structures on the rate and direction of technological
change, given a particular topology of the technology landscape.
We envision technological change primarily as the outcome of micro-level
activities between agents conducting research and development (i.), and fi-
nancial agents providing the capital to do so (ii.). In detail, we aim to explain
investment decisions of heterogeneous financial agents with incomplete in-
formation regarding investment opportunities as well as their technological
potential. The outcome of such search and investment processes - techno-
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logical change - manifests in a realized reconfiguration of components in a
complex technological system consisting of interrelated components.
Assuming analytical orthogonality between these dimensions in the short
run, we attempted to formalize heterogeneous investors decision process
under uncertainty and incomplete information in given innovation projects.
We explain this micro-decision and the macro-implication for technological
change as depending on the topology of the technology landscape, the struc-
ture and composition of the investors network, their position in technological
space and degree of specialization. We are particularly interested in which
network structures and compositions lead to the high rates of technological
change and diversity.
The results from a Monte Carlo simulation on different investor network
structures and technology landscape complexity indeed indicate networked
investor population to outperform isolated investor performance, an effect
that tends to increase with complexity of the technology landscape.
Our general attempt is to provide a more nuanced understanding of the
interplay between technology characteristics and decision making processes
of bounded rational investors and emerging characteristics of a technological
system. We thereby contribute to literature on technological change as well
as financial and investment theory by establishing an analytical link between
them. We are also convinced that this model provides a solid basis for simu-
lations to be done, enabling them to derive important implications for theory
and practice. For policy making, it provides the potential to analyze real
life investor populations and, based on the results, facilitating technological
change by policies aiming to reconfigure investor network structures or by
targeted public funding in problem areas.
Up to now, we made a set of simplifying strong assumptions. Yet, the pro-
vided model calls for further extensions to provide a more nuanced picture,
thereby offering plenty of fruitful avenues for future research.
First, financial agents make their assessment only based on perceived
technological potential of innovation projects, independent of associated re-
search agents characteristics. In reality, such characteristics as the capabilities
of an entrepreneur or management team, the financial stability of a firm et
cetera obviously matter (Hain and Christensen, 2014). For the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume such characteristics to be randomly distributed among
research agents. However, scenarios where financial agents show preferences
for certain states of such characteristics (firm size, age, balance sheet facts)
which are unevenly distributed on the landscape might also offer interesting
insights. Among others, it could explain why some sectors with particular
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characteristic mismatches are very unsuccessful in obtaining finance in spite
of great technological opportunities. In the same way, relationships between
research and financial agents might very well influence allocation decisions
(Uzzi, 1999), in a way that former successful investments between the same
pair of agents lead to the formation of relational trust and therefore prefer-
ences towards projects carried out by there research agents.
Another possible extension would be endogenous change of the agents’
networks. For instance, financial agents could be allowed to reconfigure their
ego-network in order to increase their short- or long-term returns. Such a
model could possibly explain the path-dependent concentration of invest-
ments in certain technologies, either because they are initially very profitable
and thus many financial agents establish connections to “investment experts”
in that sector, or because the financial agents operating in this sector are ini-
tially well connected and thus can mobilize large investments. In the same
way, research agents could reconfigure their networks for various reasons. In
the former sections we already provided an overview as to how research net-
works might develop differently depending on industry characteristics (eg.
Hain et al., 2014), the agents strategies (eg. Hain and Jurowetzki, ming), or
the expected cooperation performance (eg. Balland et al., 2012). These mech-
anisms could also be used to explain the endogeneous formation of research
networks with respect to the agent’s technological competences and the as-
sociated fitness of the technology, and financial constraints.
In such a model of endogenous technological change, the agents’ learn-
ing should also be included in different ways. One could be that investors
are able to gradually update their position on the landscape after personal
or observed successful investments. Alternatively, former investments could
improve the search radius and/or forecasting capability. Both mechanisms
might over time lead to situations where the attention of financial agents
concentrates in particular on the past successful areas of the technology land-
scape.
All these extensions demonstrate the potential of an integrated framework
of technological change based on the network topology within and between
investor, research, and technology space to reproduce stylized facts and gain
insights in the mechanisms creating them. However, while the reproduc-
tion of such stylized facts can to some extent be used to verify the proposed
mechanisms, if possible one should strive for empirical verification (Pyka
and Fagiolo, 2005) with real world data. Further, to use models not only
as a descriptive but also predictive tool supporting future decision making,
the mechanisms have to be measurable with available data. For the present
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framework, we indeed encounter measurement challenges in investor, re-
search, and technology space, which we will briefly discuss now, and point
towards possible solutions. Generally, network analysis is very sensitive to
missing data, hence removing some important agents (nodes) or their connec-
tion (edges) in some cases dramatically alters the topology of the resulting
network. This problem amplifies in dynamic complex systems, which are
usually very sensitive to initial conditions. Consequently, modeling the com-
plex dynamics of large networks per se has a high standard regarding the data
serving as input.
In financial space, there exists, besides large scale surveys (which often
suffer from missing data), very little possibilities to measure more informal
networks of information sharing among investors. However, we do have
well documented global data on all kind of equity investments from vari-
ous commercial databases – including detailed information on all involved
investors and the investment target, which can be used to construct fairly
reliable historical co-investment networks. Yet, this is only the case for equity
investments, such as venture capital, private equity, management-buyouts,
and mergers & acquisitions. While equity investors play an important role in
financing early stage innovation projects and entrepreneurship, their impact
differs across countries and industries. This calls for caution when generaliz-
ing insights offered by models based on such data.
In technology space, there exist some possible ways to delineate tech-
nological systems, identify entities, map their relationships and development
over time. Commonly, this is done by exploiting patent data or scientific pub-
lications (eg. Fontana et al., 2009; Verspagen, 2007) and their citation pattern.
Jurowetzki and Hain (2014) take a different approach by leveraging modern
advances in natural language processing and the availability of large amounts
of technology related online text. Using entity extraction techniques, they
identify technology terms across documents, connect them by their weighted
co-occurrence in this documents, and cluster them to technological fields with
dynamic community detection methods. To evaluate the “fitness” of identi-
fied technologies, Fleming and Sorenson (2001) use forward-citations a patent
embodying a certain technology combination receives. While this methodol-
ogy appears appropriate for empirical hypothesis testing and model verifi-
cation, a long time-lag between the appearance of a technology-combination
and the availability of data limits its potential as input for predictive models.
Further, it only provides data on revealed technological fitness of realized
technology combinations, not potential fitness of unexplored alternatives.
Consequently, to make fitness landscapes and their application in the pre-
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sented framework a powerful forecasting tool, there is still a lot of work to be
done to find ways to construct more complete landscapes based on available
real world data.
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Fig. F.5: Monte Carlo simulation results on different financial agent networks and technology
landscapes - Expected profits
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Fig. F.6: Monte Carlo simulation results on different financial agent networks and technology
landscapes - Number of technology peaks discovered
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Fig. F.7: Monte Carlo simulation results on different financial agent networks and technology
landscapes - Aggregated technological change
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Appendix
(a) Period 1.0 - Initial
Landscape
(b) Period 1.1 - In-
vestors exp. Returns
(c) Period 1.2 - Invest-
ment choice, reposi-
tioning
(d) Period 1.0 - Initial
Landscape
(e) Period 1.1 - In-
vestors exp. Returns
(f) Period 1.2 - Invest-
ment choice, reposi-
tioning
Fig. F.8: Illustration of a 4 stage investment process, 2 rounds
This figure illustrates an investment process at 2 exemplary investment rounds. Period .0 illustrates an investment rounds initial conditions, where
investors as well as innovation projects representing possible investment opportunities are placed on the landscape. The colored lines below the investors
illustrate their search radius, determining which potential innovation projects are visible in their choiceset. In period .1, an investor is randomly selected
and assesses the available projects regarding their expected risk adjusted rate of return. In period .2, the investors project of choice (with the highest
returns) is (in case of success) moved to its new position on the technology landscape.
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This Ph.D. thesis explores the complex interplay between finance and tech-
nological change. The duality between finance and technological change 
has long been recognized as a main driving force behind capitalist dynam-
ics and economic progress. I investigate how interaction and cooperation 
pattern among and between investors and innovators influence the rate and 
direction of technological change with respect to the characteristics of the 
technological system in which this change happens.
I provide evidence how network structures among investors - and with inno-
vators - greatly influence the rate and direction of technological change, and 
how this influence varies with respect to different characteristics of techno-
logical systems. I thereby identify how investors via interaction and coop-
eration alleviate barriers associated with investments in innovation in com-
plex technological systems - such as uncertainty, asymmetric and imperfect 
information, and bounded rationality. Further, I also demonstrate how tar-
geted investments in technological change are able to influence the network 
structure among firms and rindividuals envolved in the innovation process. I 
thereby provide direct policy implications on how to facilitate the emergence 
of network structures among innovators and investors which are conducive 
for a certain desired rate and direction of technological change.
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